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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
 
As part of a Naval Postgraduate School’s capstone project in Systems 
Engineering, a project team from cohort 311-081 performed a Systems Engineering 
analysis of an Advanced Sea Base Enabler (ASE). The focus of the effort was on a 
systems engineering analysis for the Concept Development stage of acquisition. The team 
performed a simplified ASE AoA that culminated in recommended alternatives for 
specific mission types. 
The functional requirements needed to support an ASE capability for several 
specific operational scenarios were considered. The initial operational scenarios were 
Major Combat Operation, Police Enforcement Operation, Natural Disaster Relief, and 
Humanitarian Aid. The scenarios were down selected to two missions, Major Combat 
Operation and the Humanitarian Aid, for the final decision analysis as these two missions 
bracketed the other two and covered the major mission features being analyzed.  
An iterative Systems Engineering process of Formulation, Analysis and 
Interpretation was utilized.  Existing or planned alternative systems were researched and 
the focus of effort was on collection, analysis and validation of operational requirements, 
functional analysis based on the operational requirements, consideration of possible 
alternatives compared to the collected requirements, prioritizing the alternatives based on 
stakeholder priorities and selection and documentation of a preferred alternative.  Many 
stakeholders were identified and requirements information collected from them through a 
series of meetings, phone calls and email exchanges. Based on the requirements a 
functional decomposition and a value hierarchy were developed and used in development 
of evaluation criteria for the ASE alternatives. Three top level functions that an ASE 
must be capable of performing were identified: Deploy ASE, Process Cargo and 
Transport Cargo. These functions cover the essential ASE requirements to be able to get 
to the sea base, support transfer of cargo between the ASE and the sea base or final 
destination and move the cargo to its destination.  
System alternatives were researched and seven possibilities settled on for further 
analysis and evaluation.  These alternative platforms include current systems, craft that 
 iv 
are currently under development and conceptual systems that are not in the acquisition 
cycle. The seven alternatives were
• Landing Craft Air 
Cushion (LCAC) 
• Ship to Shore Connector 
(SSC) 
• Transformable Craft (T-
Craft) 
• Logistics Support Vessel 
(LSV) 
• Landing Craft, Utility 
(LCU) 
• Joint High Speed Vessel 
(JHSV) 
• Airlift 
Detailed modeling and simulation of a baseline case utilizing LCACs was 
performed although the M&S was not ultimately utilized in the trade-off analysis. The 
model was built using a common M&S tool (Extend) for ease of use by future research 
teams. The majority of the decision analysis utilized a simplified Multi-Attribute Utility 
Theory (MAUT) and was executed utilizing spreadsheets. From the extensive list of 
requirements parameters, the team selected a set of six parameters for decision analysis 
based on stakeholder inputs and the team’s requirements analysis. The six critical 
decision analysis parameters were: 
Table 1:  Decision Analysis Parameters 
Parameter Threshold Objective 
Self-Deployment Range 1000 nautical miles 2500 nautical miles 
Crew size 100 0 
Intra-Theater Range 25 nautical miles 250 nautical miles 
Speed 20 knots 40 knots 
Cargo Capacity 300 short tons 600 short tons 







Value curves and weights for these parameters were developed based on an 
understanding of stakeholder priorities.  Due to project constraints, values and weights 
were only developed for two of the four initial missions considered, specifically Major 
Combat Operation and Humanitarian Aid. These two missions were selected as being the 
most and least stringent respectively, and represented the spectrum of key attributes of 
the four initial missions. Utilizing the MAUT approach the team developed overall utility 
values for each alternative for the two selected missions. The T-Craft appears to be the 
best by value for the Major Combat Operation and the JHSV was the best for the 
Humanitarian Aid mission.  
The team also conducted life-cycle cost analysis of each alternative. Cost 
estimates were based on actual data available for current systems, while for conceptual 
systems costs were input based on parametric analysis and comparison to similar 
systems.  The team conducted a cost–benefit analysis for the two missions using notional 
data based on the number of vessels required to support moving a specified amount of 
cargo in a specified time, as shown in Figures 1 and 2.   
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Major Combat Mission - Surge Operations
13k tons in 10 hours
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Figure 1: Cost Benefit Analysis Major Combat Mission 
 vii 
Humanitarian Mission
100k tons in 48 hours @ max craft speed
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Figure 2:  Cost Benefit Analysis Humanitarian Aid Mission 
 
Figures 1 and 2 show the cost versus utility results for the notional combat and 
humanitarian missions, respectively. The lines show the Pareto Frontier composed of the 
non-dominated solutions. For the Major Combat Operation Mission, the cost-benefit 
analysis reveals that for the non-dominated systems the T-Craft offers the highest utility 
but with a moderate cost as compared across the alternatives. For the Humanitarian 
Mission, the LSV and JHSV are the non-dominated solutions with T-Craft a close third. 
All have low to moderate cost and good utility. T-Craft would be eliminated from 
consideration based on the cost-benefit plot with a lower utility but higher cost than LSV 
and JHSV. Obviously, a final decision on the best alternative depends on many factors 
and is difficult to capture completely when rolled into single scores. Based on the cost-
 viii 
benefit analysis for the specified Humanitarian Aid mission parameters the best choice of 
the non-dominated solutions appears to be the LSV.  
Recommendations are made regarding the best ASE alternatives for each of the 
missions considered, recognizing the assumptions and limitations of the study. Based on 
the analysis, the T-Craft seems to be the best alternative for operations and quick 
response actions that require feet dry beach deployment of personnel and equipment. For 
operations that allow for an austere port and do not require landing of personnel or 
equipment directly on a beach the JHSV may be the best alternative of those considered 
when its additional capabilities are considered. 
In addition to recommendations regarding the best ASE alternatives, 
recommendations for future studies and work related to ASEs were made. These include 
more detailed simulation study that examined the full range of alternatives in an 
appropriate operational setting, as well as a thorough cost analysis. Additionally, a study 
that examines a potential fleet architecture, which looks at a combination of sea base 
enabler platforms in order to close current gaps in for both Army and USMC cargo 






ACAT Acquisition Category 
ACV Air Cushion Vehicle 
AJACS Advanced Joint Air Combat System  
ANOVA Analysis of Variance 
AOA Analysis of Alternatives  
ASE Advanced Sea Base Enabler 
AT/FP  Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection 
AWMP Army Watercraft Master Plan 
AWS Army Watercraft Systems 
BAA Broad Agency Announcement 
C2 Command and Control 
C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence 
C4ISR 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
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ONR Office of Naval Research 
OSHA Operational Safety and Health Administration  
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R&D Research & Development 
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A. PROJECT OVERVIEW 
Seabasing is a term that refers to a collection of ships at sea conducting operations 
that enable forces to operate in theater without a large logistical footprint ashore. Such an 
operation may require a wide variety of vessels to transfer various types of cargo such as 
pallets, containers, liquids (i.e. fuel, water) and vehicles between ships and from the sea 
base platforms to the final cargo destination. (NRC, 2005) 
The fundamental seabasing scenario positions a collection of ships at sea to act as 
a base of operations for operational forces in theater. These ships would require periodic 
re-supply of cargo, both for their own consumption and for re-supplying deployed forces. 
This cargo could be delivered by a variety of ships (including fast combat support ships, 
commercial containerships, and other pre-positioning ships), or aircraft. These ships 
could either join the sea base or serve as a cargo platform serving the vessels that deliver 
the cargo to the final destination, or they could deliver their cargo to one or more sea base 
ships for storage and/or redistribution. An ASE, then, is a system that is used to enable 
the sea base by transporting materials to and from the sea base. 
The ASE team’s efforts focused on understanding the capabilities, operational 
activities, requirements, and functions that enable the sea base concept to be fully 
realized, specifically on the need to transport cargo from the sea base to its final 
destination. Once these needs were understood the team examined potential alternatives 
that might meet the requirements and evaluated them to identify the best candidates. The 
team utilized an iterative Systems Engineering approach culminating in a limited 
Analyses of Alternatives (AOA) comparing the potential ASE candidates that were 
identified. The team faced many challenges, among the most significant being the 
challenge of determining appropriate need for this problem and scoping the project into 




The purpose of this project is to examine the issue of assembling and transporting 
cargo from a sea base to the desired destination and make recommendations regarding the 
best approaches for meeting those objectives. The key research questions that motivated 
the ASE team’s efforts are: 
• What requirements and functions are required of an ASE to meet the 
operational capabilities of the sea base and the operational forces it 
serves?  
• What ASE concept is best at performing the required functions? 
• What are the risks and limitations of the ASE concepts? 
These questions are addressed by the analyses discussed in this report. The team’s 
goal was to generate an analysis that was useful to the joint DOD community. 
C. METHODOLOGY / APPROACH  
The ASE team primarily used the systems engineering methodology as described 
by Sage and Armstrong (2000), with modifications or additions as deemed appropriate by 
the team. The basic steps and processes that were utilized during the execution of the 
project are discussed below. 
Sage and Armstrong outline three major steps in the system engineering process, 




Figure 1.   Systems Engineering Process 
Images from: (Sage and Armstrong, 2000) 
 
The following sections of the report discuss the different steps in the system 
engineering process and how the team applied them. Detailed results from each of the 
stages are reported on in later sections. As with most systems engineering processes, the 
Sage and Armstrong approach is iterative and the team revisited many of the steps 
repeatedly during the project. 
1. Formulation 
The Formulation step in the systems engineering process is used to clearly 
identify the problem, evaluate the objectives and/or goals of the solution and hypothesize 
potential alternatives and the metrics that could be used. The major components of 
Formulation that the ASE team utilized are described below. 
a. Problem Definition 
During this step the team identified and described the problem being considered. 
An initial problem statement and revised problem statement were developed based on the 
team’s research and analysis. Stakeholders were identified and the team researched the 
stakeholder’s interpretation of the problem, identified requirements and captured the 
relevant constraints that impact the problem. To better understand the problem and 
potential solutions, the team members reviewed relevant documentation. During this 
phase of the project mission analysis and operational scenarios were also identified. 
b. Value System Design 
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The team developed a value system based upon the needs and objectives 
identified by the stakeholders. A value or objective hierarchy was developed that 
provided the basis for decision criteria for identifying and selecting the “best” system 
based upon the objectives and related measures. The value system is a hierarchy of 
functional elements, with potential measures of effectiveness, which relate back to the 
requirements identified and represent the functional approach for satisfying those 
requirements. 
2. Analysis 
This step in the systems engineering process is used to evaluate the potential 
concepts, alternatives, and solutions and examine how they meet the requirements 
identified by earlier steps. The following briefly describes the elements of the analysis 
stage of systems engineering and how the team applied them. 
a. Systems Analysis and Modeling 
This is the stage of systems engineering where modeling and simulation (M&S) 
and other analytical processes are utilized to assess the effectiveness of the alternatives. 
Due to limitations in scope the team performed limited systems analysis and modeling. 
The tools and processes used help determine specific impacts or consequences of the 
various alternatives being considered based on the metrics identified in the value system. 
The team did perform some detailed M&S development to establish a baseline 
performance assessment but did not have time for extensive M&S of the potential 
alternatives. For the most part the team assumed the stated functional performance 
specifications of the alternatives were accurate. The team performed limited spreadsheet 
analysis to examine how effective the potential alternatives were at executing certain 
mission elements. 
b. Refinement of the Alternatives 
As a better understanding of the system functions becomes clear based on analysis 
of the alternatives and their ability to meet the identified requirements, it is typical to 
adjust and optimize system characteristics, within allowable parameters, to better meet 
the identified needs. The team did very little in this respect due to time limitations. 
3. Interpretation 
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This step utilizes information generated from each of the previous steps to assist 
in the decision making process. For example, by comparing the value system with the 
system analysis results the team can make assessments as to what alternatives better meet 
specified needs. 
a. Decision making 
By evaluating the alternatives against selected parameters from the value system, 
the team was able to assess the performance of the various alternatives against 
requirements. The team used Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) to assess 
alternatives against requirements and performed a limited cost analysis and cost-benefit 
analysis to support decision making. Attributes and appropriate weights were selected 
based on an understanding of stakeholder priorities. A decision matrix was developed to 
compare the alternatives based on the selected parameters.  
b Planning for Action 
The team recommends preferred alternatives and provides justification and 
discussion of the recommendations. Additional insights into the problem are discussed 


















II. OPERATIONAL BACKGROUND 
A. SEABASING OVERVIEW 
1. Seabasing: Introduction 
A cornerstone of America’s continued military supremacy is our ability to project 
combat power rapidly and virtually without hindrance to widespread areas of the world.  
Our power projection capability depends on sustained access to regions of political and 
operational concern (NDP, 1997). Any number of circumstances might compromise our 
operational forward presence and therefore weaken our ability to apply military power, 
which could reduce our military and political influence in key regions of the world. These 
circumstances have led the United States Department of Defense (DOD) to strategize on 
the need to develop an off shore military presence known as seabasing (U.S. Navy, 
2007). 
The concepts of seabasing have recently received more attention from the DOD 
community as access to foreign land bases has become an increasingly serious political 
and physical issue.  As stated previously, the sea base is a fundamental concept of this 
project. The Navy’s “Sea Power 21” vision includes the idea of a sea base as one of 
several pillars supporting Naval Sea Power for the future (Clark, 2002). The Sea Power 
21 document describes the benefits of seabasing as: 
•           Pre-positioned war-fighting capabilities for immediate employment. 
•           Enhanced joint support from a fully netted, dispersed naval force. 
•           Strengthened international coalition building. 
•           Increased joint force security and operational agility. 
•           Minimized operational reliance on shore infrastructure. 
The key capabilities required to support seabasing are identified as:  
•           Enhanced Afloat Positioning of Joint Assets. 
•           Offensive and Defensive Power Projection. 
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•           Command and Control (C2). 
•           Integrated Joint Logistics. 
•           Accelerated deployment and employment timelines. 
The “Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century Sea power” of the joint forces of 
the USMC, Coast Guard and US Navy (U.S. Navy, 2007) also indicates the importance 
of logistics and supply to meeting our nation’s naval objectives and supporting national 
strategic objectives. While seabasing is clearly perceived as a key capability of the 
National and Naval Strategies, the problem still exists of how to enable the sea base. 
Making a sea base actually work requires surmounting numerous challenges.  In 
their August 2003 report, the Defense Science Board Task Force on  
Seabasing confirmed the need for seabasing and identified twelve issues they felt needed 
to be addressed to fully realize the capability of the sea base. (Defense Science Board, 
2003)  The six issues related to “new capabilities” requiring development were: 
1. Cargo transfer at sea. 
2. A long range heavy lift aircraft that can be based at sea with capability to 
support forces ashore and transport troops. 
3.      Ships of appropriate design. 
4.  A shared data communication system with sufficient bandwidth, 
redundancy, and robustness. 
5. A logistics support system that handles all Service material 
interchangeably. 
6. Intra-theater lift operational at sea state 4. 
This project primarily considers the third and sixth capability elements identified 
by the task force and to a very limited extent the second. 
2. Seabasing: Making the case 
Despite America’s successes in the Gulf Wars, the past has seen numerous 
refusals by Middle Eastern states to allow U.S. forces the use of land bases on their 
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sovereign territory. In recent history, a few of the Middle Eastern states denied the United 
States use of their bases to respond to Iraqi attacks on the Kurds. Specifically, Turkey 
prohibited the United States from using them as a path to Iraq. As a result, the United 
States could only respond to Iraq’s actions with cruise missile attacks against targets in 
southern Iraq. The denial of infrastructure, whether directly, or by refusing to allow 
material and combat power to flow across borders, would make such bases entirely 
useless in a crisis. Moreover, that base infrastructure could subtract from the net combat 
power available to the United States by the denial of the considerable investments made 
in the maintenance and logistical facilities to support the projection of U.S. forces 
(Defense Science Board, 2003). 
3. Seabasing: Evolving for a new era 
With the end of the Cold War, the Soviet threat to U.S. maritime supremacy also 
ended, causing the DOD to re-assess their role in a new strategic era.  This reassessment 
provided the movement for resurrecting the seabasing concept, in that the underlying 
premise of U.S. sea power changed from “The fundamental purpose of naval forces is to 
achieve command of the seas” to “The fundamental purpose of naval forces is to use 
command of the seas.”  (King & Berry, 2008). 
This change in premise spawned a post-Cold War naval intellectual renaissance, 
reflected in several Department of the Navy (DON) “white papers.” First among these 
was “The Way Ahead”, which argued for a new pattern of deployments and force 
composition to maintain the forward presence required to support humanitarian 
assistance/disaster relief, nation building, security assistance, peacekeeping, counter-
narcotics, counter-terrorism, counterinsurgency, and crisis response (King & Berry, 
2008). 
Seabasing also promises to be an effective way to provide significant operational 
support to other critical missions such as disaster relief, humanitarian aid, and police 
enforcement activities – see Figure 2. In early 2005, only two weeks after the enormity of 
the Indian Ocean tsunami crisis had become clear, almost fifteen thousand U.S. military 
personnel were providing humanitarian relief throughout the affected region. These 
American servicemen and service women were supported by twenty-five U.S. Navy ships 
 10 
and one Coast Guard cutter acting as temporary sea bases for forty-five fixed-wing 
aircraft and fifty-eight helicopters. By this point in the mission, the U.S. military had 
delivered 2.2 million pounds of relief supplies to the worst-hit nations, including sixteen 
thousand gallons of water, 113,000 pounds of food, and 140,500 pounds of other relief 
supplies during the previous twenty-four hours alone (Elleman, 2007). 
 
 
Figure 2.   ASE Disaster Relief, Humanitarian Aid and Police Enforcement Operations 
Images from: (Lozano, 2009) 
Throughout the humanitarian mission, U.S. forces dealt with force protection on 
an ongoing basis. Marines were careful to stay out of the north and east, so as to avoid the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. In that case, Indian forces were assigned to work in 
areas controlled by the guerrillas. Given the ever-present force protection and cultural 
concerns, the U.S. Navy’s ability to remain offshore on the sea bases decreased the 
American footprint, reduced friction, and facilitated achieving the mission’s objectives. 
Seabasing helped eliminate unwanted accidents or incidents, even as U.S. Navy assets 
relayed ashore over four hundred thousand gallons of fresh water and over ten million 
pounds of food and supplies, and handled the treatment of thousands of patients. 
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4. Seabasing: Operational Validation 
Even if the Unites States could retain the necessary land bases and port 
infrastructure to support forward deployed forces, they would still be vulnerable to strikes 
which could reduce or neutralize their utility. Precision strikes, weapons of mass 
destruction, and cruise and ballistic missiles all present threats to our forward presence, 
particularly as stand-off ranges increase. Only those who have read deeply into the 
history of American military operations in the Second World War understand fully the 
difficulties that U.S. forces confronted in the early months of America’s participation in 
that war. Throughout 1942, American forward operating bases were under constant attack 
by the air, ground, and naval forces of the Axis. Such attacks took a severe toll on the 
defenders. In June 1942 the crucial naval base at Midway Island in the Central Pacific 
came under heavy air attack by aircraft launched from Japanese carriers, destroying much 
of the island’s infrastructure (Defense Science Board, 2003). 
The potential for anti-access by direct attacks is a threat that confronts all armed 
services over the coming decades. It has major implications for the Army which is 
devoting substantial resources to developing new capabilities and weapons systems to 
speed up deployment of its units. To a considerable extent, those capabilities are 
predicated on airlift being available and on access to land bases to which Army units can 
deploy in order to begin ground operations against the enemy. Anti-access capabilities 
obviously also have considerable implications for the use of ports and other fixed 
facilities by the Navy and the Marine Corps. 
However, in a major shift in its approach to movement-to-contact with the enemy, 
the Army, on two separate occasions over the past decade, has used the sea base as the 
primary capability for that movement. In Haiti, an aircraft carrier was the sea base for a 
brigade of the 101st Airborne Division, while during the recent Enduring Freedom 
operation the carrier, Kitty Hawk, provided a secure base for Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) units to move in and around Afghanistan (Defense Science Board, 2003). 
Reinforcing the importance of seabasing are the logistical requirements that will, 
for the foreseeable future, make some form of seabasing essential during the conduct of 
U.S. military operations. For example, the deployment of one of the Air Force’s 
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Expeditionary Air Forces represents an enormous logistical task. The deployment of 
thirty aircraft to Qatar in 1997 required the movement of 4,000 short tons of personnel, 
munitions, force protection, and other supplies. Additionally, as most of the forward 
operating bases from which U.S. forces will have to operate in the future will not possess 
a sophisticated infrastructure, the difficulties involved in relying on land bases become 
even clearer. The problem of supplying fuel alone represents an intractable problem and 
when we think about the tonnages of weapons, sustenance for supporting troops, and 
maintenance supplies required to support such forces, a picture of the difficulties 
involved in deploying U.S. military power by air become readily apparent (Defense 
Science Board, 2003). 
5. Seabasing: Summary 
The projection of military power from North America has in the past, and will in 
the future, represent a number of difficult problems. The permanent stationing of U.S. 
forces abroad will become more difficult to sustain. The political costs of such bases will 
likely rise, as will the likelihood of attack of such forces by ballistic missiles, terrorism, 
and weapons of mass destruction. Taken together, the pressures against the permanent 
forward basing of U.S. military forces have profound implications for U.S. strategy, 
power projection capabilities, and alliance relationships. The strategic and political 
framework also suggests the need for seabasing to become a truly joint concept with 
capabilities allowing for the projection of the full capability of United States. 
B. OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS 
While the team efforts were initially inspired by the formal AOA process in 
general, numerous assumptions and simplifications were made to those guidelines to 
enable a successful project within the constraints placed on the project team. Many of the 
assumptions made by the team, along with additional scope and bounds information, are 
described below. 
1. Operational Scenarios 
The full Range of Military Operations (ROMO) performed by the U.S. military, is 
quite substantial and is described in Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 on “Joint Operations” 
(CJCS, 2008).  The full list of joint operations is listed in Figure 1-2 of JP 3-0 and is 
reproduced in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Types Of Military Operations 
Major Operations Support to Insurgency 
Homeland Defense Counterinsurgency Operations 
Civil Support Combating Terrorism 
Strikes Noncombatant Evacuation Operations 
Raids Recovery Operations 
Show of Force Consequence Management 
Enforcement of Sanctions Foreign Humanitarian Assistance 
Protection of Shipping Nation Assistance 
Freedom of Navigation Arms Control and Disarmament 
Peace Operations Routine, Recurring Military Activities 
Examining twenty operations was far beyond the scope of this project. To 
simplify, the team selected four general mission scenarios for consideration that the team 
felt were representative of the major types of operations an ASE would be expected to 
encounter based on the discussions the team had with stakeholders and the documents 
reviewed. The operational scenarios considered, listed in the order the team initially felt 
were most relevant to this study: 
a. Major Combat Operations 
A combat mission is a purely military operation where the likelihood of a violent 
and threatening environment is high.  A combat mission involves transporting troops, 
combat equipment and supplies to a potentially hostile environment. Speed and combat 
capability are important.  An existing infrastructure to support offload cannot be 
assumed.  Forcible entry into the area against armed resistance is a possibility.  The 
essence of the mission is to take the combat troops, equipment including heavy 
equipment such as Abrams tanks, and supplies rapidly from the sea base to the 
destination, offload quickly, and leave.  There is also the possibility of bringing the 
troops and equipment back at a later time or of bringing people (such as wounded) or 
other items back on the return trip to the sea base. The most similar mission from the 
ROMO is Joint Operations Mission – Major Operation. (CJCS, 2008). 
b. Police Enforcement Operation 
The police enforcement mission involves taking a smaller amount of troops 
(compared to the combat mission) and their equipment to an area for the purposes of 
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police enforcement.  It is assumed the area is already secured to some degree meaning it 
is not in open combat.  Forcible entry is not considered necessary.  It is expected the 
equipment will be light combat equipment (High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled 
Vehicle -HMMWV or Humvees, personnel transports, etc.) as opposed to heavy 
equipment (tanks).  The possibility of personnel having to operate from the vessel, at 
least temporarily is considered. The most similar mission from the ROMO is Joint 
Operations Mission – Peace Operation. (CJCS, 2008). 
c. Humanitarian Aid 
A humanitarian aid mission involves bringing supplies such as food and medicine 
and possibly personnel such as aid workers to an area of need. While any area may 
contain a threat it is assumed the environment is essentially benign or non-hostile. Cargo 
and personnel capacity are key factors of importance. An existing port, austere or better, 
is considered likely.  The possibility that personnel may have to operate from the vessel is 
considered.  The most similar mission from the ROMO is Joint Operations Mission – 
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (CJCS, 2008). 
d. Natural Disaster Relief 
A natural disaster relief mission is similar in nature to a humanitarian aid effort. 
The major difference is that it cannot be assumed that any port capability exists. As such, 
an ASE must be capable of delivering its personnel and goods without external support. 
The most similar mission from the ROMO is Joint Operations Mission – Foreign 
Humanitarian Assistance. (CJCS, 2008). 
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Figure 3.   Missions under consideration 
As shown in the Figure 3, the four missions differ in two major aspects: 1) 
whether the destination is a high threat environment or not, and 2) whether an existing 
port infrastructure can be reasonably assumed. The team felt that these two dimensions of 
the problem were key differentiators that would impact ASE capability requirements. 
Due to time and resource constraints, while all four missions were considered, the 
team did not thoroughly investigate all of these operational scenarios. The team 
considered the highest level requirements for each mission, but was only able to perform 
a detailed analysis using two of these scenarios. The two scenarios selected were the 
Major Combat Operation and Humanitarian Aid as the missions with the most and least 
stringent requirements, respectively in the two dimensions considered. 
2. Assumptions 
The team had to make many important assumptions in the course of the project. 
Some assumptions were made to ensure that the project effort was scoped appropriately 
and could be accomplished in the time frame available. The following are some of the 
assumptions related to scope made by the team. 
One major assumption is the validity of the seabasing concept itself. The team has 
not considered alternatives to seabasing. Enabling the sea base is the central theme of this 
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project. Based on the research the team performed regarding seabasing, as discussed in 
the seabasing section above, the team felt this was a safe as well as necessary assumption. 
The team has made some assumptions related to the nature of seabasing. For 
example, it was not clearly defined how far the sea base can or should be from the 
operational landing point. Based on the teams research it appears that a clear specification 
does not exist. Most of the seabasing scenarios described in the literature have the sea 
base at least twenty-five nautical miles (nm) from land. The team assumed that farther is 
better (up to a point) due to the advantages obtained in maneuverability and safety of sea 
base assets.  Therefore, for the purposes of the team’s analysis, the sea base will be 
located no closer than 25 nautical miles and no further than 250 nautical miles from the 
objective. 
Similarly, the team has not considered all of the many technical obstacles that 
must be overcome to fully enable the sea base. There is a great deal of research currently 
underway related to seabasing enablers, such as platform stability and ship-to-ship 
transfer technologies.  While the team has considered the work being done in those areas, 
particularly with regard to how it affects transport of the cargo to its final destination, the 
focus of our project is on the transport capabilities and systems that move cargo from the 
sea base to its destination.  As such the team has assumed that cargo transfer and other 
sea base capabilities will exist and that the necessary cargo can be safely and effectively 
transferred between the sea base and the ASE platform. 
The focus of the effort is on the Concept Development stage of acquisition and a 
simplified AOA culminating in a recommended approach for ASE. The team considered 
alternatives from a high-level, functional perspective. Due to time constraints the team 
was limited in its ability to validate all information collected regarding the potential ASE 
alternatives. The team collected available information on potential alternatives for ASE 
and, with basic checks for reasonableness, has largely assumed the information collected 
regarding the various systems is reliable. 
3. Primary Areas of Focus 
Detailed engineering analyses, naval architecture or other detailed engineering 
work is beyond the scope of this effort. The bulk of effort by the team has been on 
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collection, analysis and validation of operational needs, functional analysis based on 
those operational needs, consideration of possible alternatives compared to the collected 
requirements, prioritizing the alternatives based on stakeholder priorities and selection 
and documentation of a preferred alternative. The team did not design any ASE solutions 
nor even really suggest modified alternatives. The team collected information on current 
existing or planned systems that might be appropriate alternatives for an ASE capability. 


















III. FORMULATION   
As mentioned in the Chapter II, the Formulation step in the systems engineering 
process is used to clearly identify the problem, evaluate the objectives and/or goals of the 
solution and create potential alternatives and the metrics that could be used to evaluate 
those alternatives. The following sections discuss the formulation efforts of the team. The 
team started with an initial problem statement and then developed a revised problem 
statement based upon research and analysis. The stakeholder’s interpretation of the 
problem was investigated, requirements were identified and relevant constraints that 
impact the problem were captured. Additional activities included mission analysis and 
identifying operational scenarios. 
  
A. INITIAL PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The initial problem statement was identified through discussions with the Office 
of Naval Research (ONR) regarding their Innovative Naval Prototype Transformable 
Craft (T-Craft) project. ONR had contacted NPS seeking assistance and input regarding 
ONR’s T-Craft project. The T-Craft project is a Research and Development (R&D) effort 
seeking to develop a “game changing” capability in support of seabasing. The T-Craft 
vision is described in more detail later in Chapter III. The ASE team met with the ONR 
project manager and support staff to discuss T-Craft and what systems engineering work 
would be of value to ONR. Going into this meeting, the team’s initial problem statement 
was as follows: 
To enable seabasing a Transformable Craft connector vehicle is needed that can 
self deploy over long distances while unloaded, can carry 300 – 750 LT of cargo, has a 
fully loaded range of 500 nautical miles at 40 knots, supports cargo transfer in high sea 
states, can traverse sand bars and mud flats and is fully amphibious for “feet dry” 
landing capability. 
In essence, the initial problem statement was the T-Craft project vision. In 
discussion with the ONR staff it became clear that ONR desired help developing a 
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“business case” for the T-Craft. After meeting with ONR, the team discussed project 
possibilities and came to the conclusion that the problem statement would not work as it 
was. The team would not be able to use the initial problem statement and still follow a 
reasonable systems engineering process since the results must be based upon impartial 
requirements, functional and decision analysis. 
Since a business case did not exist at the time for T-Craft, the team would be 
assuming the conclusion and then trying to validate the need for T-Craft. The team felt 
strongly that a more objective problem statement was needed and decided to broaden the 
project’s stakeholder portfolio to collect information on requirements and identify a more 
general problem statement that would help answer the T-Craft question but in a more 
open, systems engineering manner. 
B. STAKEHOLDERS ANALYSIS 
Stakeholders are people and groups not directly involved in the development 
project but are affected by it in some way and have a vested interest in its outcome. As 
noted by Sage & Armstrong, “stakeholders will usually be owners, users, customers, 
clients, managers, maintainers, administrators and regulators” (2000). As a result, they 
and their views must be addressed by the project manager and the sponsor. The most 
important type of stakeholder is the user—those people who will be using the end 
product. The team classified stakeholders into primary and secondary categories.  
Primary stakeholders are the individual groups that are responsible for defining the needs 
of the ASE system and making the decisions regarding ASE solutions.   Secondary 
stakeholders are the other groups or individuals with a vested interest in the system. 
The project team conducted a brainstorming session to develop an initial rough 
draft list of the stakeholders for this project. The initial stakeholders were then further 
refined and specific contacts were obtained for as many of the areas identified as 
possible. The following lists the potential primary and secondary stakeholders identified 
by the team. 
Primary Stakeholders:  Since seabasing is a broad capability with broad influence, 
this includes operational commands of most of the major services (minus Air Force) and 
special operational commands: 
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• Navy operational commands 
• USMC operational commands 
• Army operational commands 
• Special Operations Command (SOCOM) 
• Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) 
• Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) 
Note that requirements generating organizations (such as OPNAV for the Navy) 
are included under these operational commands. 
Secondary Stakeholders were identified that supported seabasing through a 
variety of means such as building the ships involved or supporting the major operational 
commands: 
• Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) 
• Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) 
• Navy Supply Command (NAVSUP) 
• Marine Corps Logistics Command (MARCORLOGCOM) 
• Office of Naval Research (ONR) 
• Tank and Automotive Command (TACOM) 
• Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) 
• Surface Deployment Distribution Command (SDDC)  
• Military Sea Lift Command (MSC) 
• Army Watercraft Systems (AWS) 
• North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
• United States Coast Guard (USCG) 
The team performed stakeholder interaction utilizing a tailored Stakeholder 
Analysis process shown in Figure 4. This iterative process includes the identification of 
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key stakeholders followed by a consolidation of their needs, wants, and desires for the 
ASE system resulting from personal interviews, research of relevant documents 
(including publications and conference presentations), operational lessons learned, phone 
conversations, and email.  Of note, selected members of the team attended the T-Craft 
CONOPS workshop conducted on May 21, 2009 at the Aerospace System Design 
Laboratory, Georgia Institute of Technology.  The team presented the work accomplished 
to date and gathered information regarding sea base enabler objectives, needs, wants, and 
desires from the stakeholders who attended the workshop. 
Identify Stakeholders
Elicit Stakeholder 











Figure 4.   Iterative Stakeholder Analysis Process 
In addition to interaction with major stakeholders representing user perspectives 
the team also collected information on several potential alternatives from NAVSEA 
program offices but did not discuss needs, wants and desires with them. The team 
conducted in-depth conference calls or meetings with several of the stakeholders and this 
information aided greatly in the refinement of the needs, wants and desires and 
development of respective requirements documentation.  A questionnaire was sent to the 
stakeholders in an attempt to further define objective and threshold metrics.  The entire 
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questionnaire can be found in Appendix C.  The following are some of the key questions 
posed by the survey: 
• What value do you expect to gain from the sea base? 
• Is there a capability gap with current military cargo platforms that would 
limit transportability from a sea base to the insertion point? Please 
describe in detail. 
• What operational scenarios to you see the need for an advanced sea base 
enabler (ASE)? 
• Based on previous military operations what is the one operational 
characteristic that could make the ASE indispensable. 
The team intended to use the stakeholder questionnaire as a basis to eventually 
determine common requirements, identify agency specific requirements, identify 
requirements overlap and refine the initial problem statement.   However, from the 
questionnaires sent out, the team received limited useful information.  ONR and other 
attendees provided feedback at the T-Craft CONOPS meeting.  While reviewing inputs 
from the stakeholders the team identified common interests regarding the capabilities of a 
sea base enabler, which include: 
• Each stakeholder saw the need to reduce the footprint (logistics footprint) 
ashore as the main value of a sea base. 
• Some capability gaps mentioned were Operational speed (“the faster the 
better”), Command and Control (C2) interoperability, range, skin to skin 
transfer, and draft issues. 
• Stakeholders indicated the ASE must operate in a sea state 4. 
• The system must be able to utilize modern ports, austere ports, and 
unimproved landing areas to support all potential missions. 
 
C. REVISED PROBLEM STATEMENT 
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As mentioned previously, ONR indicated that they had a need for a “business 
case” to support detailed development of a T-craft solution as a sea base enabler. 
Preliminary team research suggested that there are several sea base enabler efforts 
underway so T-Craft may not be the only possible solution. Due diligence and proper 
systems engineering methodology suggested that the problem statement needed to be 
broadened and generalized and should be based on major stakeholder input.  Based on 
team discussion with ONR as well as with other stakeholders mentioned above and 
reading collected resources on seabasing, the team developed a revised problem 
statement: 
For a sea base to be truly beneficial a capability must exist that supports 
efficiently transporting needed materiel from the sea base to the desired debarkation 
point. The capability must support peace-time, non-combat operations’ and war-time, 
combat operations’ logistics and support needs. The solution must be cost effective and 
capable of operating under all environmental conditions, including sea states, under 
which necessary military operations are expected to take place and must support a 
transport rate sufficient to ensure materiel is delivered within operational time limits. 
The new problem statement is more general and more accurately reflects the need 
as indicated by the stakeholders and source documents identified. Some key differences 
between the initial and revised problem statements are: 
• The revised statement focuses on a needed capability as opposed to a 
platform. 
• The revised statement focuses on the missions that must be supported as 
opposed to functional requirements. 
• The addition of cost effectiveness as a need. 
• The addition of key operational needs. 
The revised problem statement, as shown above, became the working problem 
statement for the project. 
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D. MISSION ANALYSIS 
As mentioned in the Scope section of this report, the ASE team selected four 
general mission areas to examine for the purposes of this project and ultimately ended up 
analyzing alternatives against two of those missions. One of the more challenging aspects 
of this project was determining the most appropriate missions against which to evaluate 
an ASE. The primary reason for this is that an ASE has the potential to provide value for 
a wide variety of mission areas and stakeholder perspectives on mission priorities tended 
to diverge along two lines. Figure 5 shows a view of the Range of Military Operations 
(ROMO) plotted as a function of intensity versus frequency. What is important to note in 
this figure is that the most intense or dangerous (and most demanding from a functional 
systems perspective) missions are also the least likely/frequent missions.  This was also 
highlighted in a brief by TRANSCOM at the T-Craft CONOPS meeting (Pattan, 2009). A 
slide from that brief is shown in Figure 6 and depicts that 75% of the missions they 
perform are non-combat missions. TRANSCOM also indicated that they found the non-




Figure 5.   ASE Operation Types 
Image from: (Lozano, 2009) 
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Figure 6.   Mission Types 
Image from: (Pattan, 2009) 
 
Stakeholder input indicated divergent views regarding what missions, and 
correspondingly what capabilities are needed to support those missions. When discussing 
capabilities with stakeholders with a traditional war-fighting point of view (USMC, 
Army) their focus was to support major combat operations and thus have a system that 
was suitable for those missions. Essentially these stakeholders want a combat vessel that 
can carry supplies. Conversely, when discussing missions and capabilities with 
stakeholders representing logistics functions, their primary focus was on non-combat 
missions. 
The challenge for the team was to determine an appropriate mission set and 
functional requirements that satisfied a broad spectrum of potential needs. The risk was 
that if the team focused on the combat mission needs there was the risk of developing a 
“gold plated” solution that was far more capable and expensive than what was needed for 
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the majority of missions in which the system might be utilized. If the team focused on the 
logistics needs, however, there was a risk that the system might not meet the needs for the 
critical combat missions. 
As described previously, the team developed four general missions for analysis 
purposes. The team chose to focus on two missions that represented each mission type for 
decision analysis purposes. The major combat operation is obviously representative of a 
combat mission. The Humanitarian Aid mission is representative of a non-combat, 
logistics mission. By judging potential alternative systems against these two missions, the 
team felt that recommended alternatives that met both sets of mission capabilities could 
be found. 
The Scope section above provided a basic description of the two missions. The 
following sections provide more detail including discussion of the types of functional 
requirements that are most important for each mission. 
1. Major Combat Operation 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication 3-0 on “Joint Operations” 
does not specify any mission specifically called Major Combat Operation (MCO). For the 
purposes of this project a MCO is a mission in which a large number of forces are 
involved and significant combat is expected. The conflict is not a police action or a small, 
localized combat effort. The mission involves assembling and employing significant 
amounts of troops and materiel for the purpose of combat. Some of the primary 
characteristics of this mission that affect the functional requirements of an ASE are: 
• High threat, hostile environment. The ASE will be expected to operate in 
an environment where it may encounter significant military threats to itself 
and its cargo. 
• Speed. There may be a need to rapidly employ the troops and materiel 
carried by the ASE so speed of embarking, transit and disembarking are 
important. 
• Support transport to all types of terrain including destinations with no port 
facilities (such as a beach). 
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• Support transport of combat ready troops and their equipment as a unit. 
• Operate in any environmental conditions that will support normal military 
operations.  
• May be required to make a forcible entry on a defended position/beach, 
either operating with other crafts or independently. 
To summarize, to meet this mission an ASE must be capable of delivering combat 
ready troops, as an operational unit, to almost any water bordering location, rapidly and 
safely under hostile and potentially adverse weather conditions. 
2. Humanitarian Aid Mission 
Humanitarian Aid is an increasing part of the armed forces mission. For the 
purposes of this project Humanitarian Aid is distinguished from Natural Disaster Relief. 
The major difference between the two missions is that for Humanitarian Aid it is assumed 
that reasonable port facilities (at least an austere port and probably better) exist and can 
be utilized. The Humanitarian Aid mission consists of delivering food, water, medicine 
and other necessities along with personnel (such as medical personnel) to an area of need. 
Primary characteristics of this mission that affect ASE functional requirements include: 
• Predominantly low threat environment. Security threats might be on the 
order of protecting personnel from mobs seeking food. 
• Cargo capacity is important. There is the potential to bring in huge 
quantities of supplies. For efficiency, significant cargo capacity is 
desirable. 
• May need to transport significant quantity of non-combat, non-military 
personnel. There is also a possibility that personnel may need to be 
berthed on board during operations. 
• Speed can be a consideration for the Humanitarian Aid mission in some 
cases. For example, when quick response may prevent additional death or 
injury to the aid recipients. 
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Summarizing this mission, the ASE must be able to transport large quantities of 
supplies and support personnel to essentially safe locations, provide basic security 
for personnel and possibly berthing for personnel. 
 
E. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
The team identified the requirements for materiel assembly and transport from the 
sea base to the area of operations through interaction with stakeholders as described 
above, extensive literature review and analysis based on the team members’ experience. 
The following describes the requirements generation and key parameter and metric 
selection process along with the key parameters and rationales. 
1. Requirements Definition Approach 
To continue the development of the requirements for this project, the team 
members also conducted an extensive literature search in parallel to the stakeholder 
analysis. Each of the documents listed in Appendix A was reviewed by two or more team 
members. From these documents a preliminary list of requirements was developed.  The 
team then reviewed the preliminary list and produced a consolidated list of potential 
requirements parameters. 
The complete list of the requirements with threshold and objective values is 
captured in a Microsoft Excel file. Table 2 lists these requirements, but the threshold and 
objective values are not listed as they are mission specific. 
Table 2. Requirements 
Un-Refueled Range (No-Cargo, 20kt) Land Grade 
Un-Refueled Range (Loaded, 20kt) Crew Size 
Un-Refueled Range (Loaded, 40kt) Vehicle Side Ramp Angle 
Beachable / Beach unload Ramp Length  
Un-Refueled Range (Overland) Discharge Method 
Max Speed (water borne) Discharge Areas, normal 
Seabased Cargo Operations Discharge Areas, extreme 
Survivable Draft, unloaded 
Normal Operations Draft, fully loaded 
Cargo Payload Weight AT/FP 
Cargo Payload Area Armor (ballistic) 
Cargo Payload Max Height Self-Defense / Countermeasures 
 30 
Deck Loading Offense 
Cargo Transfer Capability Built in Wash-Down capability 
Crane ops  Signature 
RO/RO Communications 
Vertical Lift Covered Cargo Area 
Clearance (for land ops) Berthing 
Discussion of the requirements parameters and rationale for selected threshold 
and objectives values are documented in section 2.  At the time the initial requirements 
analysis was performed, the team was still considering the four general missions areas 
described previously and this is reflected in the following discussion. 
The ASE Requirements spreadsheet consists of a list of requirements parameters 
followed by threshold and objective values for the parameters based on one of the four 
mission types identified for analysis: Major Combat Operation, Humanitarian Aid, Police 
Enforcement and Natural Disaster Relief. The threshold values are the values that must 
be met in order to meet operational requirements. They represent the minimum 
acceptable value. Objective values are the desired values that would give the best 
expected performance for the mission. The four missions are listed separately as the team 
expected that each mission would have significant differences in requirements that would 
be reflected in the threshold and objective values for the requirements parameters. For 
this reason, it was decided that each mission would be analyzed independently with 
regard to the potential ASE alternatives.  
The stakeholders and team members did a comparative analysis of the various 
individual platform requirements in order to determine the essential global requirements 
the ASE would need to meet for the multiple mission sets.  This analysis was done via a 
ranked survey that allowed the stakeholders and team members to assign a value from 0 
to 10 for each requirement within a specific mission.  A value of 0 indicates the 
parameter is not essential while a value of 10 is considered key.  All the data was 
complied and initial requirements were ranked.  In an effort to keep this project within 
scope and meet essential deadlines the six parameters that seemed most important to 
stakeholders across missions were selected as the global requirements and were 
employed in the decision analysis process as discussed in the interpretation section. 
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2. Initial Requirements  
The team initially identified requirements in several areas. These areas included 
ranges, sea states, cargo capacity and transfer options, and additional operational vessel 
characteristics.  These initial requirements were developed during the early stages of this 
project and were based upon the team’s initial review of existing seabasing 
documentation and preliminary interaction with the stakeholders.  As the project evolved 
and moved through the analysis phases the team chose a smaller sub-set of requirements 
on which to concentrate their research efforts.  The initial requirements and the team’s 
rationale for why a specific requirement is relevant and how threshold and objective 
values were selected are described below. While the team considered airlift as an 
alternative, the majority of the requirements discussed are relevant to sea based 
platforms. The air lift alternative and rationale for why it was not analyzed in depth are 
discussed later. 
a. Un-Refueled Range (self-deployed range) (No-Cargo, 20 knots) 
 The un-refueled range of the system, when not loaded with cargo, is 
directly related to its ability to self deploy. The higher the range the more capable the 
system is of self deploying to different operational areas of the world where it might be 
needed. Since range is affected by speed due to varying fuel consumption rates at 
different speeds it is necessary to specify the range for a specific speed. The team chose 
20 knots as a reasonable cruising speed. Based on the teams’ literature review, a range of 
2500 nautical miles was selected as the objective value which would allow the ASE to 
self deploy to most potential operational areas from U.S. controlled bases around the 
world.  A threshold of 1,000 nautical miles was established as a minimal, meaningful self 
deploy range that would allow for an ASE to transit to a forward location.   
b. Un-Refueled Range (Loaded, 20 knots) 
 For mission execution the team considered range of the system while fully 
loaded. For missions where speed is not as essential (essentially non-combat for the 
purposes of this project) an un-refueled range at a nominal cruising speed of 20 knots is 
considered. Based on the literature review on seabasing it appears that the maximum 
distance generally considered for a sea base is about 250 nautical miles. This was used 
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for the objective value for this parameter to place the sea base over the horizon and out of 
harms way. The threshold was set at 25 nautical miles as a reasonable minimum. 
c. Un-Refueled Range (intra-theater range) (Loaded, 40 knots) 
 In some cases, particularly combat missions, there may be a need to 
transport cargo at high speed. The same rationale applies for the higher speed case 
(Loaded, 40 knot) as applies to the loaded, 20 knots case shown above.  A threshold of 25 
nautical miles and objective of 250 nautical miles were used.  
d. Beachable / Beach un-load  
 Several of the stakeholders with a combat operations focus indicated the 
importance of an ASE being capable of delivering its cargo directly to most shore 
environments, meaning the ability to actually deliver personnel and materiel “feet dry” to 
a beach. Hence, the ability to deliver directly to a beach without any additional 
infrastructure is a critical parameter for some missions. For this capability the team felt 
either a platform could do it or not. As such this parameter is treated as a binary, yes/no 
parameter. The threshold values change depending on what mission is being considered. 
For each of the mission areas selected, beachability was evaluated as a threshold or 
objective value.  For both major combat operations, and natural disaster relief, 
beachability was identified as a requirement or threshold value, for the police action and 
humanitarian aid it was determined to be an objective, but not a requirement. 
e. Sea based Cargo Operations 
 During the initial project scoping meeting with ONR, one of the primary 
objectives was sea based cargo operations under operational sea states.  The team was 
told that in order to successfully support the sea basing concept, a minimum requirement 
for full cargo operational capabilities was sea state 3.  Therefore we selected sea state 3 
as our threshold and sea state 4 as objective during initial project scoping.  This is in line 
with the threshold requirements for the Mobile Launch Platform (MLP) and the future 
Large, Medium Speed, Roll-on Roll-Off (LMSR) vessels and allows for full capabilities 
when operating at the sea base.  Any reduction in the sea state requirement would limit 
the versatility and utility of the ASE. 
f. Seakeeping - Survivability 
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 During the literature review conducted by the team, a sea state of 7 or 8 
was shown to be the primary focus.  Based on the review and current ship design 
practices, a sea state of 7 (threshold) for best course and speed and 8 (objective) were 
chosen as the survivability requirements for the ASE.   
g. Seakeeping - Normal Operations 
 The same rationale that was used to determine the initial requirement for 
survivability was applied to Normal Operations.  Normal Operations is best defined as 
transit and all other at sea operations outside of cargo operations.  A sea state of 4 
(Threshold) was selected for the ASE to have full mission capability (speed and 
distance).   
h. Cargo Payload Weight 
 The maximum cargo weight selected was to allow the ASE to transport a 
minimum of four Main battle tanks (M1A1) at approximately 75 LT /per tank.  This 
would allow for 4 tanks and associated equipment to travel together on one ASE and 
supports the requirement for transporting combat troops as a unit.  The values for 
Humanitarian Aid and Natural Disaster were selected based on the need for heavy 
infrastructure items and Twenty Foot Equivalent Units, which are the standardized ISO 
shipping containers.  When supporting a civil action, the team decided the ASE would 
potentially need to carry significantly more palletized or containerized cargo vice combat 
ready mission selectable cargo.  To enable full combat operations, there must be “white 
space” between vehicles so that selective offload is an option.  During a civilian action, 
selective offload is assumed not necessary, so the “white space” lost for combat load outs 
would be replaced by additional supplies and materiel.   
i. Cargo Payload Area 
 The cargo payload area threshold (2,200 square feet.) was based on the 
requirement to load and un-load a minimum of four M1A1 Main Battle Tanks.  The 
Objective (5,500 square feet) was set to allow four M1A1 tanks and associated 
equipment. 
j. Cargo Payload Max Height 
 Since the ASE is planned to support a full range of combat and 
humanitarian efforts, a Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT) may be 
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required.  The minimum height required to support a HEMTT ( M1075/M1076) Truck 
and Trailer system is fifteen feet.  If the design of the ASE has an enclosed mission deck, 
then the cargo area must have sufficient height to support the HEMTT and trailer loaded 
with Twenty Foot Equivalent Units (ISO shipping containers). 
k. Deck Loading 
 Unlike the M1A1 Main battle tank, the wheeled combat vehicles in Army 
and Marine Corps have a very high point load at the wheels.  Therefore based on research 
and analysis of current ship designs, the capstone team selected a threshold of 500 
pounds per square foot for deck loading.  This will enable the largest number of military 
vehicles and cargo to be transported by the ASE. 
l. Cargo Transfer Capability 
Cargo transfer capabilities were modeled as binary criteria, Yes/No, for 
each of the missions for each type of capability based on whether the specific cargo 
transfer capability would be appropriate.  Based on the teams’ research and analysis, the 
threshold value, Yes or No was determined for each mission.  The objective value was set 
to have full Crane, RO/RO and Vertical Lift for all four mission areas. 
m. Clearance (for land ops) 
 The clearance selected by the capstone team was based on man-made and 
natural beach and land obstacles that an amphibious vehicle may encounter when 
performing operations.  A four foot threshold obstacle would allow the ASE to traverse 
over large rocks and obstructions. Obviously, this parameter is only relevant to 
amphibious alternatives. 
n. Land Grade 
 For amphibious alternatives, a five degree land grade threshold value was 
selected to allow the ASE to transit most beach areas when in air cushion vehicle 
configuration.  The land grade value was selected based on the literature review 
conducted by the team and on the design of existing and future air cushion vehicles.  The 
objective value of seven degrees would exceed existing capabilities.  This land grade was 
based on historical requirements of previously designed hovercraft vehicles. 
o. Crew Size 
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 A minimal crew size is desired based on stakeholder input. The crew size 
selected was based upon reduced manning requirements. If the mission requires a forcible 
entry craft, then the ASE would potentially require additional personnel to man offensive 
and defensive weaponry. Manning is a large contributor to Life Cycle Costs (LCC) and 
any reduction in manning, even a single billet, will have a significant impact upon LCC. 
p. Vehicle Vertical Ramp Angle 
 The ramp angle provided is consistent with current design requirements 
and is set to allow military vehicles to easily embark/debark the ASE. Depending on the 
configuration of the sea base, the ramp angle will need to allow interface with the various 
ships of the sea base as well as the different points of debarkation. 
q. Vehicle Ramp Slew Angle 
 A 40 deg slew angle will allow the ASE to work in an Austere port 
environmental as well as with a quay wall.  This will allow for side mooring and enable 
the ASE to perform full mission on-load and offload.  The ASE may also need to have 
the ability to offload either from the front or the rear depending on the design 
requirements. 
r. Ramp Length  
 A 30 ft. ramp length was selected as a threshold value by the capstone 
team to allow for vehicle offload to the largest possible locations, the longer the ramp 
length, the greater the allowance for cargo offload particularly for non-amphibious 
vessels.   
s. Draft, un-loaded / fully loaded 
The draft selected for the ASE was primarily based on the the beachability 
requirement and whether it was required for a specific mission. If beaching is not 
required then a draft not to exceed 15 ft is required to allow the ASE to operate in austere 
port environments.  However, if a mission requires the ability to beach then it will require 
a smaller draft, or no draft at all when it converts to amphibious mode.  The maximum 
draft of 12 feet was selected for a beachable craft assuming the ramp would then project 
to the beach and the cargo would be offloaded “Feet-dry”. For beaching craft, the smaller 
the draft the better. 
t. Combat Systems 
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 The ASE is assumed to have the capability for crew served weapons.  The 
Anti-terrorism / Force protection (AT/FP) capability is just the ability to mount weapons 
in specific locations when the ship is operating in an environment where AT/FP is 
required.  Depending on the employment and if the ASE is considered a forcible entry 
craft, then more robust self-defense and offensive capability may be necessary.  Possible 
levels of combat systems that the team considered include: 
o AT/FP Compatible – support carry on of AT/FP capabilities. For example, 50 
caliber machine gun mounts. 
o AT/FP Integrated – has AT/FP weaponry fully integrated and always 
available. 
o Armor (ballistic) – to provide protection from ballistic weaponry. 
o Self-Defense / Countermeasures – examples include chaff and flares. 
o Offense – offense includes more capable weaponry than covered by AT/FP. 
For example, 5 inch guns or small missiles or rockets. 
u. Built in Wash-Down Capability 
 The built in wash down capability is specifically for cleaning of vehicles 
that are being returned to the ASE after operations. The ASE is not assumed to be NBC 
capable, but the objective would be to allow the ASE to have an organic capability to 
clean vehicles and equipment prior to them returning to the ASE, and subsequently 
returning to the sea base. Stakeholders indicated it was required to de-contaminate the 
vehicles in the field. 
v. Signature Reduction 
 Reduced signatures were considered as a possible requirement. The ASE 
is not required to have any signature reduction. Under various operational concepts, the 
ASE is considered a combat capable craft. Under those operational scenarios the ability 
to have a reduced signature, (IR, magnetic, etc.) may be desirable, but is at best 
considered as an objective. 
w. Communications 
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 The minimum communications suite for the ASE is to allow for full 
operations of the craft at sea, within the sea base, and in any port or beach location.  The 
objective (more robust C4ISR including elements such as Common Operational Picture) 
would be necessary in a combat role during forcible entry.   
x. Cargo Area Cover (visual or ballistic shielded) 
 During discussions with the various stakeholders there were a number of 
suggestions regarding covering the cargo area. The suggestions ranged from a visually 
obscuring cover to “camouflage” or mask the cargo load, to full ballistic protection for 
the cargo area. The stakeholder suggestions included the desire to have protection of the 
cargo from environmental factors as well as threat factors depending on the employment 
of the ASE.  
y. Quantity of Berthing 
 The berthing numbers selected for the ASE for the Humanitarian Aid and 
Natural Disaster relief missions were based on the need for a workforce or relief team to 
be able to operate off of the ASE for a period of time to due to limited local 
infrastructure. 
F. SYSTEM CONTEXT 
The ASE team analyzed the environment in which as ASE would be expected to 
operate to identify which external systems or entities the ASE would interact with and 
what items or information would be exchanged between them.  According to Buede, “An 
external systems diagram is the single most important activity to help define the 
boundaries of the new system” (Buede, 2000).  The team developed an external systems 
diagram for ASE to aid in understanding how the ASE system would be required to 
function. Figure 7 shows the external systems diagram that was developed. The diagram 
is mostly in IDEF0 format with inputs coming in from the left, outputs exiting from the 





Figure 7.   ASE External Systems Diagram 
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The following describes the elements shown in Figure 7. 
1. CONUS 
The Continental United States is one of the locations from which the ASE might deploy. 
Fuel and Crew are expected items that move from CONUS to the ASE. (Note: for deployment 
the team made the assumption that the ASE generally deploys without cargo. Obviously it could 
deploy loaded although that would affect its deployment range.) 
2. Advanced Base 
The ASE might deploy from a forward or foreign base. As above, fuel and crew are the 
primary items transferred. 
3. Operational Command 
When an ASE is being used in an operational capacity it will be responsible to some 
operational command from which it will receive its operational orders. 
4. Sea base 
The most important external system from the perspective of this project is the sea base. 
The ASE will take on cargo, fuel and personnel from the sea base. In addition the sea base 
provides a control, in IDEF0 terms, to the ASE in the form of cargo transfer requirements and a 
mechanism in terms of cargo transfer technology or capability. 
5. Environment 
The ASE will operate in some physical environment that will influence how the ASE can 
operate. Weather is an example of an environmental control. Sea State will influence how and 
whether the ASE can operate. In addition, the ASE will contribute to the environment in terms of 
its physical interactions such as gaseous (exhaust) and electromagnetic emissions. 
6. Threats 
Another element of the environment that is covered separately is threats. As a military 
vessel the ASE may encounter significant threats as part of its operation. These threats create 
threat conditions that act as controls on the ASE. The ASE might have the capability to utilize 
countermeasures of some form in response to threats. 
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7. Destination 
Delivering the cargo and personnel it is carrying to some destination is the primary 
objective of the ASE. 
G. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Functional analysis is a critical systems engineering activity during which the key 
functions are identified and analyzed. The team considered the requirements that had been 
identified and the operational situation in which the ASE would operate, as depicted in the 
external systems diagram above, and then developed the hierarchical diagram of the three 
primary (top level) ASE functions, as shown in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8.   Top-level Functions 
 
1. Deploy ASE 
The Deploy ASE function is responsible for getting the ASE from wherever it is stationed 
to the sea base. The exact nature of this function will depend on the final form of the ASE but all 
ASE candidates must get to the sea base to perform their mission. 
2. Process Cargo 
The Process Cargo function includes the necessary activities to load and un-load materiel, 
personnel and any other items that must be loaded or un-loaded from an ASE and to or from any 
source or destination with which the ASE would be expected to operate. 
3. Transport Cargo 
The Transport Cargo function is responsible for moving the ASE, while loaded, from the 
ASE to its destination, and also possibly from the destination back to the sea base if the ASE is 
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returning with cargo or personnel. This function may also include elements for dealing with 
threats. 
It should be noted that there are many ways in which a system may be functionally 
decomposed. The functional hierarchy described here is one way in which the functions of an 
ASE could be decomposed. The team chose to focus on the logistics functions of the ASE since 
they are central to its mission. As such, the three top-level functions described represent good 
top-level functions for an ASE and it makes sense to incorporate sub-functions for dealing with 
threats as part of the transport function where such threats are most likely to be encountered. It 
would be equally valid to have a fourth top-level function for responding to threats. Also, as 
discussed later it is recognized that processing cargo can be significantly different depending on 
the type of cargo and mission. Top-level functions could have been created to acknowledge this. 
However, the team felt that the three top-level functions chosen were a good representation of 
the top level functions for an ASE. 
The team did additional analysis to decompose the top level functions. The team noted 
that there can be significant differences between how the ASE platform must behave depending 
on whether it is executing a combat or non-combat mission. As such, each function was 
decomposed into combat and non-combat versions as shown in Figure 9. The team felt that for 
the purposes of this project, decomposing Deploy ASE and Transport Cargo by combat or non-
combat mission was sufficient. Process Cargo, on the other hand, required some additional 
decomposition to understand some of the nuances of this function. The team recognized that the 
processes for loading and un-loading cargo, while similar in some respects, could also have 
significant differences and hence should be distinguished. Loading will take place at the sea 
base, a hopefully benign environment from a combat perspective. Un-loading cargo could 
potentially take place in a variety of physical situations (port, austere port, beach, etc.) and could 




Figure 9.   Functional Decomposition 
The cargo sub-functions are also decomposed based on whether the cargo is a combat or 
non-combat load. Non-combat loads are likely to be dominated by items such as ISO containers, 
pallets, etc. and may be packed more tightly than combat loads. Combat loads may be similar but 
also may be combat ready units ready to roll of the ASE and into action, a very different un-load 
process than un-loading pallets. 
In addition to the function requirements the team also considered non-functional 
requirements (INCOSE, 2006). In a systems engineering effort the non-functional requirements 
can play a major role in selecting a final solution. Non-functional requirements such as 
availability, reliability, maintainability and interoperability often are key attributes that define 
system performance. 
While non-functional requirements are important features of most systems, the team did 
not have the time to conduct any analysis on these requirements other than to identify some of 




Figure 10.   Non-Functional Requirements 
While functional requirements frequently get the most attention, non-functional 
requirements are frequently extremely important to achieving a usable system and should be 
carefully considered during the systems engineering effort. Figure 10 identifies the ASE non-
functional requirements. As stated above, for the purposes of this project the team did not do in 
depth analysis of non-functional requirements but a brief discussion of their relevance for an 
ASE system is presented.  
Within DOD, three of the most commonly recognized non-functional requirements are 
Reliability, Availability and Maintainability (RAM) (OSD, 2009). An ASE that breaks down or 
has degraded performance frequently, or that is not available when needed or that has excessive 
maintenance costs is not a good solution. Manning levels are a major cost driver for ships and 
most new ship programs give consideration to minimizing or optimizing manning levels. 
Transportability is an important factor in system design when considering the total force and 
 44 
logistics impact of a system. Will a system self-deploy and if so, under what conditions? If it 
cannot self-deploy, how will it be transported to its required destination? A system that requires 
special transportation equipment or procedures is not as attractive as one that can use existing 
transportation infrastructure. 
The definition of environment in today’s military structure has two independent 
meanings.  The first is how the environment impacts a ship, and second is how a ship impacts the 
environment.  As part of the non-functional requirements, both are considered.  First is the 
function of the system as it operates in the environment; how will it operate in varying 
temperatures, winds, seas, climates, and beach topographies.  The second is how the ship impacts 
the environment.  This is a subject that continues to get significant press and the Navy faces 
increasing challenges regarding environmental compliance. An example is the use of sonar 
systems near sea mammals. Dumping of wastes and inadvertent transport of living organisms to 
foreign habitats are examples of other issues. The environmental requirements for a platform, 
including policies, should be considered during the systems engineering process. Standards, 
interoperability and open architectures can have a major impact on the life-cycles costs of a 
system as well as the system’s ability to serve its primary functions. The ASE will have to 
interoperate with many other systems such as the systems that make up the sea base, port 
systems, and many others. 
Survivability is a major consideration for any military platform. While specific aspects of 
survivability may be functional in nature (chaff launchers, armor, etc.), survivability as a whole 
can be considered a non-functional requirement. Since a military platform is expected to face 
adverse conditions, survivability should certainly be a factor in deciding on a final solution. 
A system that is extremely expensive to produce will be less attractive than one that is not 
expensive to produce.  Producibility of a design should be considered as one factor when faced 
with options on how to implement a solution. 
The federal government and DOD have extensive rules regarding safety. The Operational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) provides regulations and guidance related to federal 
employee safety, including MIL-STD-882D (Standard Practice for System Safety).  While any 
military vessel or personnel will obviously face potential safety challenges due to the nature of 
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their missions, unnecessary safety risks are obviously undesirable and should be mitigated as 
much as possible during the systems engineering process. 
The above is not a comprehensive list of non-functional requirements but represents some 
of the factors that should be considered in making a final selection of an ASE alternative. As 
mentioned above, the team did not have time for detailed analysis of these factors so this is left 
as an exercise for future projects. 
H. VALUE SYSTEM DESIGN   
Sage and Armstrong state that the value system design is “probably the most 
controversial and crucial step of the entire [systems engineering] process” (Sage and Armstrong, 
2000). To develop a value system the systems engineers, through interaction with the 
stakeholders, define objectives and organize them in relationship to one another, generally in a 
hierarchical tree such that lower level objectives feed a higher level. The functional hierarchy 
represents a piece of a potential ASE value system as it provides the hierarchical tree of 
functional/performance objectives. A complete value system contains many types of objectives, 
examples of which would include cost, quality, non-functional requirements and others. In 
addition to structuring the system objectives into a hierarchy, metrics or objective measures are 
assigned to the lowest level objectives in the objectives tree. These criteria are used for 
measuring the success of various alternatives at meeting the objectives that represent the 
requirements for the system. The result of value system design is a hierarchical organization of 
objectives with associated measures. 
The team had significant interaction with some major stakeholders as described in the 
Stakeholder Analysis section. The majority of discussions and effort focused on needs for an 
ASE. The associated performance requirements are broadly represented by the functional 
hierarchy. The team expanded the functional hierarchy into an objectives hierarchy by adding 
potential metrics to the tree for the lowest level functions considered as shown in Figures 11 and 
12. Due to the iterative nature of the systems engineering process, the metrics essentially 
converged with the requirements parameters over the course of analysis. The explanations for 
these metrics are included with the requirements descriptions provided in Section E 
(Requirements Analysis) of this report. The metrics in these figures represented the starting point 
for parameters selected for decision analysis. 
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Figure 12.   Objectives Hierarchy – Load/Un-load and Transport 
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Table 3 aligns the objective hierarchy metrics in Figures 11 and 12 with the critical 
technical parameters in Table 11 that were used for decision analysis. Table 3 also lists the 






Table 3. Objectives Hierarchy Metrics – Critical Technical Parameter Alignment  
Category Objectives Hierarchy Metric (Figures 11 and 12) 
Critical Technical 
Parameter (Table 10) 
Future 
Research 
Un-Refueled Range (no cargo) (nautical miles) Self-Deployment Range  
Un-Refueled Range (loaded) (nautical miles) Intra-Theater Range  
Range & Speed 
Speed (knots) Speed  
Sea State (normal operations) (number)  Yes 
Sea State (survivable) (number)  Yes 
Sea State 
Sea State cargo operations (number)  Yes 
Services Quantity of Berthing (number)  Yes 
Communications Types (number)  Yes 
Crew Size (number) Crew Size  
Vehicle Vertical Ramp Angle (degrees)  Yes 
Vehicle Ramp Slew Angle (degrees)  Yes 
Vessel Operations 
Ramp Length (feet)  Yes 
Draft (un-loaded) (feet)  Yes Vessel Characteristics 
Draft (fully loaded) (feet)  Yes 
AT/FP Compatible (yes/no)  Yes 
AT/FP Integrated (yes/no)  Yes 
Armor (ballistic) (yes/no)  Yes 
Self Defense/Countermeasure Types (number)  Yes 
Combat Systems 
Offensive Capability Types 
(number) 
 Yes 
Cargo Payload Weight (short tons) Cargo Capacity  Cargo 
Cargo Payload Area (square feet)  Yes 
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Category Objectives Hierarchy Metric (Figures 11 and 12) 
Critical Technical 
Parameter (Table 10) 
Future 
Research 
Cargo Payload Max. Height (feet)  Yes 
Deck Loading (pounds/square foot)  Yes 
Cargo Transfer Capability Crane Ops (yes/no)  Yes 
Cargo Transfer Capability RO/RO (yes/no)  Yes 
Cargo Transfer Capability Vertical Lift (yes/no)  Yes 
Covered Cargo Area - visual (yes/no)  Yes 
Covered Cargo Area - ballistic shielded (yes/no)  Yes 
Beachable/Beach Un-load (yes/no) Beachability  
Clearance for Land Ops (feet)  Yes 
Terrain 





This section describes the material and non-material alternatives. 
1. Non-materiel solutions and impacts 
Non-materiel solutions are methods of satisfying an identified need by changing 
something within the current operational infrastructure that does not entail a full-scale 
development or acquisition process.  These solutions often involve process changes to increase 
efficiency or effectiveness of particular activities, training to improve performance with existing 
systems, or changes in policies that affect the procedures used to manage.  Many of these non-
materiel solutions may be accomplished in conjunction with other government agencies or 
through international coordination.   
Often a team would consider non-materiel solutions before starting a project to develop 
or procure a new materiel solution. However, that level of analysis is beyond the scope of this 
effort. The ASE team will consider a variety of alternatives that may be suitable for the ASE 
role, some of them being existing platforms that need no additional development. In addition, the 
team considered non-materiel aspects of a total ASE solution such as non-functional system 
attributes and elements of the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and 
Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) approach.  
In this section DOTMLPF elements are briefly considered in terms of how those 
elements might impact an ASE solution or how the existence of an ASE capability might impact 
the DOTMLPF elements. 
a. Doctrine 
There are numerous doctrinal elements that could impact the requirements for an 
ASE. The most notable area of doctrine relates to seabasing doctrine. The team utilized many 
seabasing references in analyzing the requirements for an ASE. These source documents 
essentially represent the seabasing doctrine and directly impact the need for an ASE and how an 
ASE would be operated. As mentioned previously, the team made the assumption that seabasing 
was a desirable capability and essentially accepted the seabasing doctrine as presented in the 
sources reviewed. If the doctrines used for this project were invalidated or changed then there 
would obviously be a significant impact of the requirements for an ASE. 
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b. Organization 
Organization of the Naval forces obviously impacts the requirements of an ASE. 
One example is the composition of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). It is expected that 
ASEs will support the transportation of the MEB during major combat operations. Another 
example is how the elements of a sea base are organized. As part of the naval inventory, ASEs 
will have to be assigned to specific operational elements. The organization of naval logistic 
assets and bases will impact how ASEs are based and deployed. Support element organization 
could also be impacted as ASE systems will need to be maintained. 
c. Training 
Training is a ubiquitous requirement across the naval enterprise. Obviously, a new 
asset or an asset being used in a new capacity, such as the ASE, will have an impact on training 
requirements for naval personnel. The crew of an ASE would need appropriate training in 
operating the vessel and performing the tasks required to support ASE operations. The education 
and training acquired by individual personnel and the unit’s training background are non materiel 
resources that contribute to the unit’s capability.  These resources are perishable and so 
continuing education and sustainment training must be part of the operational capability. 
d. Leadership and Education 
If an ASE ends up being a new capability then naval leadership will have to 
understand the impact of this new asset on mission operations and capabilities. The most 
significant aspect is most likely the enabling of seabasing and its impact on the nation’s ability to 
project power. Leadership will need to be educated on the new capabilities and their potential 
and impact. 
e. Personnel 
ASE personnel resource requirements involve not only having the right number of 
people ready and available, but also having the right occupational specialties for each job 
description.  While an ASE might be a new capability it is unlikely to have significant personnel 
impacts from a naval enterprise perspective. 
f. Facilities 
Facilities will be required to support docking and maintenance of an ASE, as with 
any other platform, however, it is unlikely that any new facilities would be required as there are 
no unique aspects identified related to an ASE platform that would require special facilities. 
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2. Materiel Solutions  
The final piece of the DOTMLPF lexicon is the need for a materiel solution.  As part of 
the analysis, the team analyzed seven different alternatives.  Each of these alternatives is 
discussed below.  Each alternative description contains a table of its primary characteristics 
including key parameters upon which the decision analysis was conducted. 
a. Ship to Shore Connector (SSC) 
The Ship to Shore Connector (SSC) is an Air Cushion Vehicle (ACV) currently in 
the contract design phase. The SSC (Figure 13) is slated to replace the current Landing Craft Air 
Cushion (LCAC) craft with an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in FY2019 (Carlson, 2009).   
While the SSC is a replacement for the current LCACs, it will provide increased 
operational capabilities with a significant improvement in the craft’s reliability. The SSC 




Figure 13.   Ship To Shore Connector (SSC) (Artist’s concept) 




Table 4. SSC characteristics 
Length Over All 93.2 feet (28.4 meters) 
Beam (Width) 48.1 feet (14.66 meters) 
Range (self-deploy) 86 nautical miles 
Speed (loaded) 40 knots 
Cargo Capacity 75 short tons (67long tons) 




The T-Craft (for Transformable Craft) is being developed under an Office of 
Naval Research (ONR) project on advanced sea base enablers. The objective of the T-Craft 
project is to provide “game changing” capabilities that will support making the Sea Power 21 
vision of seabasing a reality. At the time of this report the T-Craft project is completing phase 1 
under which three contractors with competing designs are developing T-Craft concepts. ONR’s 
objective is to move the project to phase 2 under which one contractor will be selected to 
develop a prototype system for testing. Figure 14 depicts one of the T-Craft’s concept designs. 
This project makes no judgment as to the engineering or naval architecture 





Figure 14.   T-Craft (artists concept) 
Image from http://www.marinelog.com/IMAGESMMVII/tcraft.jpg 
 
Key aspects of the ONR Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) for the T-Craft are that the 
T-Craft will be able to: 
• Travel 2,500 nautical miles at 20 knots in sea state 5 
• Transfer Cargo (tanks, equipment, personnel, etc.) from the sea base to the 
T-Craft at sea in state 4 seas 
• Traverse a 250 nautical miles Radius of Action in sea state 4 conditions at 40 
knots 
• Deliver 300 LT of Cargo to a dry Beach with a 0.5-2.0% (0.3-1.1 degree) slope 
• Drive off of the Beach and return 250 nautical miles to the sea base at 40 knots in 
sea state 4 without re-refueling 
The T-Craft concepts being created independently by Alion, Umoe Mandel and Textron 
are a merging of three ship-type concepts; the catamaran, the surface effect ship and the air 
cushion vehicle. Table 5 lists the T-Craft characteristics.  A catamaran utilizes two hulls that uses 
hydrostatic lift to support the hulls that are long and slender which, from a hydrodynamic point 
of view, are good shapes for high speed and operation in higher sea states, and is propelled with 
in-water propulsors.  A surface effect ship (SES) also has two long and slender hulls with fabric 
seals or skirts at its bow and stern.  It can operate as a catamaran at very low efficiency or in the 
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design configuration with lift fans that are driven to put air under the main hull to create the air 
cushion. The SES then is raised well out of the water by the air cushion minimizing the frictional 
wetting of the twin hulls or sidewalls which enables the SES to achieve very high speeds and 
with a ride control system. It has an improved ride quality and is propelled with in-water 
propulsors.  An air cushion vehicle (ACV) rides on a cushion of air which is contained by fabric 
seals or skirts around its entire periphery.  An ACV uses lift fans to provide its cushion air, is 
amphibious, and is powered by air propellers; hence, it has limited range and speed. (Wilson, 
2009). 
The vision for the T-Craft is that it will be an SES which can operate at times as a 
catamaran or as a standard SES but at various lift system power setting, thus varying the amount 
of sidewall depth in the water. When operating as an ACV, the skirts are released from the sides 
of the hull and mating with the bow and stern seals such that the entire lower periphery of the 
vessel is covered by the skirts.   
This combination of modes will provide capabilities for self-deployment at significant 
ranges, high speed transfer of cargo from the sea-base to the destination, and amphibious 
delivery of the cargo and personnel “feet dry” to a beach. The T-Craft will also be required to 
interface to sea base assets and support other required naval vessel and military requirements 













Table 5. T-Craft Characteristics 
Length Over All Nominally 240 feet (73.2 meters) 
Beam (Width) Nominally 70 feet (21.3 meters) catamaran /  
100 feet (30.5 meters) ACV 
Range (self-deploy) 2500 nautical miles 
Speed (loaded) 40 knots 
Cargo Capacity 336 short tons (300 long tons) 
Crew Size 3 
Beachable Yes 
Source: (Wilson, 2008) 
 
c. Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) 
The Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) is a fully amphibious ACV craft that 
utilizes an air cushion to “lift” the craft out of the water and supports the craft and its entire 
payload. It is able to carry 60 short tons (75 overloaded) at speeds up to 40+ knots. Table 6 lists 
the LCAC characteristics. 
LCAC’s, as shown in Figure 15, first achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in 
1986. At that time they were intend to have a service life of 20 years. Beginning in 2000, the 
class began to undergo a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) that will extend the operational 
life to 30 years. The SLEP LCAC’s will be used to bridge the availability gap until the Ship to 




Figure 15.   Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) 











Table 6. LCAC Characteristics 
Length Over All 87 feet, 11in (26.8 meter) -on cushion 
Beam (width) 47 feet (14.3 meter) - on cushion 
Range (self-deploy) 200 nautical miles  
Speed (loaded) 40 knots 
Cargo Capacity 60 short tons (53 long tons) 
75 short tons (67 long tons) - overload 
Crew Size 5 
Beachable Yes 
Source:  (Marine Corps, 2001) 
 
d. Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) 
The Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) program is a Navy led acquisition to 
procure a high-speed, shallow draft ship capable of intra-theater transport of personnel and cargo 
for the joint force.  The JHSV, as shown in Figure 16, is being designed to be capable of 
transporting 700 short tons of troops, supplies, and equipment 1200 nautical miles at an average 




Figure 16.   Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) 
Image retrieved from (Austal JHSV Team, 2009) 
The JHSV is intended to fill the gap between low-speed sea lift and high speed airlift by 
transporting personnel, equipment, and supplies over operational distances.  The JHSV will have 
a shallow draft and high speed to allow for fast transit and access to austere and degraded ports.  
The JHSV will be designed to allow for immediate offload of combat-ready troops and 
equipment.  JHSV will have the ability to self-deploy directly to the sea base or to the 
operational area. The JHSV will operate under the protection of other vessels and will only 
operate independently in permissive/benign environments. The JHSV does not have the ability to 
deliver cargo or personnel directly to an unimproved beach without additional resources. 
Table 7. JHSV Characteristics 
Length Over All 337.9 feet (103 meters) 
Beam (width) 93.5 feet (28.5 meters) 
Range (self-deploy) 5600 nautical miles  
Speed (loaded) 35 knots 
Cargo Capacity 700 short tons (625 long tons) 
Crew Size 41 
Beachable No 
Source: from (Austal JHSV Team, 2009) 
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The JHSV will not be a forcible entry asset and will be designed to commercial 
shipbuilding standards.  The first JHSV is currently scheduled to be delivered in the beginning of 
FY12 with the remaining ships being delivered starting in FY13. 
Table 7 lists the JHSV characteristics and Figure 16 shows the general design of the 
JHSV following the Phase I contract period.  The JHSV program is currently in phase II, detailed 
design and construction.  Construction of the first JHSV is scheduled to begin in November 
2009. As Greg Trauthwein noted “Austal is the prime contractor for the project and the company 
will design and construct the first 103-m JHSV with options for nine additional vessel - a 





Figure 17.   Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) General Vessel Description 
Image retrieved from (Austal JHSV Team, 2009) 
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e. Logistics Support Vessel (LSV) 
The Logistics Support Vessel (LSV), shown in Figure 18, is a self deployable 
vessel that provides transport of vehicles and cargo. The LSV can perform intra-theater supply of 
cargo and equipment.  The LSV has both bow and stern ramps. The LSV is ideally suited for 
Roll-on/Roll-off (RO/RO), Large, Medium-Speed, RO/RO Ships (LMSR) and Logistics Over-
the-Shore (LOTS) operations. The LSV can perform tactical re-supply in remote areas with 
unimproved beaches as well as austere ports. The LSV has a bow thruster to assist with 
beaching, beach extraction, docking, undocking and can conduct these operations without 
landing.  
The first LSV will begin to reach the end of its projected lifecycle in 2013. The LSV has 
been identified by the Army for modernization and service life extension beginning in 2009 to 
extend the useful life until 2024. The modernization program is planned to be complete before 
2015. The modernization strategy includes the equipping of LSV’s with updated C4ISR and 
AT/FP capabilities. The LSV’s lack of speed will remain an issue after modernization.  
 
Figure 18.   Logistics Support Vessel (LSV) 
(Army, 2008) 
The LSV has an un-refueled range with No-Cargo of 8,200 nautical miles at 12.3 knots 
and an un-refueled range loaded is 6,500 nautical miles at 11.5 knots. The LSV can perform sea 
based cargo operation at sea state 3.  The LSV can beach, but cannot operate over land. The LSV 
requires a crew of 32. Table 8 lists the LSV characteristics. 
The LSV has a cargo payload capacity of 2000 short tons. The LSV deck area of 10,500 
square feet and can accommodate 24 M1 main battle tanks. Cargo can be transferred via crane 
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operations and RO/RO.  The LSV does not have vertical lift capabilities. The LSV has a ramp 
length of 32 feet. 
The LSV is currently deployed as part of the Army watercraft fleet and is part of the U.S. 
Army plan for supporting a sea base as shown in Figure 19. 
 
Figure 19.   LSV as sea base Connector 
Image from: (Army, 2008) 
The LSV can self deploy from CONUS to the sea base location. At the sea base location 
it is loaded via crane or RO/RO as needed and provides the sea base connector function to port 





Table 8. LSV Characteristics 
Length Over All 273 feet (83.2 meters) - LSV1-6 
314 feet (95.7 meters) - LSV7-8 
Beam (width) 60 feet (18.3 meters) 
Range (self-deploy) 8,200 nautical miles 
Speed (loaded) 11.5 knots 
Cargo Capacity 2,000 short tons (1785 long tons) 
Crew Size 32 
Beachable Yes 
 
f. LCU - 2000 
The Landing Craft, Utility 2000 (LCU) provides transport of combat vehicles and 
cargo.  Re-supply missions can be undertaken to remote areas with austere shore facilities and 
unimproved beaches.  The LCU, shown in Figure 20, is ideally suited for the discharge or 
loading of sealift including RO/RO such as with Military Sealift Command's large, medium-
speed, roll-on/roll-off ship (LMSR) and Logistics Over-the-Shore (LOTS) operations. The LCU 
has a bow ramp for RO/RO cargo and a bow thruster to assist in beaching, beach extraction, 
docking, undocking and is able to perform these operations unassisted.  
The LCU will begin to reach the end of its projected lifecycle in 2015. The LCU has been 
identified by the Army for modernization and service life extension beginning in 2012 to extend 
the useful life until 2024. The modernization program is planned to be complete before 2015. 
The modernization strategy includes the equipping of LCU’s with updated C4ISR and AT/FP 




Figure 20.   Landing Craft Utility: LCU-2000 
Image from: (Army, 2008) 
The LCU has an un-refueled range un-loaded of 9,200 nautical miles at 12 knots and an 
un-refueled range loaded of 6,500 nautical miles at 10 knots. The LCU can perform sea based 
cargo operations at sea state 3.  The LCU can beach, but cannot operate over land.  The cargo 
payload capacity is 350 short tons. The deck area of 2,500 square feet and can accommodate 5 
M1 main battle tanks. Cargo can be transferred via crane operations and RO/RO.  The LCU does 
not have vertical lift capabilities.   The LCU has a ramp length of 22 feet. The LCU requires a 
crew of 13. The LCU characteristics are listed in table 9. 
The LSU is currently deployed as part of the Army Water Craft fleet and is part of the 
U.S. Army plan for supporting a sea base as shown in Figure 19. The LCU can self deploy from 
CONUS to the sea base location. At the sea base location it is loaded via crane or RO/RO as 








Table 9. LCU-2000 Characteristics 
Length Over All 174 feet (53.04 meters) 
Beam (width) 42 feet (12.8 meters) 
Range (self-deploy) 9,200 nautical miles 
Speed (loaded) 10 knots 
Cargo Capacity 350 short tons (312 long tons) 




The ability to re-supply combat forces over long distances without depending on 
truck convoys is fundamental to the operational concepts of sea-basing. This means that Marine 
Corps ground forces and early-entry Army forces will be more dependent on air transport than 
they ever have been in the past, as shown in Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21.    Notional sea base airlift  
Image from: (NRC, 2005) 
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The capability to project influence from the sea base to a forward objective is not strictly 
limited to surface operations.  The ability to employ airlift provides the regional commander with 
flexibility of maneuver across multiple mission scenarios in conjunction with surface operations 
or acting independently.   Prior to 2007 there were two distinct programs within the DOD that 
sought to define, test, and equip future forces with the next generation airlift vehicle.   
Joint Heavy Lift (JHL) was a program under direction of the US Army that sought 
primarily vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) configured aircraft for the next generation airlift 
mission.  JHL requirements were built around transporting the future combat system (FCS) 20 
ton combat vehicles directly to the objective for Lightening strike capability.  In May 2007, the 
Army picked the Quad Tilt-rotor (Figure 22), an 80-ton behemoth nearly the length of a C-130. 
Designed by a Bell-Boeing Textron team, the four-rotor aircraft was intended to carry 10 tons of 
fuel and 20 tons of cargo up to 4,000 feet at temperatures up to 95 degrees Fahrenheit (Osborn, 
2008).  The VTOL capability of this aircraft allows the strike force to go directly to an objective 
a significant distance inland over almost any terrain as opposed to a beachable water-borne 
vessel or amphibious vessel which requires an intermediate stop and staging point. 
 
Figure 22.   Bell/Boeing Quad Tilt-rotor concept  
Image from: (Sklar, 2006) 
Due to a significant paradigm shift in combat operations, due in part to the evolution of 
the IED (improvised explosive device), the manned FCS vehicles are required to be equipped 
with much more armor.  The revised armor requirement has increased the transport weight of 
many of these vehicles to a range of 25-30 tons (Grant, 2008). This revised weight requirement 
invalidates previous design configurations – namely the Quad Tilt Rotor. 
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Since 2005, the Air Force had been working on a future-airlift program of its own, the 
Advanced Joint Air Combat System (AJACS). Early design models from the Air Force Research 
Laboratory, headquartered at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, show a tougher, stealthier, 
slightly larger C-130-type cargo plane. The aircraft will have short-takeoff and landing ability 
(STOL), which is generally defined as being able to take off and clear a 50-foot high obstacle at 
the end of a 2,000-foot runway. The plane will have a top speed comparable to that of a 
commercial airline: Mach 0.8, about twice as fast as the C-130. (Osborn, 2008) As shown in 
Figure 23, Boeing, Lockheed and Northrop Grumman have been involved in AJACS 
development. 
 
Figure 23.   Concepts for future STOL airlift 
(L to R Lockheed MACK vehicle, Northrop concept, Boeing modified C-17) 
Image from: http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/ajacs-load-us-begins-another-nextgen-
tactical-transport-project-03230/ 
The capabilities of both platforms types will impact the future mission configuration of 
the sea base.  Recently the two programs have been brought under one developmental umbrella 
and the effort has been re-designated Joint Future Theater Lift (JTFL) (Osborn, 2008).  The 
Defense Science Board study published in July 2007 stated: 
Distance, volume, weight, and speed requirements – as well as likely threat 
environments rule out ground transportation in many instances.  Deployed forces 
will require air bridges connecting enclaves to more developed intermediate 
supply bases (ISBs) or sea bases far from the scene of combat. The single best fit 
for a tactical ground combat support aircraft is one that combines elements of 
both rotary and fixed-wing technology in a hybrid aircraft.  (Defense Science 
Board, 2007) 
The change in program organization does not detract from the fact that a next generation 
mobility aircraft is needed to truly exploit all the benefits of seabasing.  Figure 24 shows the 
payload delivery required (in tonnage vs. range) by airlift in order to sustain mission operations 
ashore.  The configuration of the sea base’s landing and loading platforms will be driven by this 
next generation mobility aircraft; so it is essential that the requirements and attributes of this 
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hybrid aircraft are well defined.  A composite specification for this vehicle is detailed in Table 
10. 
 
Figure 24.   Airlift payload tonnage v. range 
Image from: (NRC, 2008) 
 
Table 10. Next Generation Air Mobility Requirements 
Attribute Requirement 
Payload >30 short tons 
Speed >300 knots 
Mission radius 250-500 nautical miles 
Cargo space Consistent with FCS vehicle spec 
Transit altitude >15000 ft 
Take-off & landing Capable of VTOL but able to use 
1,000 feet runway 
Joint operability sea base compatible 
Environment Operate at 4000 feet with 95F temp 
(Defense Science Board, 2007) 
The ability to employ airlift as a seabasing enabler provides regional commanders 
superior flexibility in executing mission tasking.  Airlift not only enables but accentuates the 
other logistics capabilities such as water and land based connectors by delivering key mission 




During the analysis phase of the systems engineering process the team brought together 
previously developed and defined alternatives and needs.  The team examined the potential of 
the seven alternatives (defined in the formulation section) to determine how they met the 
requirements identified by earlier steps.  This evaluation also determined any “impacts or 
consequences of the alternatives” applicable to any issues defined in the value system (Sage and 
Armstrong, 2000). 
The team performed detailed research to assemble a list of key requirements that 
pertained to various operational scenarios, as detailed in Section I.  This list was compiled and 
sent to the stakeholders in the form of a survey.  The stakeholders were asked to rank the 
requirements from most desired to least desired utilizing a number scale as described in Section 
II (Formulation – Requirements Analysis).   The results of these rankings were compiled and the 
six primary requirements for the ASE were determined, as seen in Table 11. These threshold and 
objective values were developed after extensive review on seabasing and interviews with the 
project stakeholders. For the two missions considered (MCO and Humanitarian), the threshold 
and objective values for these specific parameters were considered to be equal, with the 
exception of beachability as described later. During this phase of the project we were interested 
in the ability of the craft to conduct the mission, not necessarily the parameters of the mission 
and we did not include other parameters of the mission such as weather conditions (wind, sea 
state, temperature, humidity, etc) , time of day (or night) nor other potentially relevant 
parameters. 
Value curves were generated based on this ranking data. The team used the Multi-
Attribute Utility theory (MAUT) process to compare the strengths and weaknesses of each 
alternative with regard to the objectives.  In addition, the team performed selective Modeling and 
Simulation (M&S) on the major combat operation scenario for one alternative, which appears to 
be most demanding scenario.  Our limited simulation analysis serves as a platform for future 




Table 11. Critical Technical Parameters 
Parameter Threshold Objective 
Self-Deployment Range 1000 nautical miles 2500 nautical miles 
Crew size 100 0 
Intra-Theater Range 25 nautical miles 250 nautical miles 
Speed 20 knots 40 knots 
Cargo Capacity 300 short tons 600 short tons 
Beachability No Yes 
 
A. FEASIBILTY SCREENING 
Once the team generated a number of alternatives the next step in the process is to 
perform a feasibility screening based on certain criteria.  The purpose of feasibility screening is 
to save analysis time by eliminating alternatives that are obviously not suitable for consideration 
before detailed analyses are performed.  Based on research and stakeholder feedback, at this 
broad level of system design the only screening criteria defined was the ability of the ASE to 
beach for combat operations. As mentioned in the formulation section, beachability is being 
capable of delivering cargo and personnel directly to the beach without the need for any 
additional infrastructure.  Beachability was a critical requirement for combat missions and 
desirable for humanitarian aid missions.  As a result of the screening criteria, the JHSV was ruled 
out of the decision analysis for combat missions. 
Due to the recent changes in focus regarding the future of joint airlift there is currently no 
cohesive vision regarding specific requirements, much less a flagship design that embodies the 
desired joint airlift capability.  The team members collectively agreed that including dated joint 
airlift requirements into the ASE decision analysis would not add any merit to the analysis, 
therefore it was screened out.  It is the professional collective opinion of the team that joint airlift 
should be included in any and all future ASE analysis, once the requirements are jointly vetted 
and the program has reach an appropriate level of technical maturity. 
B. MODELING, SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS 
1. Modeling and Simulation Approach 
a. Definition of the Objective 
The desired objective of the analysis phase of our study was to determine which 
of the various alternative systems (or combinations thereof) is better in terms of the parameters 
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of interest established in Section II.  Particularly, the processing and movement of cargo and 
forces ashore, as established in the objectives hierarchy, are the most significant parameters.  
While we discuss a broad analysis of the capabilities of each of the proposed alternative vessels 
in the next chapter, our M&S analysis is limited to one alternative technology, the LCAC, for 
which functional information exists.  The M&S analysis therefore seeks to determine whether the 
LCAC alternative meets the threshold requirements of the value hierarchy.  The major purpose 
for M&S in this simulation analysis is to lay the foundation for future work such as the 
development of functional architectures for the various alternatives.   
Of the four mission areas described earlier (Major Combat Operation, Police 
Enforcement Operation, Natural Disaster Relief, and Humanitarian Aid), Major Combat 
Operation was chosen as the primary operational scenario for study.  The primary reasons for 
this choice are the availability of applicable data and the relative importance of the mission 
scenario.  The M&S analysis will focus on evaluating sections 2 and 3 of the objectives 
hierarchy, Load/Un-load Cargo and Transport Combat Cargo, respectively, in the context of the 
MCO scenario. 
b. Context of the Evaluated Objective 
The context focuses on the critical operational issue among stakeholders, which is 
ship-to-shore movement of equipment, supplies, and personnel, and is captured in sections 2 and 
3 of the objectives hierarchy.  The parameters of interest in this context are Cargo Payload 
Weight, Cargo Payload Area, Cargo Payload Maximum Height, Deck Loading, Cargo Transfer 
Capabilities, and Sea State 
c. M&S Requirements Analysis 
The analysis of system parameters performed with utility curves and static 
spreadsheet models does not capture the dynamic behavior of the alternative systems under 
study.  Discrete-event simulation is a popular technique that can be employed in the study of 
dynamic systems, and is herewith employed as part of the analysis of alternatives.  More 
specifically, a process-oriented discrete-event approach is used.   
Three primary world views exist in discrete event simulation programming: the activity-
oriented paradigm, the event-oriented paradigm, and the process-oriented paradigm (Matloff, 
2008).  Activity-oriented simulations step through time at small, uniform time increments and 
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check for state changes at each step.  This approach is well suited for systems in which activity 
delays and inter-arrival times are continuous random variables, as is the case for the alternative 
systems herein, but is very slow to execute.  Multiple experiment runs would require a 
significant amount of time to complete, and therefore the activity-oriented paradigm is deemed 
unsuitable for employment in this study.   
The event-oriented paradigm is somewhat more desirable since it shortcuts the time-
incremented approach of the activity-oriented method by storing a set of all pending events and  
proceeding from one stored event time to the next.  The event-oriented process is more flexible, 
executes faster, and is easier to implement than the activity-oriented approach.   
Lastly, the process-oriented approach is one in which simulation activities are modeled 
by processes.  The uniqueness of this approach is found in the concurrent nature of the processes.  
The idea that concurrent processes exist is a natural one.  Many processes execute independently 
of one another, but it is more often the case that processes are interdependent; their states being 
dependant on the states of other processes.  The major benefit of this paradigm is the ability to 
more closely model a system as is would exist in nature.  The process-oriented paradigm has all 
the benefits of the event-oriented paradigm, but also has the added benefit of natural 
representation.  Therefore, the process-oriented method is the approach adopted for the purposes 
of this study. 
d. Selection of Synthetic Environment 
All of the aforementioned factors were evaluated in determining which simulation 
tool to adopt for use in this study.  Initially, the study adopted an approach using the SimPy 
simulation software library since highly skilled M&S personnel with experience using this 
library were available.  However, given that basis of future work concerning this topic will rely 
partly on the resulting models and data sets of this study, it has been determined that a need for 
ease of use is the most important factor.  It is unlikely that future modelers will have the requisite 
knowledge and ability to quickly and easily utilize any work or product developed in a software 
library environment.  Of equal importance is the choice of a tool that is popular and widely 




2. Model Constructs 
a. Description of Scenario and Mission  
The scope of the simulation study was limited to a major combat operation 
(MCO) scenario.  Specifically, it was limited to those mission areas of MCO utilizing the ASE as 
a ship-to-shore connector. This mission role corresponds to the functions in the Objective 
Hierarchy:  “2.0 Process Cargo” and “3.0 Transport Cargo”. 
The intent of the simulation study was to capture the performance of this mission role 
with a functional system consisting of one LMSR, one MLP, and six LCAC craft.  This 
functional configuration is herein referred to as the "baseline" configuration.  This baseline was 
chosen because it utilized known systems. Seabasing consists of many platforms whose 
characteristics have not been adequately defined and tested, especially in relation to the Function 
2.0 Process Cargo. For this reason, only the baseline case was explored. 
The baseline MCO scenario was defined as a combat mission that needed to bring ashore 
notional combat equipment for one Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) from a sea base 
located 25 nautical miles from the objective (beach).  Large construction equipment that may be 
associated with a MEB is not included in the simulation because the size of the equipment does 
not permit transportation to the sea base via the LMSR and therefore cannot participate in the 
assembly process aboard the LMSR. 
In the simulation, the LCAC craft are able to travel at maximum speed (40 knots), in an 
operating environment that consists of sea state 1 with an air temperature of 70 degrees F. Six 
LCAC were chosen for this simulation because it is the maximum number of LCAC that can be 
assigned to a ship per NWP 3-02.12, "Employment of Landing Craft Air Cushion".  It is 
assumed, for the purposes of the simulation, that breakdowns of equipment, either LCAC or 
otherwise and either at sea or aboard the LMSR or the MLP, do not occur, and that no other 
similar factors that might inhibit the optimum execution of the mission arise. 
b. Performance Measures 
The metrics chosen for the simulation study reflect the extent to which the ASE 
system is able to complete the Load Cargo system function of the objectives hierarchy, and the 
extent to which the ASE system is able to complete the Transport Cargo system function of the 
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objectives hierarchy. Table 12 provides a mapping of the simulated MOPs and objective 
functions.  One Measure of Performance (MOP) is chosen for each of these functions.  For the 
Load Cargo function, the MOP is the time required to assemble forces, equipment, and cargo, 
and to place these assembled forces onto awaiting ASE craft for transport ashore (Assemble).  
The MOP for the Transport Cargo system function is the time required to move these assembled 
forces ashore (Employ).  The threshold values for these MOPs are obtained from the seabasing 
Joint Integrating Concept (DOD, 2005). 
They are: 
• Assemble – assemble and integrate joint capabilities from the sea base to support 
major combat operations within 24 – 72 hours of arrival within the Joint 
Operational Area (JOA); 
• Employ – employ over-the-horizon from the sea base at least one brigade for Joint 
Forcible Entry Operations (JFEO) within a period of darkness (8 – 10 hours). 
It is important at this juncture to understand where the JIC measures of performance used 
in the simulation tie into the objectives hierarchy and, where possible, to identify possible future 
technical parameters that were not treatable in the current decision analysis.  Table 12 illustrates 
how the simulation measures of performance align with the objectives hierarchy. The Assemble 
measure of performance incorporates objectives in the Function 2.1 Load Combat Cargo of the 
ASE. The Employ measure of performance incorporates objectives of Function 2.2 Un-load 
Combat Cargo and Function 3.1 Transport Combat Cargo.  The time to assemble and time 
required for employment can be technical parameters that vary depending upon the particular 
ASE alternative employed. When more characteristics of the sea base become known, this 
simulation can be used to establish values for both technical parameters for each ASE alternative 
and incorporated into the decision analysis. The contribution of these two critical parameters in 
future analysis work is important as they fill a known gap in available data and can make the 





Table 12. Mapping of Simulation MOPS to Objective Functions 
Simulation MOP Objectives Function(s) 
Assemble MOP 2.1 (Load Combat Cargo) 
Employ MOP 3.2 (Transport Combat Cargo) 
2.2 (Un-load Combat Cargo) 
The data requirements for the MOPs are the simulation time required for assembly, and 
simulation time required for employment, respectively.  The simulation study accumulates 
multiple observations of these measures and statistically determines if the modeled system meets 
the required values as established in the objectives hierarchy. 
c. Model Entities, Assets, and Resources 
The baseline model consists of several entities, assets, and resources.  In the 
model, entities were defined as war fighting equipment, supplies, and troops, since these are the 
items in the system upon which the performance of the modeled system depends.  Specifically, 
for assembly, the simulation monitored elapsed time between the first vehicle beginning 
assembly operations and the last vehicle completing assembly operations.  Similarly, the 
simulation monitored elapsed time for employment; the time between the beginning of LCAC 
loading operations and the last vehicle to debark its ferrying LCAC ashore. 
Assets are usually those items in a model which host various resources.  A resource is 
something that is required in the performance of an assigned task, is usually available in limited 
quantities, and must be shared by all assets and entities which require said resource.  An asset 
can also be counted as a resource, as is the case for the Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) in 
this simulation.  Assets in the model were the LMSR, aboard which all assembly operations 
occur; the MLP, aboard which queuing of assembled forces and the subsequent loading of LCAC 
craft occurs; and the LCACs themselves.  Resources belonging to the LMSR asset are forklift 
trucks for the dissemination of supplies to each vehicle in the assembly area, a buffer area for 
sequencing of vehicular and troop movement from the LMSR to the MLP, and a ramp for the 
actual transfer of vehicles and troops from the LMSR to the MLP.  Only one resource belongs to 
the MLP asset: a ramp for the transfer of assembled forces aboard an embarked LCAC.  Lastly, 
as stated earlier, the LCAC asset also serves as a resource in the model since the number of 
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available LCAC are limited, and LCAC usage must be shared among assembled forces requiring 
transit ashore 
3. Description of Primary Model Processes 
a. Assembly of Forces 
The major process streams in the simulation model are vehicular loading of Joint 
Modular Intermodal Containers (JMICs), foot transit of troops to and from the MLP, loading of 
assembled vehicles aboard an LCAC, and ferrying of assembled forces ashore via LCAC.  
JMICs are standard containers demonstrated under a JCTD program that are smaller than the 20 
foot ISO containers and are likely candidates for future military cargo transport. The Assemble 
line of operation contains a number of processes which are depicted in Figure 25.  Prior to the 
onset of combat operations (and hence prior to the beginning of the simulation) vehicles arrive at 
the sea base aboard a modified LMSR in a stowed configuration.  Once the sea base has been 
closed and combat preparations have commenced, each vehicle is un-stowed, fueled, and queued 
for entrance into the assembly area.  The simulation begins at this point with the batching of 
vehicles into small groups (waves) which then proceed into an assembly area at maneuvering 
speed (see Appendix B for wave data).  Assembly is then accomplished through the hand-
loading of supplies and munitions contained within JMICs which are transported by fork truck to 
the vehicles from a ready storage locker (RSL).  Each vehicle type has a unique requirement for 
supplies and munitions (see Appendix B for vehicle types and their corresponding JMIC 
requirements).  Therefore, certain vehicles require greater time to un-load their respective JMICs 
than others.  The contents of each JMIC is unpacked and loaded onto its respective vehicle one at 
a time, and each JMIC requires 300 seconds of time for the unpacking of contents, stowage 
aboard the vehicle, and then the dismantling of the empty JMIC container.  Once all required 
JMICs have been delivered to their respective vehicles the unpacking of contents begins and all 
free forklift trucks begin replenishing the RSLs with new JMICs that arrive from cargo holds, 
and also begin to remove retrograde (dismantled JMICs) from the assembly area for return to the 
cargo holds below.  Once all JMICs have been un-loaded and all retrograde removed from the 
assembly area, the wave of vehicles move together from the assembly area into a ramp buffer 
area, where coordination of transiting vehicles and troops to the MLP occurs.  While this wave of 
assembled vehicles moves out of the assembly area, the next wave of vehicles moves into the 




Figure 25.   Notional Assembly Process 
 
b. Employment of Forces 
Once assembled and having successfully transited the ramp between the LMSR 
and the MLP, the assembled forces and equipment are queued for loading aboard an LCAC at 
one of two designated LCAC loading points.  Vehicles are batched into appropriately-sized 
groups of vehicles for optimum LCAC combat loading with a maximum load of 75 short tons 
allowed.  Once an LCAC resource has been secured (an LCAC has become available for 
loading), the next wave of assembled forces moves aboard.  Once loaded, the LCAC departs the 
MLP load point and proceeds to an at-sea LCAC collection area.  LCACs wait in the collection 
area until three LCAC are available for batching into a three-member column echelon for transit 
to shore.  Transit to shore occurs via established landing craft control points in route to the 
shoreline.  Once a loaded LCAC has reached the shoreline, it begins maneuvering operations to 
land on the beach at the craft penetration point.  Once beach landing has been achieved, the 
LCAC proceeds a short distance to a craft landing zone where assembled forces un-load and 
proceed to the objective.  Un-loaded LCACs then proceed to a beach debarkation craft control 
point on the beach, where they begin their transit to the craft holding area at sea and await 




Figure 26.   Notional Employment Process via LCAC and MLP 
Image from (USMC, 2009)  
 
4. Model Output 
a. Output Summary 
The data collected from each simulation run is as follows: 
1. The time required for each individual MEB vehicle (and its attached trailer as applicable) 
to complete each stage of assembly aboard the LMSR; 
2. The time required for each individual MEB vehicle (and its attached trailer as applicable) 
to transit a 100 foot ramp from the LMSR to the MLP at maneuvering speed; 
3. The time required for each batch of 50 troops to transit a 100 foot ramp from the LMSR 
to the MLP on foot; 
4. The time required for each batch of 50 troops to transit a 100 foot ramp from the MLP to 
the LMSR; 
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5. The time required for each LCAC to complete its un-loading process at the craft landing 
zone;  
The time required for LCAC return to the craft launch area Troop movement back and 
forth from the MLP to the LMSR represents the MEB personnel required to participate in 
combat operations ashore.  The inclusion of troop movement from the LMSR to the MLP, and 
from the MLP to the LMSR, demonstrates that the shared dependence of a single ramp between 
the LMSR and the MLP between the troop movement process and the vehicular movement 
process had negligible effects upon overall simulation time required to complete the assembly 
process.  It should be noted that the inclusion of the buffer area permits this condition as 
assembly processes are allowed to continue inside the closed assembly area while coordination 
of vehicular and pedestrian traffic across the ramp is performed. 
b. Simulation Results and Conclusions 
This study performed 50 iterations of the simulation, computed the means and 
standard deviations for the two MOPs described above, and computed their respective 95% 
confidence intervals. The study finds that the notional baseline case fulfills the mission threshold 
requirements with regard to the Assemble MOP only.  The Assemble threshold requirement of 
72 hours is met with a mean completion time of 61.92 hours in the baseline case.  The Employ 
threshold requirement of 10 hours is Not met.   The Employ MOP completes with a mean 
completion time of 53.16 hours.  It should be noted however, that the baseline case did not study 
the effects of delivering forces farther than 25nautical miles from shore, and that additional study 




C. COST ANALYSIS 
The Cost Analysis section covers several areas of analysis.  The cost estimates are a 
mixture of estimates by analogy with assumptions and rationales with historical data from past 
acquisitions converted to FY09 dollars. The first area of analysis is the alternative cost estimates. 
Given there are several alternatives, some already in the fleet, two in development, and another 
in Research and Development (R&D), developing cost estimates was complicated.  Cost 
estimates were developed for the existing and developmental alternatives first. Following that, a 
cost estimate for the R&D alternative, the T-Craft, was performed using a mixture of the other 
alternatives to form a unique analogous estimate. Next, the Total Ownership Cost (TOC) for 
each alternative on an individual basis was illustrated graphically. The team assumed a notional 
fielding date for an ASE platform of 2015 and as such the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) 
costs start to accrue at that time.   Following the TOC, notional mission costs for each alternative 
system are examined.  Last, a cost-benefit analysis compares the TOC for each platform against 
the notional mission costs.  
Table 13 contains a summary of the costs for five of the six alternatives considered, with 
the exception of T-Craft. The T-Craft is excluded from this initial cost estimate since it is such a 
unique vessel currently in R&D and as such the T-Craft cost estimate is derived using an 
analogous estimate using the final costs estimates from the alternatives discussed later on in this 
section.  Table 13 includes the estimates for non-reoccurring engineering (NRE), acquisition, 
O&M and service life extension (SLEP) which is O&M but listed separately, and 








Table 13. Summary of In Service and Developmental Alternatives Costs 
 
Cost ($M FY09) per unit by Alternative 
  JHSV SSC LCAC LCU LSV 
NRE ($M) 40 69 5 2.5 5 
Acquisition Cost ($M) 170 60 44.5 7.2 19.5 
Operation & Maintenance (annual 
$M) 38.5 27.5 27.5 1.6 18 
SLEP ($M) 30 12 12 3 10.4 
            
Salvage Cost ($M) 2.5 0.5 0.5 1.25 2.5 





The cost data for JHSV was derived from information obtained from the JHSV program 
office.  It should be noted that this vessel is in the detail design and construction phase and as 
such the costs should be considered relatively solid with non-recurring engineering estimated at 
$40M and vessel unit cost of $170M.  The O&M costs are estimated at $38.5M annually using a 
civilian crew.  The vessel is currently designed for a 20 year service life; however, the 
assumption is made that a SLEP will occur at year 20 to extend the service life by 10 more years 
at a cost of $30M which is approximately 18% of the initial unit cost, similar to LCAC and LCU 
SLEP costs.  The first vessel is scheduled for service in 2011.  The salvage cost is based on the 
MARAD cost estimate for an average ship of $2.5M per the article by Roxana Tiron in the 
National Defense (Tiron, 2001). 
2. SSC 
The SSC is currently in contract design and the cost data is the latest estimate from the 
program office.  The non-recurring engineering is estimated at $69M with the first craft cost of 
$60M.  The O&M cost is estimated to be $27.5M, using the Joint High-Speed Vessel analysis of 
alternatives from RAND Corporation (Schank, et. al, 2006).   Due to the newness of the design, 
there is not a SLEP estimate. However, considering the similarities of the SSC to the existing 
LCAC, the assumption is there will be a SLEP and its costs will be the same as LCAC.  The 
salvage cost of the SSC is based on the use of it as a target, meaning once it has been stripped of 
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all valuables it will be destroyed to support future war fighter training exercises. Such costs are 
estimated at $500,000.  Current forecasts are for the SSC to have a 30 year service life and the 
first unit will enter the fleet in 2019; however, given additional resources and funding we are 
assuming the SSC can enter service to support the 2015 date. 
3. LCAC 
The LCAC has been around since 1986. Despite this fact, finding adequate historical data 
was challenging.  The data we obtained was from open sources such as the magazines Maritime 
Log and internet sources such as Wikipedia.com, GlobalSecurity.org, and Naval-technoloy.com.  
The non-recurring engineering effort to reestablish production is assumed to be approximately 
$3m with an additional $2M added for design enhancements such as rolling the SLEP changes 
into the new crafts for a total of $5M. The craft unit costs are based on the previous costs 
converted to FY09 dollars at $44.5M.   The team was unable to find O&M costs for the LCAC. 
To estimate, the same rational is used for the LCAC as for the SSC, namely $27.5M.  Currently, 
the LCAC is undergoing a SLEP at $12M each.  This will be rolled over to the new units to 
extend the service life from 20 years to 30 years for better alignment with the other alternatives.  
There is no reason the new fielded units could not be in service by 2015 considering the fact the 
LCAC is currently in service.  The salvage value for the LCAC is based on the use of it as a 
target, meaning once it has been stripped of all valuables it will be destroyed to support future 
war fighter training exercises.  This is estimated at $500,000. 
4. LCU-2000 
The LCU-2000 has been in operation since the early 1990’s.  Between the Army 
Watercraft Master Plan and the Army Program office, the team was able to obtain costs and 
convert them to FY09 dollars.  The current unit cost in 2009 dollars is estimated at $7.2M.  Since 
the LCU-2000 product line will need a restart to include upgrades per the SLEP, using similar 
non-recurring engineering costs from the LSV based on the physical dimensions and not 
displacement, the LCU-2000 NRE is estimated at $2.5M.  Furthermore, the LCU is undergoing a 
SLEP which has a cost of $3M.  The O&M cost is $1.6M.  The salvage cost of $1.25M is based 
on half of the MARAD cost estimate for an average ship of $2.5M per the article by Roxana 
Tiron in the National Defense (Tiron, 2001).  Given the fact that this class exists today, restarting 
the class for a 2015 need date is not an issue.  It is assumed that with the SLEP the class has a 
service life of 30 years. 
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5. LSV 
The LSV’s have been in production for the longest duration of all the alternatives, from 
the late 1980’s thru 2006.  The cost estimate for vessel acquisition cost in 2009 dollars is $19.5M 
based on the Army Watercraft Master Plan and the Army Program office.  The estimate for the 
NRE is based on the fact that even though the vessel was in production just 3 years ago, there is 
a start up value, which is assumed to be equal to the smaller but more complicated LCAC vessel 
of $5M.  The O & M costs are $18M.  There is also a SLEP at a cost of $10.4M.  Given the fact 
of the LSV’s service and production history, there is no reason new LSV’s could not support the 
2015 fielding requirement.  Furthermore, the LSV will have a 30 year service life after which 
time, retirement will consist of a $2.5M cost associated with disposal per the aforementioned 




The cost estimate for the T-Craft, a vessel which is still conceptual and in the R&D 
phase, is based on an analogous estimate that is a composite of several alternatives, since the T-
Craft is a unique vessel and none of the alternatives match the design characteristics.  Instead the 
T-Craft estimate is based on all of the alternatives, selecting the closest alternative or alternatives 
for different cost aspects.  The team did have an estimate from ONR for the phase 2 R&D effort 
of $150M to develop a prototype for demonstration and testing. The characteristics of the T-
Craft used for cost analysis are those previously noted within this paper.  The parameters for the 









7. Cost Comparison 
Table 14. Parameters Comparison  
Alternatives Evaluation 
Measure T-Craft JHSV SSC LCAC LCU LSV 
Cargo Capacity (short tons) 336 700 75 60 350 2000
Range (self deploy) (nautical 
mile) 2500 5600 86 200 9200 8200
Range (intra-theater) (nautical 
mile) 500 1200 86 200 6500 6500
Speed (loaded) (knots) 40 35 40 40 10 11.5
Length (feet) 240 338 93 88 174 273
Breadth (feet) 70 94 48 47 42 60
 
To perform a complex analogous estimate using all of the alternatives, a table was 
developed to determine the cost per parameter.  The total cost per alternative is the acquisition 
cost and the SLEP added together.  The total cost was then divided into the parameters values to 
get a dollar cost per parameter unit for each parameter for each alternative. This is shown in 
Table 15: 
 
Table 15. Cost per Criteria 
Cost ($M FY09) per Criteria by Alternative 
Criteria 
JHSV SSC LCAC LCU-2000 LSV 
Cost / Net Tonnage 0.2857 0.9600 0.9417 0.0291 0.0150
Cost / Speed (knots) 5.7143 1.8000 1.4125 1.0200 2.6000
Self-deploy 
Range - nautical miles 
0.0426 0.8372 0.3767 0.0011 0.0036
intra-theater 
Range - nautical miles 
0.1667 0.8372 0.3767 0.0016 0.0046
Cost / LOA 0.5917 0.7742 0.6420 0.0586 0.1095




Using the alternatives’ characteristics and the cost per criteria ratios as listed above, the 
best match of T-Craft criteria and those of the alternatives can be identified.  Those best fit 
values can then be averaged together to generate an analogous estimate by parameter.  For 
instance, the cargo capacity of the T-Craft (336 short tons) best aligns with the JHSV at 700 
short tons and the LCU at 350 short tons. There was no precise formula used to determine what 
alternative values would be used to build the analogous estimate. The selections were based on 
the closeness of the parameter values and engineering judgment. The preference was to use more 
than one alternative to develop each analogous estimate.  The average of the cost ratios for cargo 
capacity for JHSV (0.2857) and the LCU (0.0291) is 0.157.  Next, the cost ratio of 0.157 is 
multiplied by the cargo capacity requirement of the T-Craft to determine an analogous cost 
estimate component for cargo capacity of $52.90M. The same methodology was then used for 
the other criteria.  The average of the cost ratios for speed for the JHSV, SSC, and LCAC is used 
for T-Craft speed with a final cost ratio of 2.976, and when multiplied by the T-Craft speed 
requirement of 40 knots, leads to a cost of $119.02M.  For self-deploy range, the LHSV and 
LCU parameters were closest resulting in a coefficient of 0.018 with a final cost of $46.03M.  
The intra-theater range coefficient used the data from the JHSV, SSC, and LCAC which netted a 
cost ratio of 0.429 which equals a T-Craft cost of $214.40M.  For both the length and breadth of 
the T-Craft, the JHSV, SSC and LCAC data were used.  For length over all, the cost ratio is 
0.669 resulting in a cost of $160.64M and breadth has a cost of $112.70 with a cost ratio of 
1.610.  Then each analogous estimate for each parameter is averaged netting a final cost estimate 










Table 16. T-Craft analogous criteria estimate 











Cost given Net Tonnage (short tons) 336 0.157 $52.90 
Cost given Speed (knots) 40 2.976 $119.02 
Self-deploy 
Range - (nautical miles) 2500 0.018 $46.03 
Intra-theater 
Range - (nautical miles) 500 0.429 $214.40 
Cost given LOA (feet) 240 0.669 $160.64 
Cost given Breadth (feet) 70 1.610 $112.70 
estimated T-Craft cost   $117.61 
 
The design service life for T-Craft is assumed to be 30 years with no SLEP assumed nor 
estimated.  Additionally, the O & M cost of $55M is estimated to be approximately twice that of 
the SSC due to the T-Craft’s comparative size and complexity.  Retirement of the craft will be to 
train the war fighters and is similar to the LCAC and SSC costs of $500,000.  The complete cost 
table of all of the alternatives is listed in Table 17. 
 
Table 17. T-Cost table of all alternatives 
Alternatives - all $ are FY09 Evaluation 
Measure T-Craft JHSV SSC LCAC LCU LSV 
NRE ($M) 40 40 69 5 2.5 5 
Acquisition Cost ($M) 117.6 170 60 44.5 7.2 19.5 
Operation & Maintenance (annual 
$M) 55 38.5 27.5 27.5 1.6 18 
SLEP ($M) 0 30 12 12 3 10.4 
              
Salvage Cost ($M) 0.5 2.5 0.5 0.5 1.25 2.5 




The Total Ownership Cost is developed using FY11 dollars for each alternative.  It is 
assumed that with the recent stimulus spending that inflation from 2009 to 2011 was zero and 
thus dollars in 2011 equal the dollars in 2009.  However, inflation rate following 2011 is 
assumed to be a constant 2.8%.  This assumption is supported by the whitehouse.gov site’s 
appendix C regarding circular A-94 (revised) where the 30 year Real Interest Rate is cited as 
2.8%.  The Real Interest Rate was used to support the constant dollar flows and the 30 year time 
period was selected in support of the 30 year product lifecycle. TheTOC categories to highlight 
the 30 year life cycle are initial design or the NRE, production, O & M, SLEP, and retirement.  
The TOC is for only one unit or craft.  All of the data used for the TOC comes from Table 17. 
The TOC of the T-Craft is calculated at $1047.90M in FY09.  The T-Craft LCCP is as 


















Figure 27.   T-Craft TOC 
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The TOC of the JHSV is calculated at $1004.36M in FY09.  The JHSC TOC is as shown 



















Figure 28.   JHSV TOC 
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Figure 29.   SSC TOC 
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The TOC of the LCAC is calculated at $503.40M in FY09.  The LCAC TOC is as shown 





















Figure 30.   LCAC TOC 
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The TOC of the LCU-2000 is calculated at $37.51M in FY09.  The LCU-2000 TOC is as shown 






















Figure 31.   LCU-2000 TOC 
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Figure 32.   LSV TOC 
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The TOC for each alternative, as shown, are only part of the picture needed to support 
decision analysis.  To better support decision making and normalize across platforms, the 
different alternatives are analyzed against a mission scenario requiring the transport of a certain 
amount of cargo over a certain time period. Determining the number of vessels it takes to move 
the specified cargo within the specified time gives a better performance metric that can be 
utilized as part of a cost-benefit analysis. The alternatives are analyzed against the combat and 
humanitarian missions with notional mission specifications regarding amount of materiel to be 
moved and time requirements. For each analysis it is assumed that each vessel will travel at 
maximum speed and will be fully loaded to its maximum cargo capacity. Only transport time is 
considered. For the combat scenario, the analysis objective is to determine the number of crafts it 
takes to move 13,000 tons of cargo 25 nautical miles in a 10 hours period, not including the time 
to perform cargo operations.  Table 17 shows the number of craft required to execute this 
mission and the acquisition cost for that number of vessels. JHSV is not considered as it was 
screened out for combat missions. 
 
Table 18. Major Combat Mission- Acquisition cost of required number of connectors 
Alternatives required to move 13,000 tons in 10 hours FY09 
$M T-Craft JHSV SSC LCAC LCU LSV 
Connector Acquisition 
Cost $117.61 $170.00 $60.00  $44.50  $7.20  $19.50 
Number of Connectors 6 0 22 28 19 3 
Total Cost $705  N/A  $1,320  $1,246  $137  $59  
 
A humanitarian aid mission was also analyzed determining the number of craft needed to 
move 100,000 tons of cargo, 25 nautical miles in a 48 hour period.  Table 19 shows the number 
of vessels required for each alternative and the acquisition cost for that collection of vessels.  The 
“fleet” cost estimates will be visited again in the Cost vs. Utility section where cost-benefit 





Table 19. Humanitarian Mission   Acquisition cost of required number of connectors 
Alternatives required to move 100,000 tons in 48 hours FY09 
$M T-Craft JHSV SSC LCAC LCU LSV 
Connector Acquisition 
Cost $117.61  $170.00 $60.00  $44.50  $7.20  $19.50 
Number of Connectors 9 5 35 44 30 5 





The Interpretation phase of the system engineering process utilizes information generated 
from previous phases to assist in decision making.  The goal of interpretation for this project is to 
identify the best decision alternative through the use of utility theory, value scoring, and 
sensitivity analysis. This phase of the project is described by Sage and Armstrong, as the 
evaluation in accordance with the value system of the decision makers and selection of the path 
forward (Sage and Armstrong, 2000). 
A. DESCISION ANALYSIS 
Decision analysis is a normative and prescriptive framework that allows the decision 
maker to select the preferred course of action in a complex decision situation (Sage and 
Armstrong, 2000).   The evaluation of the sea base enabler platforms was done via a rigorous 
MAUT (multi-attribute utility theory) process which pooled together the collective abilities and 
knowledge of the stakeholders and team members.   The MAUT process sets forth guidelines for 
conducting the value scoring, constructing of a data matrix, and a decision matrix.  These 
processes will be explained in depth to fully comprehend how the decision process was executed. 
B. SCORING, SCOPING AND ASSUMPTIONS 
For this decision analysis there are assumptions which must be defined: 
• Only the sea-borne surface connectors are evaluated.  The report detailed airlift 
connectors in a previous section (Chapter III), but it was decided among the team that airlift 
connector decision analysis should be conducted separately when the platforms are more mature 
(see feasibility screening – Chapter IV, Section A). 
• Only the combat and humanitarian operational scenarios are evaluated.  These 
scenarios are the polar opposite of each other based on the two characteristic dimensions 
considered and therefore address the all requirements that would be inclusive in the police action 
and disaster relief scenarios. 
• Beachability was determined to be a screening requirement for the combat 
scenario.  Current alternatives in service that do not possess beachability or concept alternatives 
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that do not address the capability in the design criteria were screened out of the combat value 
analysis. 
Three of the six alternatives (T-Craft, SSC, and JHSV) are not currently operational with 
the US force structure and are at various stages within the acquisition or developmental process.     
The operational alternatives (LCAC, LCU, and LSV) have performance data readily available 
which was used to populate the raw data matrix, which addresses the key performance 
parameters discussed in the following section.  As all of these vessels are brought into service or 
upgraded the value analysis should be repeated using real world performance measurements to 
ensure that this analysis model remains consistent.  The raw value matrix for these alternatives is 
shown in Table 20. 
Table 20. Raw Value Matrix 
      Alternatives     
Evaluation Measure 
T-
Craft JHSV SSC LCAC LCU LSV 
Range: self deploy 
(nautical miles) 2500 5600 86 200 9200 8200 
Range: intra-theater 
(nautical miles) 500 1200 86 200 6500 6500 
Speed: loaded (knots) 40 35 40 40 10 11.5 
Cargo Capacity (short 
tons) 336 700 75 60 350 2000 
Crew Size 3 41 5 5 13 32 
Beachable (1=yes, 
0=no) 1 0 1 1 1 1 
 
C. VALUE SCORING 
The team performed detailed research to assemble a list of global platform parameters 
that pertained to the various operational scenarios, as detailed in Section I (Introduction - Scope).  
This list was compiled and sent to the stakeholders in the form of a survey.  The stakeholders 
were asked to rank the requirements from most desired to least desired utilizing a number scale; 
see Section II (Formulation – Requirements Analysis).   The results of these rankings were 
compiled and the six highest ranked were detailed as global requirements due to their 
applicability across multiple ASE mission sets, see Table 21.  The utility curves were also 
generated from this ranking data. 
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Table 21. Primary Requirements to be analyzed 
Requirement Unit of measure Evaluation measure 
Range: self deploy Nautical miles  Farther is better (2500 nautical 
miles max) 
Range: intra-theater Nautical miles  Intra-theater >=200 nautical 
miles 
Speed: loaded Nautical miles per hour 
(knots) 
Faster is better  
Cargo Capacity Short tons Bigger is better  
Operational Crew Size Integer - # of personnel Fewer crew members are better 
Beachability Binary (Yes/No) Dependant on mission 
 
1. Utility Curves 
Utility curves and the theory governing their use allow the decision maker to see the 
impact of selecting a specific value or range for a requirement.  Since not all consequences are 
monetarily governed these curves allow the decision makers to see the utility of a specific scalar 
value and in turn mitigate by selecting a capability that maximizes the utility (Sage and 
Armstrong, 2000).  The utility curves for this analysis are used to graphically represent the utility 
of a specific attribute on a scale of 0 to 1, with 0 being no utility and 1 being maximum utility. 
The utility values for each attribute can easily be read from the curve and then carried over to the 
decision matrix for evaluation.  Figures 33-37 are the utility curves for each requirement detailed 
in Table 21 with the exception of beachability which is binary and as such has no meaningful 
curve. The team generally utilized piecewise linear curves for simplicity of computation.  
a. Self-deployable range 
Self-deployable range is the maximum distance a platform may traverse with 
minimum crew and load and without refueling. The utility curve for this requirement is shown in 
Figure 33.  The maximum utility (1) is realized at 2500 nautical miles.  This is predicated on the 
need for the platform to be capable of self deploying from any US naval installation worldwide 
without the need for additional logistical infrastructure for support. The shape of the curve is 
essentially ‘S’ shaped based on the threshold and objective values for the parameter. The utility 
gets slowly greater as range increases until the threshold value of 1000 nautical miles is 
achieved. At that point there is an inflection point in the curve and the slope increases. As the 
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range nears the objective of 2500 nautical miles the curve begins to flatten out again until the 
maximum utility of 1 is reached at the objective value of 2500 nautical miles. 
 
 
Figure 33.   Utility Curve: Self-deployable range  
 
b. Intra-theater range 
Intra-theater range is the maximum cumulative range of the platform without 
refueling, analyzed as point to point from sea base to insertion point. The utility curve for this 
requirement is shown in Figure 34.  250 nautical miles (125 nautical miles each way) or higher 
has a maximum utility (1) because it is assessed that this may be the maximum distance from the 
sea base to the shore while staying within the sea-shield field of regard. The curve ramps up 
rapidly to a moderate utility at the threshold range value of 25 nautical miles. It begins to level 
out after this point, with utility increasing slowly as range increases to the maximum utility range 








c.  Speed with Cargo (Speed – Loaded) 
Speed with Cargo is the maximum speed of the platform with a full cargo load. 
The utility curve for this requirement is shown in Figure 35.  Maximum utility (1) is realized at 
40 knots.  Stakeholder analysis indicated 40 knots as the threshold for optimizing logistical 
operations. It was difficult for the team to assess how utility would change based on speed as 
stakeholders had not been clear on this point. The team assumed a moderate increase until a 
speed of approximately 20 knots was reached after which utility would increase more rapidly 
until the maximum utility is reached at 40 knots. 
 
 
Figure 35.    Utility Curve: Speed with cargo 
 
 
d. Cargo capacity (s tons) 
Cargo capacity is the maximum amount of cargo the platform is capable of 
carrying. The utility curve for this requirement is shown in Figure 36. Maximum utility (1) is 
realized at 600 short tons.  Stakeholders indicated 600 short tons as the threshold for optimal 
mission support. The curve has some minor deviations but is mostly a fairly linear slope from 




Figure 36.   Utility Curve: Cargo capacity (s tons) 
 
e. Crew Size 
The crew size is the minimal amount of crew required to fully operate the 
platform. The utility curve for this requirement is shown in Figure 37. Stakeholders indicated 
that minimal organic crew was better in order to fully exploit the capacity of the platform for the 
specific mission. Fewer crew members are better because manning is the primary driver of 
operational costs.  With the increasing prevalence of unmanned systems and improvements in 
autonomous technologies the team decided to be futurists and set the maximum utility (1) for a 
crew size of 0. The crew size utility curve has an inverse slope, with utility dropping as crew size 
increases. A utility of 0 is reached when crew size exceeds 100. The slope of the curve drops 
gradually until a crew size of 20 is reached at which point is begins to drop more rapidly until a 
crew size of 40 is reached. Then it slowly decreases to the maximum crew size. 
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Figure 37.   Utility Curve: Crew size 
 
A note on crew size: After the analysis was complete and documented the team decided 
that total crew size, as it is, might not the best measure of crew impact. The reason is that crew 
size will likely increase with the size of the vessel, but generally so will beneficial parameters 
such as cargo capacity. A fairer measure might be the ratio of number of crew to cargo capacity. 
Since crew size was not heavily weight for either mission, the impact of making such a change 
would not significantly impacted the analysis results presented. 
The utility value for each alternative was read from the curve and used to populate the 
utility score matrix, as shown in Tables 21. 
Table 22. Utility Scores Matrix 
      Utility Score Matrix   
Evaluation Measure 
T-
Craft SSC LCAC LCU LSV JHSV 
Range: self deploy 
(nautical miles) 1.00 0.01 0.02 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Range: intra-theater 
(nautical miles) 1.00 0.84 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Speed: loaded (knots) 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.20 0.21 0.85 
Cargo Capacity (short tons) 0.39 0.07 0.06 0.40 1.00 1.00 
Crew Size 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.87 0.46 0.30 
Beachable (1=yes, 0=no) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0 
 
 104 
The humanitarian mission analysis includes beachability due to the reasons explained 
previously, which makes this attribute a binary step function for this mission.  The alternative 
will either score a 0 or 1 for this attribute. 
 
 
D. BASELINE ANALYSIS 
The alternative value scoring baseline for combat and humanitarian missions is shown in 
Figures 38 and 39 respectively.  This initial set of results is called the baseline as it is the basis 
for comparison for the sensitivity analyses that follow. The total value scores were computed 
with the formula shown in Equation 1.0. 
 
Equation 1.0     Value Scores Formula 
V(ai) is total value score of a specific alternative, noted as subscript i. 
wj is the global weight that is applied to the specific attribute (j) of the alternative. 
Uj(ai) represents the utility score of the specific attribute (j) for the alternative (i). 
For the combat analysis the global weighting was determined based upon what the 
stakeholders defined as key attributes for this mission.  Speed was given a global weight of 30% 
while intra-theater range was weighted as 25% of the total composite score.  As with any combat 
type scenario the strike force wants to be able to quickly embark on a mission and know that they 
have the speed and range to get “out of harm’s way”, as well as the range to reach their 
objectives, which is why these two attributes were rated as 55% of the total composite score.  
Beachability was the one attribute which was determined to be absolutely essential when 
conducting combat and potential covert operations.  The ability to come ashore where ever and 
when ever was so important to the stakeholders that it was elevated to a screening criterion for 
the combat mission analysis.  The JHSV (Joint High Speed Vessel) even though still in the 
concept phase was removed from the analysis because it did not address this ability in the system 
requirements.  The T-Craft was deemed as the optimal alternative for the combat mission set. 
The T-Craft alternative received a utility score of 1 for three out of five of the combat 
scenario measures (self deploy range, intra-theater range, speed).  The T-Craft objective is to 
only require an operational crew of three personnel, and hence did not receive a utility score of 1. 
The only measure where the T-Craft is lacking, relative to the other alternatives, is cargo 
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capacity.  Based on the analysis the T-Craft received a value score of 87.3%, which is over 17% 
better than the next highest scoring alternative, the LCAC. The other alternatives scored fairly 











T‐Craft SSC LCAC LCU LSV
 
Figure 38.   Combat Mission – Alternative’s Value Scores 
Table 23 depicts the application of the global weights to the utility scores to calculate the 
value scores for each alternative that is included in the combat mission analysis.  
 
Table 23. Combat Mission Baseline Alternative’s Value Scores 





Craft SSC LCAC LCU LSV 
Range: self deploy (nautical 
miles) 0.10 1.00 0.01 0.02 1.00 1.00 
Range: intra-theater 
(nautical miles) 0.25 1.00 0.84 0.95 1.00 1.00 
Speed-loaded (knots) 0.30 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.20 0.21 
Cargo Cap (short tons) 0.20 0.39 0.07 0.06 0.40 1.00 
Crew Size 0.15 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.87 0.46 
              
Total Value Score   0.873 0.668 0.694 0.621 0.682 
 
The humanitarian value scoring included the JHSV because beachability was determined 
to be a desired but not essential attribute for this mission.  While beachability was included as a 
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criterion, the global weight assigned for the humanitarian mission was 10%.  Beachability was 
rated low simply because data from previous humanitarian missions detailed port accessibility as 
a non-compromising issue. The primary attributes for the humanitarian mission were cargo 
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Figure 39.   Humanitarian Mission – Alternative’s Value Scores 
 
Table 24 depicts the application of the global weights to the utility scores to calculate the 
value scores for each alternative that is included in the humanitarian mission analysis.  
Table 24. Humanitarian Mission Baseline Alternative’s Value Scores 
      
Humanitarian Mission Utility 






Craft SSC LCAC LCU LSV JHSV 
Range: self deploy 
(nautical miles) 0.05 1.00 0.01 0.02 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Range: intra-theater 
(nautical miles) 0.1 1.00 0.84 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Speed-loaded 
(knotts) 0.2 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.20 0.21 0.85 
Cargo Cap (short 
tons) 0.4 0.39 0.07 0.06 0.40 1.00 1.00 
Crew Size 0.15 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.87 0.46 0.30 
Beachable 0.1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Total Value Score 1 0.750 0.555 0.563 0.581 0.761 0.765 
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The stakeholder rationale for this weighting is logistically based in that they want to be 
able to deliver the maximum amount of supplies to a crisis area in the shortest time possible.  
Analysis indicates that the JHSV would be the optimal alternative for this mission set (score 
76.5%) but by a narrow margin.  The T-Craft, which scored highest for the combat scenario, 
scored third in the humanitarian analysis with a score of 75% behind JHSV (76.5%) and LSV 
(76.1%). 
E. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Sensitivity analysis affords the decision maker a degree of confidence in the decision 
process as well as quantifies the potential uncertainty of the global weights and the decision 
outcome. This is especially useful since utility and weights are subjectively determined. A 
sensitivity analysis was performed for both operational scenarios in order to fully understand 
how the global weighting impacted the total value scores for the alternatives.  The global weights 
for each alternative were incremented from 0 to 1 in 0.05 steps.  This method allowed for 
development of a linear model to depict how the specific attribute for each alternative affects the 
value assessment for that alternative.  The lines are then be graphed on a common scale and 
analyzed for any intersection point where the global weighting variation would affect the overall 
relative value score of the alternatives.  
For the combat mission, Figures 40 and 41 shows that the global weighting for speed and 
intra-theater range do not affect the selection of T-Craft as the highest scoring alternative.  Figure 
42 shows an intersection point at a global weight of 50%.  The LSV would then become the 
alternative of choice if cargo capacity was globally weighted higher.  Cargo capacity becomes a 
significant issue when supporting or sustaining ground combat operations with armor and 
supplies.  Cargo capacity would likely not be a primary concern when inserting a light 
reconnaissance or special operations team, but if the mission dictated berthing several of these 
types of teams from one vessel to multiple insertion points then cargo capacity may impact 
mission effectiveness. Of course, the significantly higher speed of the T-Craft offsets its lower 














Figure 42.   Combat Mission: Cargo capacity 
The humanitarian mission was also subjected to a sensitivity analysis.  The results 
narrowly indicate that the JHSV may be the best alternative for this mission set, but analysis 
indicates one operational platform is a close contender.  In cargo capacity analysis (Figure 43), it 
can be seen that the LSV runs parallel with that of the JHSV, with an intersection point at 38% 
where JHSV capability exceeds that of T-Craft.  The speed loaded analysis (Figure 44) shows 
that T-Craft is converging to the JHSV capability at a global weight of ~ 40%.  Both platforms 
surpass the speed capability of the LSV, as indicated by the intersection point at 20%.  Figure 45, 
illustrating intra-theater range, shows T-Craft and LSV running directly parallel with the JHSV 





Figure 43.   Humanitarian Mission: Cargo capacity 
 
 





Figure 45.   Humanitarian Mission: Intra-theater range  
 
F. COST VS. VALUE  
Both the estimated cost for each of the alternatives, in Chapter IV, and the best 
performance as represented by the value score for each alternative, in Chapter V has been 
presented. To properly investigate the alternatives’ utility and cost relative to the 
accomplishment of each mission, the team conducted a cost to utility analysis based upon the 
two mission profiles previously discussed. As this analysis represents a snapshot for a specific 
mission, acquisition cost rather than life-cycle cost was used for analysis purposes. 
It is important to note that the analysis was conducted as if each mission was conducted 
with only one type of connector to provide an equal analysis. In actual operations, there might be 
several types of connectors available and detailed operations research would be conducted to 





1. Combat Mission Cost vs. utility 
For this analysis, the major combat mission was further refined to add elements of time 
and cargo requirements. The objective is transporting 13,000 tons in a 10 hour time period. The 
sea base was assumed to be at the minimum distance from shore of 25 nautical miles, and the 
connectors would operate at their respective maximum speed.  
This analysis is based upon comparing the total acquisition cost of the number of 
connectors required to meet the transportation requirements of the notional mission as described 
above against the utility value. This would provide a metric that would allow the team to fairly 
compare each connector. The first step was to calculate the number of each craft required to 
move 13,000 tons of combat cargo, from the sea base that is 25 nautical miles from the shore 
with the craft at max speed in 10 hours. This was done using the total craft capacity for each 
craft. Figure 46 shows the resultant number of each type of craft to meet the mission 
requirements. JHSV is zero as it is not suitable for the combat mission per the previous 
discussion. 
Surge Operation -Seabase @ 25NM - 


















Figure 46.   Surge Operation - # of connectors required 
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Next the acquisition cost of the total number of connectors required to complete this 
“surge” mission was calculated. This was done by multiplying the number of connectors 
calculated by the acquisition cost.  Finally the total craft acquisition cost is compared to the 
baseline utility value for each connector, as shown in Figure 47. The line in Figure 47 represents 
the Pareto Frontier and shows the boundary of the trade space that includes the non-dominated 
solutions. Two of the five potential solutions for the combat mission are non-dominated: LSV 
and T-Craft. All other alternatives have higher cost and lower utility than at least one of these 
two. 
Major Combat Mission - Surge Operations
13k tons in 10 hours
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Figure 47.   Combat Mission – Cost vs. Utility 
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Of the non-dominated solutions the T-Craft offers the highest utility with a moderate cost 
as compared across the alternatives. LSV provides moderate utility at comparatively low cost. 
The choice between T-craft and LSV depends on whether the 20% increase in utility is worth the 
major increase in acquisition cost. SSC and LCAC costs are the highest cost due to their 
relatively small cargo capacity compared to the other platforms and when you look at the number 
of connectors required, SSC and LCAC can be eliminated from practical consideration (for 
single platform solutions) due to their moderate utility at very high cost. Likewise, LCU has 
lower utility and higher cost than LSV so it appears a poor choice 
2. Humanitarian mission cost vs. utility 
For this analysis, the notional Humanitarian Aid mission was defined as transporting 
100,000 tons of supplies in a 48 hour time period.  The sea base was assumed to be at the 
minimum distance from shore, 25 nautical miles, and the connectors would operate at maximum 
speed. 
The approach to the Humanitarian Aid mission analysis is the same as for the combat 
mission analysis. The first step was to calculate the number of each craft required to move 
100,000 tons of humanitarian cargo, from the sea base that is 25 nautical miles from the shore 
with the craft at max speed in 48 hours. This was done using the total craft capacity for each 
craft. It is expected that each connector would be full when it travels to the port meaning the 
vessel was carrying the maximum cargo capacity as specified in the alternatives descriptions. 
Figure 48 shows the results of the analysis.    
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Humanitarian Mission -Seabase @ 25NM - 
# of vessels to move 100k tons in 48 hrs





















Figure 48.   Humanitarian mission: # of connectors required 
 
Next the acquisition cost of the total number of connectors required to complete this 
humanitarian mission was calculated. This was done by multiplying the number of connectors 
calculated by the acquisition cost identified in Chapter III.  Finally the total craft acquisition cost 
was compared to the baseline utility value for each connector, as shown in Figure 49. As before, 
the line represents the Pareto Frontier and shows the non-dominated solutions. Again, two of the 
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Figure 49.   Humanitarian Mission – Cost vs. Utility 
 
Examination of the cost-benefits results for the non-dominated solutions reveals that the 
JHSV offers the highest utility (though only with a slight increase over LSV and T-Craft) with a 
moderate comparative cost. LSV again has the lowest cost with a moderate to high utility. As 
with the combat mission, for single platform solutions, SSC and LCACs have high cost and low 
utility for the specified mission parameters. The SSC and LCAC can be eliminated from 
consideration since they are both dominated solutions as can LCU. While T-craft is a dominated 
solution it is not dominated by much compared to its closest competitor, JHSV. 
The LSV, JHSV and T-Craft appear to be the remaining possible choices based on low to 
moderate cost and good utility. Looking solely at the cost and utility values, T-Craft could be 
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eliminated from consideration based on the cost-benefit plot with a lower utility but higher cost 
than JHSV. Based on the cost-benefit analysis for the specified Humanitarian Aid mission 
parameters the best choice would appear to be the LSV as its utility is about the same as JHSV 
but its cost is much lower.  
 
G. RISK 
The Risk Management Guide for DOD Acquisition defines risk as “Risk is a measure of 
future uncertainties in achieving program performance goals and objectives within defined cost, 
schedule and performance constraints.” (DOD, 2006) The DOD guide essentially defines best 
practices for risk management and describes the classic 5x5, red, yellow, green risk reporting 
matrix which is used fro risk analysis. The Guide is focused on the traditional three categories of 
acquisition program risk: cost, schedule and performance. 
Blanchard and Fabrycky have a similar but slightly different take on risk. Risk is defined 
as, “the potential that something will go wrong as a result of one or a series of events.” 
(Blanchard and Fabrycky, 2006).  .Risk has four categories: technical, cost, schedule and 
programmatic. Technical, cost and schedule align well with the traditional DOD risk categories 
of performance, cost and schedule. Programmatic risk is defined as, “the occurrence of events, 
imposed on the program/project, which are the result of external influences.” A distinction is 
made between risks that are inherent to the project versus those that are essentially out of the 
project’s control (Blanchard and Fabrycky, 2006).  The ASE team felt there are risks that are 
based on factors outside the scope of an ASE platform program so the programmatic risk 
category are discussed in addition to the usual three categories.  
A full risk analysis involves not just identifying risks but also determining priorities of 
risks by qualifying or quantifying them in terms of the likelihood of their occurrence and the 
severity of the consequences if they do occur. The risks are frequently mapped to a 5x5 matrix, 
as pictured in Figure 50 with the seriousness of the risk indicated by the color of the sector in 
which the risk appears. Green indicates low magnitude of consequence, yellow a moderate 
magnitude and red a high level of magnitude or significance to the risk. In addition, risk 
management also involves selecting approaches to mitigate risks to reduce the level of risk, 
avoid the risk, and transfer the risk or simply to accept the risk as it is.  
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For this project, the team only identifies some of the possible risks for most of the 
alternatives. Most of the alternatives either already exist or are in design as programs of record. 
Their risks, with respect to their documented mission requirements, have already been examined. 
The team considers possible risk areas for these systems with respect to the ASE mission but 
does not examine risks for these platforms in detail. Of the alternatives, T-Craft represents the 
most innovative and new combination of capabilities with a significant potential benefit. As T-
Craft is still an S&T project it also entails many risks that the other alternatives have moved 
beyond through the process of their becoming programs of record. As such, the team selected T-
Craft for a more detailed risk analysis. 
Team Carderock also utilized the risk methodology in Naval Sea Systems Command 
Instruction (NAVSEAINST) 5000.8, Naval SYSCOM Risk Management Policy (DON, 2008). 
 
 





1. Discussion of Risks – ASE Alternatives 
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Each of the alternatives considered has risks associated with selecting that alternative as 
the ASE platform. The following discusses the different alternatives considered and some of the 
major aspects of their risks. These risks are not comprehensive but represent some of the risks 
the team felt were most relevant for the various alternatives.  
a. Airlift 
As discussed previously in the report, current airlift capabilities do not meet the 
requirements laid out for an ASE. The primary shortcoming of current systems is the lack of 
cargo capacity. There have been recent projects looking at development of heavy lift systems 
but, those projects have been reorganized and are not well defined at this time. The primary risks 
of heavy airlift are related to its maturity level. It is simply not mature enough to consider as a 
viable option at this time 
b. LCU and LSV 
LCU and LSV are covered together as they are similar systems and both are 
existing systems in inventory. The fact that they are fielded systems in inventory reduces some 
aspects of their risk as they are known quantities. However, as the decision analysis showed, if 
the decision criteria developed by the ASE based on stakeholder input are valid then neither the 
LSV nor LCU fully meet ASE criteria. A key performance risk is their maximum speed. For 
combat missions speed was considered an important criterion and the LSV and LCU cannot 
support the high speeds desired by the stakeholders. If those speeds are critical to mission 
success then this creates a risk to successful mission operations. Another risk of these platforms 
is that they are aging and may begin to suffer from reduced availability and increased 
maintenance costs. Additionally, as these platforms age, parts obsolescence may become a risk. 
Mitigations to this risk might include the SLEP that is planned for both platforms. 
c. JHSV 
The JHSV does not exist in current inventory but, as it is in detailed design it 
promises to be a potential ASE solution in the near term. While in detailed design it still has not 
been produced or fielded so there are risks related to the unknowns regarding performance, cost 
and schedule. Actual field testing may reveal that it does not achieve the projected performance 
requirements. It may end up costing more than expected. And there may be schedule slippages 
that impact when the system can be fielded. There are also risks related to the capabilities of the 
JHSV and its suitability for the ASE mission. JHSV was screened out as a potential alternative 
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for ASE for combat missions due to its lack of inherent capability to deliver cargo and personnel 
directly to an unimproved beach. This represents a programmatic risk in the sense that 
development and fielding of JHSV could utilize resources needed for systems to meet that 
operational requirement. Likewise, as noted earlier, JHSV is being designed to perform cargo 
operations in a maximum sea state of 1. While this was not one of the key decision criteria 
utilized by the team in the decision analysis, it does represent a performance risk in that JHSV 
may not be fully utilizable in the sea base context. 
d. LCAC and SSC 
The LCAC is the other system, besides LSV and LCU, that exists in current 
inventory. From an ASE standpoint there are several performance risks, with the most notable 
being its lack of ability to self deploy and its small cargo capacity. LCAC also carries significant 
cost risk as there are issues with availability and maintenance costs for the platform. These issues 
are some of the drivers for the slated replacement for LCACs, the SSC. The SSC is still in design 
and as such has similar risks to the JHSV due to the uncertainties involved in a system that has 
not been produced and field tested. However, the SSC is being designed to address the 
availability and cost issues found with the LCAC. While the SSC has a slightly higher cargo 
capacity and speed compared to the LCAC it has lower range and still represents performance 
risks from an ASE requirements perspective. 
e. T-Craft 
As described in the alternatives section, the T-Craft is an innovative concept 
being explored by ONR. The T-Craft concept calls for an innovative collection of features 
designed to provide “game changing” capability for enabling seabasing. A key concept is the 
ability to transform between catamaran, SES and ACV modes, hence its name, the 
Transformable-Craft or T-Craft. Such game changing capability obviously comes with risk. The 
risks associated with T-Craft are considered below. 
Performance Risk 
The risks related to T-Craft in the three primary areas of interest (cost, schedule 
and performance) need to be identified. Most programmatic risks are generally applicable to all 
alternatives and are discussed separately after the T-Craft discussion. As T-Craft is an R&D 
effort that involves development of new technologies, much of the performance risk associated 
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with T-Craft can be captured by considering the technology risks associated with the 
development. ONR identified key technology challenges in a status brief discussing the T-Craft 
project. (ONR, 2007) These technical challenges were: 
1. Transition of Propulsion systems from in-water to out-of-water 
2. Variable/retractable skirt geometry 
3. High strength, lightweight, long-wear materials 
4. Active ride control systems 
5. Human system integration 
6. Vehicle transfer at the sea base 
For the purpose of developing risk matrices the team used the six technical challenge 
areas for simplicity and time’s sake. Figure 51 shows a risk matrix for performance issues for T-
Craft, followed by the rationale for the risk levels. Risk values were assessed using the 
engineering judgment of the team members. 
 
 
Figure 51.   T-Craft Performance Risk Matrix 
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To populate the matrix, each risk area had to be assigned a likelihood and consequence 
level. The rationale for each technical risk area follows. 
1 Transition of Propulsion systems from in-water to out-of-water 
The ability to transition between travel modes is essential to the ability of T-Craft to 
perform its role. It is what makes it the transformable craft. The consequences of a failure in this 
area are high so the team ranked this risk area with a consequence level of 4. The complexity of 
this technical area is also high which is why the team ranked it with a likelihood level of 4. 
2. Variable/retractable skirt geometry 
Similar to the previous risk area, the ability to deploy and retracts skirts is essential to the 
T-Craft mission. As such it was also given a consequence level of 4. The team felt that this 
technical area is somewhat less complicated than the propulsion area so the likelihood was given 
a level of 3. 
3. High strength, lightweight, long-wear materials 
Utilization of high strength, lightweight, long-wear materials is important to achieving 
some of the technical goals for the T-Craft. However, there is a great deal of work going on in 
this area that the T-Craft project should be able to leverage. The LCS and JHSV programs are 
utilizing aluminum in the construction of the vessel. ONR is doing significant research on 
composites as are many other organizations and a several major Navy programs such as DDG 
1000 and LPD 17 have made use of composite materials. Since the impact to the project is 
significant but not overly so the team gave this risk area a consequence level of 3. Due to the 
large amount of other work in this area that could be leveraged the team gave this risk area a 
likelihood of 2. 
4. Active ride control systems 
Active ride control systems are used on many different platforms today and play an 
important role in safety of on-board personnel and cargo. If a workable active ride control system 
cannot be developed it will significantly impact the performance of the T-Craft. For this reason 
the team scored this risk area a 4 for consequences. However, as mentioned previously, active 
ride control systems do exist today. While the complex nature of the T-Craft increases the risk to 
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developing a system to meet this need for this platform this is still a fairly well worked technical 
area. As such the team gave a score of 2 for likelihood.  
5. Human system integration 
Human System Integration (HSI) is an area that has been getting increasing attention in 
the DOD acquisition realm. It is an important area that impacts performance and cost. The 
primary reason given for improved HSI for T-Craft is to meet the reduced manning goals. While 
important, this is not a critical factor from a performance perspective. There has also been 
considerable work done in the area of improved HSI for reduced manning and other purposes. As 
such the team gave this risk area a consequence and likelihood level of 2. 
6. Vehicle transfer at the sea base 
The ability to load and off-load cargo at the sea base is an essential attribute required to 
make T-Craft useful as a sea base enabler. From the ONR material it appears ONR is considering 
special equipment to move vehicles from the sea base to the T-Craft and vice versa. As T-Craft 
should support RO/RO capability, which is implied by the vehicle transfer capability itself, it 
seems that much transfer of vehicles could take place under their own power, rather than being 
moved by another system. While there may be some vehicles that require assistance in moving 
for the sea base environment, since many could likely move under their own power the team 
gave a consequence level of 3. Given the weight and awkward geometry of many military 
vessels, a system designed to move these vehicles in an at sea environment may be challenging. 
As such the team scored this risk a 4 for likelihood. 
Now that risks have been identified and prioritized, risk mitigation should be considered. 
In a sense the whole T-Craft effort, as an R&D effort, is a risk mitigation effort. A major purpose 
for R&D, at least from a DOD acquisition perspective, is to mitigate operational risks. In 
addition, these detailed technical efforts require significant technical expertise to determine 
appropriate mitigations. What can be said is that ONR should understand what the risks are and 
should have an “off ramp” for each major technical risk that has a consequence or likelihood of 3 
or higher. ONR should have an understanding of what alternatives are available for each 
technical area if there is a failure to achieve the developmental goals in that area. While the 
resulting capability might not be as good as with a successful development it may still provide 
value from an operational perspective. 
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Cost Risk 
The team was not able to identify many individual cost risks related to T-Craft. T-
Craft is an R&D project and R&D is inherently risky. In fact, R&D differs significantly from 
acquisition in that R&D tends to be risk embracing, at least to some degree, whereas acquisition 
tends to be risk averse. This dichotomy is one contributing factor leading to what is popularly 
known as the “valley of death” which represents the challenge of transitioning from R&D to 
acquisition. The key cost risk is that the T-Craft project may not be able to achieve all of its goals 
within budget due to the many unknowns involved in performing R&D. Treating cost as an 
individual risk the team would assign it a consequence of 2 and likelihood of 4 as shown in 
Figure 52. As an R&D effort, it is not uncommon to require additional funds to achieve the 
desired results. However, the impact of a cost overrun for an R&D project is not as dramatic as 
for an acquisition project. The only mitigations for cost risk the team can offer are to use some of 
the many project management and systems engineering tools and methods available. Earned 
Value Management (EVM) is one example. While not as useful for R&D projects as for 
acquisition, since phase 2 of the T-Craft project will be of substantial expense, utilizing some 
form of EVM may help identify both cost and schedule issues earlier when they are more likely 
to be mitigated. Prioritizing the different tasks within the project may also help avoid additional 
costs due to churn if there is a budget issue and something needs to be cut. 
C
 




As with cost, it is difficult to identify specific schedule risks for the T-Craft 
project. As an R&D effort it has more inherent flexibility with regard to schedule than does an 
acquisition program. This does not mean attention should not be given to staying on schedule. 
The main schedule risk for T-Craft again centers on its nature as an R&D effort and the inherent 
risk involved in R&D. This makes a schedule overrun of some sort likely unless significant slack 
is built into the schedule. As the ultimate goal of the T-Craft project is to meet an operational 
need of enabling the sea base, schedule may be somewhat more significant than cost as there 
may be operational schedules for when such a capability would be needed. As discussed later on 
it is unclear if such schedules exist but the team scored schedule risk as a 3 for consequence. 
Similar to cost, R&D projects frequently run over schedule so a likelihood of 4 is suggested as 




Figure 53.   T-Craft Schedule Risk Matrix 
If an average is computed for the performance risks for T-Craft, an overall performance 
risk level for the system can be estimated as a likelihood of 2.83. Likewise the average 
consequence value is 3.33. Using these values an overall risk matrix for T-Craft for cost (C), 










There is significant programmatic risk for T-Craft and for all ASE alternatives. Again, for 
the purposes of this effort, per Blanchard and Fabrycky, programmatic risk refers to risks based 
on outside influences (Blanchard and Fabrycky, 2006). There are many outside elements that 
will influence the viability and value of an ASE system. These include: 
• Seabasing doctrine – seabasing has been identified in many high level documents as 
being an important element of our military strategy. This could change. Likewise, there are many 
aspects of seabasing that influence requirements for an ASE such as the range at which the sea 
base is expected to operate. ASE requirements will change based on how these doctrines are 
established. 
• Sea base composition – A sea base is a flexible entity and may be composed of a 
variety of assets. There are a number of propositions regarding new platforms and the 
composition of a sea base. ASE requirements could change depending on the dominant approach 
to sea base composition. 
• Seabasing technologies – As stated earlier in the report, this project assumed that 
many of the technologies and systems required to make the sea base work would exist when an 
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ASE capability was ready for fielding. This may not be the case. For example, if methods for 
ship to ship transfer in high sea states are not adequately worked out this will certainly impact 
the effective capability of an ASE. 
The team did not attempt to individually score programmatic risks. There are 
undoubtedly others beyond what is mentioned above. It is difficult to prognosticate on where 
such high level efforts will end up. The team felt that the likelihood of there being some change 
or further definition regarding doctrine or seabasing technologies was somewhat likely so it was 
given a score of 3 for likelihood. The impact is highly dependent on the specific change. It could 
be highly significant or very minor. As such the team went for an average with a score of 3 for 
consequence. This is represented in Figure 55. It is difficult to mitigate these kinds of risks. The 
primary way is to be involved. Engage with the operational community regarding seabasing 
needs and plans. Stay on top of what is happening with regard to doctrine and technology 
development. And, of course, utilize good program management and systems engineering 









Throughout this entire capstone project, the team has been primarily focused on the 
operational requirements collection, analysis and validation. The functional analysis, based on 
the operational requirements, consideration of possible alternatives compared to the collected 
requirements, “racking and stacking” of the alternatives based on stakeholder priorities and 
selection and documentation of alternatives. 
Primarily through a DOD literature search and review process, the team developed a list 
of requirements for each of the four operational scenarios chosen as our foci for the project.  
These requirements were then presented to the key stakeholders that were identified during the 
scoping portion of this effort.  Following the review by the major stakeholders, the team focused 
on the requirements that were developed as validated requirements. It is important to note that 
there are some fundamental discrepancies in the needs and desires of the various key 
stakeholders; one critical discrepancy was whether or not the ASE needed to possess a forcible 
entry capability.  The JHSV, LCAC and other logistics platforms are not designed to operate in 
certain threat environments.  During a meeting with USMC it was indicated that there is a 
capability gap in amphibious warfare, from their standpoint, and there is a desire for the T-Craft 
to have some offensive capabilities and the ability to perform forcible entry operations. 
Based on the research and analysis conducted by this project team, the recommended 
solutions regarding advanced sea base enablers are shown in Table 25: 
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Table 25. Recommended Sea Base Enablers 
Operational requirements Recommended 
ASE 
For operations and quick response actions that require feet dry, beach 
deployment of personnel and equipment such as a major combat operation, 
the T-Craft appears to have the best capability for the cost.  Although the 
LCAC, LSV, LCU-2000 and SSC all have or will have the capability to 
traverse the surf zone and deposit their cargo feet dry, from a performance 
perspective, the T-Craft was shown to have the best combination of speed, 
range, and cargo capacity. The recommendation is based on the 
performance and cost analyses performed. T-Craft also comes with 
significant risks that will have to be factored in to any decision. 
T-Craft 
For operations such as a Humanitarian Aid mission that allow for the use of 
a port facility, an austere port or a Quay wall (large wall, usually masonry, 
bordering a body of water) the LSV is the best capability for the cost.  
Additional, the LSV can also be used on a beach. 
LSV 
The cost analysis of the two operational scenarios, using data from tables 17 
& 18, indicates that the ASE of choice would be the LSV for both 
operational scenarios if cost were the dominant decision factor.  The LSV is 
relatively inexpensive to build, and maintain.  The next closest ASE in total 
cost per system was the LCU which was approximately $80M more in the 
combat mission and nearly $120 M more in the humanitarian aid scenario. 
LSV 
The best existing operational alternative for humanitarian or combat 
operations today, based on the decision analysis, is the LSV.  As the 
alternatives still in developmental stages, such as the T-Craft and the JHSV 
become operational, operational needs could be reassessed to factor in the 
new capabilities. 
LSV 
The T-Craft has been show to have utility in both the major combat 
operation and the humanitarian aid scenarios.  This team recommends that 
ONR continue to fund the development of the T-Craft and support the 
ongoing technology insertion efforts to bring the conceptual designs into 
operational reality.    
T-Craft 
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B. KEY ASSUMPTIONS 
During the evolution of the Capstone project, the team made numerous key assumptions 
to help maintain the proper project scope and bounds to ensure that the project effort was 
achievable in the time frame available.  The initial assumption made by the team is that 
seabasing is the viable approach.  From this base assumption several alternatives were developed 
and subsequent analysis was conducted.  Next, the team developed several further assumptions 
based on the nature of seabasing.  Currently the distance from shore for a sea base is not a well 
defined parameter and to complicate matters more for the team the distance from shore for a sea 
base has significant impact on how fuel is supplied to the beach.  The current fuel pipe capability 
for piping fuel from container ships to the shore does not support sea bases over the horizon.  
This will impact the ability of the connectors to move higher tonnages of cargo as there will be a 
need for movement of fuel ashore as well as personnel and equipment.  It is important to note 
that our analysis did not consider the negative impact of moving further from shore due to the 
additional requirement to move fuel; it only analyzed the increased distance from a transit time 
impact.  For our analysis, the further the sea base was from shore the better, within a reasonable 
amount of transit time. This was based on the advantages obtained in maneuverability and safety 
of sea base assets. 
The next key assumption regarding the sea base had to do with the many technical 
obstacles that must be overcome to fully enable the sea base.  Naval Sea Systems Command is 
currently developing a robust transfer capability to move personnel and equipment quickly and 
more efficiently around the sea base.  For the analyses conducted in this study, the specific 
requirements for moving personnel and equipment to the various connectors are considered 
available and supportable in sea state 3 and 4 respectively.  The assumption developed by the 
team is that the cargo can be efficiently loaded onto the connectors at the sea base.  The prime 
focus of the analysis was on the movement of the ASE to the sea base, and once loaded with 
cargo, its movement to their respective points of debarkation. 
In regards to the different connectors that were analyzed by the team, we did not consider 
the detailed engineering or system design of those connectors due to time constraints.  The 
assumption is that the technical designs required to support the operational concepts will be met 
and the connectors will perform as defined in detailed system specifications and key 
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performance parameters (KPP’s).  To further delve into specific technical constraints and design 
characteristics of the sea base or connectors would have broadened the scope beyond what was 
feasible to accomplish with the time and resources available. 
C. LIMITATIONS 
The initial concept the team developed was centered on the sea base supporting four 
different operational scenarios based on summarizing mission sets based on a detailed analysis of 
many other operational scenarios portrayed on DOD doctrine.  The four options represented a 
reasonable set of scenarios for assessing ASE value but were not representative of the ROMO. 
Due to the limitations imposed on the effort, the team did not thoroughly investigate each of the 
four major operational scenarios.  Therefore the team prioritized efforts to examine MCO and 
Humanitarian Aid as the most and least stressing operational requirements, respectively.  The 
other two operational scenarios, Police Action and Disaster Relief, had significant overlapping 
and redundant operational requirements which led the team down the path of eliminating them 
from the initial analysis effort.  
In general, the focus of the effort was on the Concept Development stage of acquisition 
and a simplified AOA culminating in a recommended approach for ASE. The team considered 
alternatives from a high level functional perspective. The team did not perform detailed 
engineering analyses, provide a recommended naval architecture or any other detailed 
engineering work. However, the team collected many sources of available information on 
potential alternatives for ASE and, with basic checks for achievability, has largely assumed that 
the information collected regarding the various systems is reliable. 
The team had several influencing factors that also produced limitations to our analysis.  
The Analysis was limited to current DOD Programs of Record (POR) and existing design efforts.  
The team did not attempt to develop, design or create a new ASE.  Instead as previously stated, 
the team collected available information on existing and planned connectors and then compared 
them against each other from an operational and functional requirements standpoint.  The team 
was supported throughout the project by various organizations and people throughout the DOD 
community.   
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A reoccurring premise throughout this report is the inconsistencies and conflicting 
requirements provided by the different stakeholders.  Due to the limited time associated with the 
project, full verification and validation of the individual technical requirements could not be 
conducted.  As will be explained in the recommendations section, one of the primary 
recommendations that should be addressed is the inconsistencies in the desired capabilities 
between the individual major stakeholders.   
D. FUTURE STUDIES (THE WAY AHEAD) 
The team has identified numerous areas where follow-on studies and additional research 
can be performed to further evaluate the need for and value of an ASE.  This list of potential 
future efforts is not all encompassing, however it does provide numerous areas where additional 
information can be collected and evaluated to improve and further strengthen the overall 
recommendations regarding an ASE. The recommendations for future efforts are organized 
according to the major efforts conducted as part of this study. 
1.  Overview/Seabasing Background 
To be able to fully assess the capabilities and need for an ASE, a formal AOA will need 
to be conducted.  As part of an AOA, detailed engineering analysis of the various capabilities 
will need to be evaluated to determine the feasibility of the Transformable Craft as an 
operational asset. 
A primary key assumption that was made was on the validity of the sea base.  Future 
studies on the need and utility of the sea base will have significant impacts on the decision 
analysis performed.  An analysis of not only the feasibility and utility of the sea base but also 
that of the minimum and maximum distance from shore should be conducted to establish DOD 
policy and document clear requirements that would influence the nature of an ASE.   
2. Formulation 
As documented throughout the report, a recurring theme was the inconsistencies and 
conflicting requirements provided by the different major DOD stakeholders.  The team 
recommends, as part of the future efforts, a specific list of formal requirements must be 
established that supports each of the individual stakeholders and that is formally documented so 
it can be used in analyzing potential solutions to those requirements.  Once a more complete list 
of requirements has been established then the ASE analyses can be revisited and refined.   
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Future efforts should entail an analysis of all functions of the sea base.  The analysis 
conducted was primarily on the functional capability of an ASE as it departs the sea base 
following equipment load out.  The analysis did not cover self deployment of the ASE to the sea 
base.  Additionally, an analysis of the complete range of military operations which would include 
the remaining two operational scenarios (Police Action and Disaster Relief) identified by the 
team should be conducted.  Expanding the mission analysis to more comprehensively address the 
ROMO would be worthwhile. As part of the future studies, careful consideration of the non-
functional requirements must be included to ensure a fully functional and usable system. 
3. Analysis 
a. Modeling and Simulation 
M&S represents an area where considerably more effort could be expended with 
significant payoff. Recommended future studies include completing the envisioned studies that 
this team did not have the resources to complete. Detailed models for all of the possible 
alternatives need to be constructed allowing for a dynamic assessment of the Process Cargo 
(Assemble) and Transport Cargo (Employ) functionality of an ASE. This will allow much more 
refined value assessment of the various alternatives individually and in combination. The models 
could also be expanded beyond the Assemble and Employ functions to consider Reconstitution 
(also part of Transport Cargo) and Close (Deploy ASE) functionality. 
Due to time limitations, this modeling and simulation study was unable to create 
functional descriptions and their corresponding discrete event simulations for any of the 
alternative technologies discussed in this report.  Therefore, these initial simulation runs and 
corresponding analysis serve as a proof-of-principle of this simulation methodology.   We 
believe that future research on sea base enablers needs to include a more robust usage of system 




b. Cost Analysis 
Cost estimation is a field of its own and a major undertaking in its own right. The 
cost analysis performed as part of this study was very limited and high level. More complete and 
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validated cost data is needed for the existing platforms and systems still in the design phase. In 
particular, better data for O&M and NRE costs are needed. These costs should be collected and 
folded into a refined ASE cost analysis.  
The cost analysis was accomplished using an analogous cost estimate and numerous 
variables from the different alternatives, then assessing the best matching variables and 
computing the costs per parameter on the alternative to estimate the T-Craft cost.  As more 
formal acquisition and LCCP costs for the T-Craft are established, the analysis will need to be 
reassessed to determine if any changes in costs has an impact on the overall evaluation. 
Based on the current financial crisis and continuing Federal Government loan programs, 
a zero discount was used from FY09 to FY11.  As the various stimulus package programs are 
halted, a review of historical and future cost models would provide a better determination if 
some level of discount factor should be applied to the FY09 to FY11 cost estimates.   
An assumption was made that all NRE costs would start in FY11.  This is highly unlikely 
as the T-Craft and SSC may not have any significant R&D expenditures until the FY15 
timeframe.  Therefore, the LCCP estimates will need to be updated to adjust for changes in fiscal 
year planned expenditures.  
4. Interpretation 
To fully assess appropriate ASE alternatives a more comprehensive collection of 
parameters should be used, hopefully based on better validated requirements for seabasing and 
an ASE capability, for feasibility screening and decision analysis.  As part of the decision 
analysis, the team selected six requirements based on stakeholder prioritization and subject 
matter expertise input to analyze each alternative.  Future efforts will need to examine a more 
comprehensive set of validated operational and technical requirements to determine the best 
option available.   
As part of the decision analysis, beachability was established as a binary value. An 
improved method for future decision analysis and value assignment would be to change from 
two levels to three levels of requirements analysis for beachability.  Three recommended levels 
would be: 
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• Not beachable – platform requires a port facility of some sort or external 
resources to deliver cargo to an unimproved beach. 
• Beachable - equipment can be deployed feet dry via a ramp while the vessel 
remains in the water. 
• Fully amphibious - allows for full access to an unimproved beach and potential 
inland deployment of personnel and equipment.   
This further refinement would be an improvement as it recognizes the additional value 
achieved by having a fully amphibious capability. The improved access to the land site as well as 
the ability to traverse sand bars and mud flats afforded by fully amphibious capability should be 
captured as part of the analysis. 
As noted previously, following the completion of the decision analysis, the team 
determined that instead of an absolute value for crew size, it would be more appropriate to utilize 
a ratio of crew size to the cargo capacity of the vessel or some similar ratio. This would eliminate 
some of the bias against larger vessels that generally have higher crew requirements but also 
generally have better cargo capacity. As part of future studies, a ratio of crew to cargo capacity 
should be considered as part of the decision analysis. 
Future analyses should broaden more beyond individual craft to look at force structure 
composition that includes ASEs. With the exception of the limited M&S analysis and cost-
benefit analysis, the bulk of the analysis performed as part of this study looked at individual ASE 
alternatives by themselves. To fully assess the impact of an ASE platform on seabasing 
capability will require a more comprehensive analysis of collections of potential ASEs in concert 
with other sea base assets.  
As the various vessels and alternatives mature and are brought into service or upgraded, 
the detailed value analysis should be repeated using real world performance measurements to 
ensure that this analysis model remains consistent.  For the decision analysis, the team sees both 
short and long term efforts that can be undertaken: 
a. Short Term 
Analysis needs to be done of how soon seabasing needs to happen based on DOD 
Guidance and Policy. If there is a requirement for seabasing to be operational in the near term 
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then a decision analysis should be performed to factor in time to realize a viable solution.  Also, 
the total amount of cargo an ASE needs to move needs to be revalidated. Analysis of whether the 
design objective should be the sustainment cargo or the surge cargo needs further study. If the 
amount of cargo is more than the 1000 ton of sustainment cargo in a 10 hour window and is 
closer to the 13,000 ton surge of moving a Stryker Brigade Combat Team in a ten hour window, 
then the Decision Analysis needs to be weighted accordingly.  Based on a 25 nautical miles 
range, transit time only at 40 knots and not including loading and un-loading times, 6 T-Craft can 
move 13,000 tons in a 10 hour window.  Based on a 25 nautical mile range, transit time only at 
12 knots and not including loading and un-loading times, 3 LSV’s can move 13,000 tons in a 10 
hour window.  7 LSV’s can move the entire Stryker Brigade Combat Team 13,000 ton surge in 
one movement.  
It is also recommended that the requirements for vessel speed in the near term need to be 
reexamined. In the 25 nautical mile scenario outlined above, the T-Crafts objective speed of 40 
knots allows it to reach shore in 38 minutes.  The slower 12 knot speed of the LSV takes 125 
minutes over the same distance. If a phased approach to seabasing that finds it permissible in the 
near term to allow lower speeds and phases in higher speeds in the long term, a cost/benefit 
analysis may show that there are viable existing material solutions for near term, albeit slower, 
sea base enablers.  
b. Long Term 
Beyond validation of the total amount of cargo, the required integrated combat 
systems needs to be examined. A detailed threat analysis needs to be performed that specifically 
addresses the ASE operating away from its protecting escorts in the shallow littorals and 
beached. The value of ballistic shielding of critical components and crew areas needs to be 
analyzed, as well as need for self defense and countermeasures. 
Sustainability, Maintainability, and Lifecycle Cost Analysis of the alternatives will also 
need to be analyzed as part of the decision analysis.  Half of the alternatives used in this report 
are not currently fielded systems, so a comparison of the non-functional requirements must be 
performed as part of any future decision analysis to better understand the overall costs beyond 
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APPENDIX A – DOCUMENTATION REVIEW 
The following documents were reviewed by the ASE team during the initial phase of the 
project. 
 
Army Transportation FAA (PIA Updated) - 14 Sep 07 
Army Watercraft FNA (PIA Updated) - 14 Sep 07 
Army Watercraft FSA (PIA Approved) - 13 Nov 07 
Army Watercraft Master Plan - April 08 
Army Watercraft Requirements (010209rev1) _ OLD.ppt 
Army Watercraft Requirements (030209) (NXPowerLite) 
Army_Perspective_on_seabasing_-_31July06 
ASNE Day 2006 Paper Operational Logistics in the Future Sea Force 
Defense Science Board Task Force on Seabasing 
Identifying Requirements for seabasing Assets 
JLOTS (Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore) joint pub 4-01.6- 5 Aug 05 
NATO Paper 
Naval Transitions Roadmap 2003 - Assured Access and Power Projection 
from the Sea 
Naval Transitions Roadmap 2003 - Power and Access from the Sea 
Naval_Operations_Concept_2006 
Sea base Connector Transformable 
Seabasing -  Ensuring Joint Force Access from the Sea 
Seabasing: Joint Integrating Concept 
Seabasing _MIT_Concept Design Solutions 
Seabasing 2015 - Concept Design Solutions.pdf 
Seabasing Book 
Sea_Basing_Enablers_INP_Cooper 
T-Craft Brief HSS-AP AO Group 29Oct08_Final 
T-Craft Concepts Technical Foundation 
TRADOC_White_Paper_Joint_seabasing 
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APPENDIX B – M & S DATA 
Extend model Output Data: 
 
LCAC Unload Times 
 









































































































Vehicle Ramp Transit Completion Times 
 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Simulation Input Data: 
 












1 1 0 1 1 
2 1 1 1 1 
3 1 2 1 1 
4 1 3 1 1 
5 1 0 2 1 
6 1 1 2 1 
7 1 2 2 1 
8 1 3 2 1 
9 1 0 1 1 
10 1 1 1 1 
11 1 2 1 1 
12 1 3 1 1 
13 1 0 1 1 
14 1 1 1 1 
15 1 2 1 1 
16 1 3 1 1 
17 1 0 1 1 
18 1 1 1 1 
19 1 2 1 1 
20 1 3 1 1 
21 1 0 1 1 
22 1 1 1 1 
23 1 2 1 1 
24 1 3 1 1 
25 1 0 1 1 












27 1 2 1 1 
28 1 3 1 1 
29 1 0 1 1 
30 1 1 1 1 
31 1 2 1 1 
32 1 3 1 1 
33 1 0 1 13 
34 1 1 1 13 
35 1 2 1 13 
36 1 3 1 13 
37 2 0 1 13 
38 2 1 1 13 
39 2 2 1 13 
40 2 3 1 13 
41 2 0 2 13 
42 2 1 2 3 
43 2 2 2 3 
44 2 3 2 3 
45 2 0 3 3 
46 2 1 3 3 
47 2 2 3 3 
48 2 3 3 3 
49 2 2 1 3 
50 2 3 1 2 
51 2 0 2 13 
52 2 1 1 4 
53 2 0 1 4 
54 3 0 1 4 
55 3 1 1 4 












57 3 3 1 4 
58 3 0 2 4 
59 3 0 1 4 
60 3 1 1 4 
61 3 2 1 4 
62 3 3 1 4 
63 3 1 2 4 
64 4 0 1 4 
65 4 1 1 4 
66 4 2 1 4 
67 4 3 1 4 
68 4 0 2 4 
69 4 0 1 4 
70 4 1 1 4 
71 4 2 1 4 
72 4 3 1 4 
73 4 1 2 4 
74 5 0 1 4 
75 5 1 1 4 
76 5 2 1 4 
77 5 3 1 4 
78 5 0 2 4 
79 5 0 1 4 
80 5 1 1 4 
81 5 2 1 4 
82 5 3 1 4 
83 5 1 2 4 
84 6 0 1 4 
85 6 1 1 4 












87 6 3 1 4 
88 6 0 2 4 
89 6 1 2 4 
90 6 2 2 4 
91 6 0 1 4 
92 6 1 1 3 
93 6 2 1 3 
94 6 3 1 3 
95 6 0 2 3 
96 6 1 2 3 
97 6 2 2 3 
98 7 0 1 3 
99 7 1 1 3 
100 7 2 1 13 
101 7 3 1 13 
102 7 0 2 3 
103 7 1 2 3 
104 7 2 2 3 
105 7 3 2 3 
106 7 0 3 3 
107 7 1 3 3 
108 7 2 3 3 
109 7 3 3 3 
110 7 0 4 2 
111 7 3 1 2 
112 7 2 2 2 
113 7 0 1 2 
114 7 1 1 6 
115 7 2 1 6 












117 8 1 1 8 
118 8 2 1 3 
119 8 3 1 3 
120 8 0 2 3 
121 8 1 2 3 
122 8 2 2 3 
123 8 3 2 3 
124 8 0 3 10 
125 8 1 3 10 
126 8 2 3 2 
127 8 3 1 2 
128 8 0 1 2 
129 8 1 1 11 
130 8 2 1 8 
131 9 0 1 1 
132 9 1 1 1 
133 9 2 1 1 
134 9 3 1 1 
135 9 0 2 1 
136 9 1 2 1 
137 9 2 2 1 
138 9 3 2 1 
139 9 0 3 8 
140 9 1 3 8 
141 9 2 3 8 
142 9 3 3 8 
143 9 0 4 8 
144 9 1 4 8 
145 9 2 1 8 












147 9 0 2 13 
148 9 1 2 13 
149 9 0 1 2 
150 9 1 1 10 
151 9 0 1 10 
152 9 1 1 2 
153 9 0 1 10 
154 9 1 1 10 
155 9 0 1 2 
156 9 1 1 10 
157 9 0 1 10 
158 9 1 1 2 
159 9 0 1 2 
160 9 1 1 2 
161 9 0 1 3 
162 9 1 1 3 
163 10 0 1 3 
164 10 1 1 3 
165 10 2 1 3 
166 10 3 1 3 
167 10 0 2 2 
168 10 1 2 2 
169 10 2 2 2 
170 10 3 2 5 
171 10 0 3 5 
172 10 1 3 2 
173 10 2 3 2 
174 10 3 3 8 
175 10 0 4 8 












177 10 2 4 8 
178 10 1 1 8 
179 10 2 1 8 
180 10 3 1 8 
181 10 0 2 8 
182 10 1 2 11 
183 10 2 2 11 
184 10 0 1 11 
185 10 1 1 11 
186 10 2 1 2 
187 10 0 1 10 
188 10 1 1 10 
189 10 0 1 2 
190 10 0 1 10 
191 10 0 1 10 
192 10 0 1 2 
193 11 0 1 10 
194 11 1 1 10 
195 11 2 1 2 
196 11 3 1 10 
197 11 0 2 10 
198 11 1 2 2 
199 11 2 2 2 
200 11 3 2 2 
201 11 0 3 2 
202 11 1 3 2 
203 11 2 3 2 
204 11 3 3 2 
205 11 0 4 2 












207 11 2 4 10 
208 11 0 1 8 
209 11 1 2 8 
210 11 2 2 8 
211 11 0 1 8 
212 11 1 1 8 
213 11 2 1 8 
214 11 3 1 8 
215 11 0 2 8 
216 11 1 2 9 
217 11 0 1 9 
218 11 1 1 9 
219 11 2 1 9 
220 11 1 1 9 
221 11 0 1 9 
222 11 1 1 9 
223 11 0 1 9 
224 11 1 1 9 
225 11 0 1 9 
226 11 1 1 9 
227 11 0 1 9 
228 11 1 1 11 
229 11 0 1 11 
230 11 0 1 11 
231 11 0 1 11 
232 12 0 1 9 
233 12 1 1 9 
234 12 2 1 9 
235 12 3 1 9 












237 12 1 2 9 
238 12 2 2 9 
239 12 3 2 9 
240 12 0 3 9 
241 12 1 3 9 
242 12 2 3 9 
243 12 0 1 9 
244 12 1 1 11 
245 12 2 1 11 
246 12 3 2 11 
247 12 0 2 11 
248 12 1 2 7 
249 12 2 2 7 
250 12 3 3 7 
251 12 0 3 7 
252 12 0 1 7 
253 12 1 1 7 
254 12 2 1 7 
255 12 3 1 7 
256 12 0 2 12 
257 12 1 2 12 
258 12 2 2 12 
259 12 3 2 12 
260 12 0 3 7 
261 12 1 3 7 
262 12 0 1 7 
263 12 1 1 7 
264 12 2 1 7 
265 12 3 1 7 












267 12 1 2 7 
268 12 2 2 12 
269 12 3 2 12 
270 12 0 3 12 
271 12 1 3 12 
272 12 2 2 8 
273 12 3 2 8 
274 12 0 1 8 
275 12 1 1 8 
276 12 2 1 8 
277 12 3 1 8 
278 12 0 2 8 
279 12 1 2 8 
280 12 0 1 8 
281 12 1 1 8 
282 12 2 1 8 
283 12 3 1 8 
284 12 0 2 8 
285 12 1 2 8 
286 12 0 1 8 
287 12 1 1 8 
288 12 2 1 11 
289 12 3 1 11 
290 12 0 2 11 
291 12 1 2 11 
292 12 0 1 2 
293 12 1 1 8 
294 12 2 1 8 
295 12 3 1 8 












297 12 0 1 8 
298 12 0 1 8 
299 12 0 1 8 
300 12 0 1 8 
301 13 0 1 11 
302 13 1 1 11 
303 13 2 1 11 
304 13 3 1 11 
305 13 0 2 8 
306 13 1 2 8 
307 13 2 2 8 
308 13 3 2 8 
309 13 0 3 8 
310 13 1 3 8 
311 13 2 3 8 
312 13 3 3 8 
313 13 0 4 11 
314 13 1 4 11 
315 13 0 2 11 
316 13 1 2 11 
317 13 2 2 8 
318 13 3 3 8 
319 13 0 2 8 
320 13 1 2 8 
321 13 2 2 8 
322 13 3 1 8 
323 13 1 2 8 
324 13 0 2 8 
325 13 3 2 10 












327 13 1 1 8 
328 13 2 1 8 
329 13 3 1 8 
330 13 0 2 8 
331 13 0 1 8 
332 13 1 1 8 
333 13 2 1 8 
334 13 3 1 8 
335 13 0 2 11 
336 13 0 1 11 
337 13 1 1 11 
338 13 2 1 11 
339 13 3 1 2 
340 13 0 2 10 
341 13 0 1 10 
342 13 1 1 2 
343 13 0 1 10 
344 13 1 1 10 
345 13 0 1 2 
346 13 1 1 2 
347 13 0 1 6 
348 14 0 1 6 
349 14 1 1 8 
350 14 2 1 8 
351 14 3 1 8 
352 14 0 2 8 
353 14 1 2 8 
354 14 2 2 8 
355 14 3 2 8 












357 14 1 3 2 
358 14 2 3 13 
359 14 3 3 2 
360 14 0 2 8 
361 14 1 2 8 
362 14 2 2 8 
363 14 3 2 8 
364 14 0 1 8 
365 14 1 1 8 
366 14 2 1 8 
367 14 3 1 8 
368 14 0 2 11 
369 14 1 2 11 
370 14 2 2 11 
371 14 3 2 11 
372 14 0 1 7 
373 14 1 1 7 
374 14 2 1 7 
375 14 3 1 7 
376 14 0 2 7 
377 14 1 2 7 
378 14 2 2 7 
379 14 3 2 7 
380 14 2 1 12 
381 14 3 1 12 
382 14 0 2 12 
383 14 1 2 12 
384 14 1 1 7 
385 14 2 1 7 












387 14 0 2 7 
388 14 0 1 7 
389 14 1 1 7 
390 14 2 1 7 
391 14 3 1 7 
392 14 0 2 12 
393 14 0 1 12 
394 14 1 1 12 
395 14 2 1 12 
396 14 3 1 9 
397 14 0 2 9 
398 14 2 1 9 
399 14 3 1 9 
400 14 1 1 9 
401 14 2 1 9 
402 14 0 1 9 
403 14 1 1 9 
404 14 2 1 9 
405 14 1 1 9 
406 14 0 1 9 
407 14 0 1 9 
408 15 0 1 11 
409 15 1 1 11 
410 15 2 1 11 
411 15 3 1 11 
412 15 0 2 9 
413 15 1 2 9 
414 15 2 2 9 
415 15 3 2 9 












417 15 1 3 9 
418 15 2 3 9 
419 15 3 3 9 
420 15 0 4 9 
421 15 1 4 9 
422 15 2 1 9 
423 15 0 1 9 
424 15 1 1 11 
425 15 2 1 11 
426 15 0 1 11 
427 15 1 1 11 
428 15 2 1 2 
429 15 1 1 2 
430 15 0 1 2 
431 15 1 1 2 
432 15 0 1 2 
433 15 0 1 2 
434 15 0 1 2 
435 15 0 1 2 
436 15 0 1 2 
437 15 0 1 2 
438 15 0 1 2 
439 16 0 1 2 
440 16 1 1 2 
441 16 2 1 2 
442 16 3 1 2 
443 16 0 2 2 
444 16 1 2 2 
445 16 2 2 2 












447 16 0 3 13 
448 16 1 3 13 
449 16 2 3 13 
450 16 3 3 13 
451 16 0 4 13 
452 16 1 4 13 
453 16 2 4 13 
454 16 3 4 13 
455 16 0 5 13 
456 16 1 5 13 
457 17 0 1 13 
458 17 1 1 13 
459 17 2 1 13 
460 17 3 1 13 
461 17 0 2 13 
462 17 1 2 13 
463 17 2 2 13 
464 17 3 2 13 
465 17 0 3 14 
466 17 1 3 14 
467 17 2 3 14 
468 17 3 3 14 
469 17 0 4 14 
470 17 1 4 14 
471 17 2 4 14 
472 17 3 4 14 
473 17 0 5 14 
474 18 0 1 14 
475 18 1 1 14 












477 18 3 1 14 
478 18 0 2 14 
479 18 1 2 14 
480 18 2 2 14 
481 18 3 2 14 
482 18 0 3 14 
483 18 1 3 14 
484 18 2 3 14 
485 18 3 3 14 
486 18 0 4 14 
487 18 1 4 14 
488 18 2 4 15 
489 18 3 4 15 
490 19 0 1 15 
491 19 1 1 15 
492 19 2 1 15 
493 19 3 1 16 
494 19 0 2 16 
495 19 1 2 17 
496 19 2 2 10 
497 19 3 2 10 
498 19 0 3 10 
499 19 1 3 10 
500 19 2 3 10 
501 19 3 3 10 
502 19 0 4 10 
503 19 1 4 10 
504 19 2 4 10 
505 19 3 4 10 












507 19 1 5 10 
508 19 2 5 10 
509 19 3 5 10 
510 19 0 6 10 
511 19 1 6 10 
512 19 2 6 10 
513 19 3 2 10 
514 19 0 2 10 
515 19 0 3 10 
516 19 1 3 10 
517 19 2 3 10 
518 19 3 3 10 
519 19 0 4 10 
520 19 1 4 10 
521 19 2 4 10 
522 19 3 4 10 
523 19 0 5 10 
524 19 0 2 10 
525 19 1 2 10 
526 19 0 1 10 
527 19 1 1 10 
528 19 2 1 10 
529 19 3 1 10 
530 20 0 1 10 
531 20 1 1 10 
532 20 2 1 10 
533 20 3 1 10 
534 20 0 2 1 
535 20 1 2 1 












537 20 1 1 1 
538 20 2 1 1 
539 20 3 1 1 
540 20 0 2 1 
541 20 1 2 1 
542 20 0 1 1 
543 20 1 1 1 
544 20 2 1 1 
545 20 3 1 1 
546 20 0 1 1 
547 20 1 1 1 
548 20 2 1 1 
549 20 3 1 1 
550 20 0 1 1 
551 20 1 1 1 
552 20 2 1 1 
553 20 3 1 1 
554 20 0 1 1 
555 20 1 1 1 
556 20 2 1 1 
557 20 3 1 1 
558 20 0 1 1 
559 20 1 1 1 
560 20 2 1 1 
561 20 3 1 1 
562 20 0 1 1 
563 20 1 1 1 
564 20 2 1 1 
565 20 3 1 1 












567 21 1 1 1 
568 21 2 1 1 
569 21 3 1 1 
570 21 0 2 1 
571 21 0 1 1 
572 21 1 1 1 
573 21 2 1 1 
574 21 3 1 1 
575 21 0 2 1 
576 21 1 1 1 
577 21 3 1 1 
578 21 0 1 1 
579 21 1 1 1 
580 21 2 1 1 
581 21 3 1 1 
582 21 0 1 1 
583 21 1 1 1 
584 21 2 1 1 
585 21 3 1 1 
586 21 0 1 1 
587 21 1 1 1 
588 21 2 1 1 
589 21 3 1 1 
590 21 0 1 1 
591 21 1 1 1 
592 21 2 1 1 
593 21 3 1 1 
594 21 0 1 1 
595 21 1 1 1 












597 21 3 1 1 
598 21 0 1 4 
599 21 1 1 4 
600 22 0 1 4 
601 22 1 1 4 
602 22 2 1 4 
603 22 3 1 4 
604 22 0 2 4 
605 22 0 1 4 
606 22 1 1 4 
607 22 2 1 4 
608 22 3 1 4 
609 22 0 2 4 
610 23 0 1 4 
611 23 1 1 4 
612 23 2 1 8 
613 23 3 1 8 
614 23 0 2 8 
615 23 1 2 8 
616 23 2 2 8 
617 23 3 2 8 
618 23 0 1 8 
619 23 1 1 8 
620 23 2 1 8 
621 23 3 1 8 
622 23 0 2 8 
623 23 1 2 8 
624 23 2 2 8 
625 23 3 2 8 












627 23 3 1 8 
628 23 0 2 8 
629 23 1 2 8 
630 23 2 2 8 
631 23 0 1 8 
632 23 1 1 8 
633 23 2 1 8 
634 23 3 1 8 
635 23 0 2 8 
636 23 1 2 8 
637 23 2 2 8 
638 23 0 1 8 
639 23 1 1 8 
640 23 2 1 8 
641 23 3 1 8 
642 23 0 2 8 
643 23 1 2 8 
644 23 2 2 8 
645 23 0 1 8 
646 23 1 1 8 
647 23 2 1 8 
648 23 3 1 8 
649 23 0 2 8 
650 23 1 2 8 
651 23 2 2 8 
652 23 0 1 8 
653 23 1 1 8 
654 23 2 1 8 
655 23 3 1 8 












657 23 1 2 8 
658 23 2 2 8 
659 23 0 1 8 
660 23 1 1 8 
661 23 2 1 8 
662 23 3 1 8 
663 23 0 2 8 
664 23 1 2 8 
665 23 2 2 8 
666 23 0 1 8 
667 23 1 1 8 
668 24 0 1 8 
669 24 1 1 8 
670 24 2 1 8 
671 24 3 1 8 
672 24 0 2 8 
673 24 1 2 8 
674 24 2 2 8 
675 24 3 2 8 
676 24 0 3 8 
677 24 0 1 8 
678 24 1 1 8 
679 24 2 1 8 
680 24 3 1 8 
681 24 0 2 8 
682 24 1 2 8 
683 24 2 2 8 
684 24 3 2 8 
685 24 0 3 8 












687 24 1 1 8 
688 24 2 1 8 
689 24 3 1 8 
690 24 0 2 8 
691 24 1 2 8 
692 24 2 2 8 
693 24 3 2 8 
694 24 0 3 8 
695 24 0 1 8 
696 24 1 1 8 
697 24 2 1 8 
698 24 3 1 8 
699 24 0 2 8 
700 24 1 2 8 
701 24 2 2 8 
702 24 3 2 8 
703 24 0 3 8 
704 24 0 1 8 
705 24 1 1 8 
706 24 2 1 8 
707 24 3 1 8 
708 24 0 2 8 
709 24 1 2 8 
710 24 2 2 8 
711 24 3 2 8 
712 24 0 3 8 
713 24 0 1 8 
714 24 1 1 8 
715 24 2 1 8 












717 24 0 2 8 
718 24 1 2 8 
719 24 2 2 8 
720 24 3 2 8 
721 24 0 3 8 
722 24 0 1 8 
723 24 1 1 8 
724 24 2 1 8 
725 24 3 1 8 
726 24 0 2 8 
727 24 1 2 8 
728 24 2 2 8 
729 24 3 2 8 
730 24 0 3 8 
731 24 0 1 8 
732 24 1 1 8 
733 24 2 1 8 
734 24 3 1 8 
735 24 0 2 8 
736 24 1 2 8 
737 24 2 2 8 
738 24 3 2 8 
739 24 0 3 8 
740 25 0 1 11 
741 25 1 1 11 
742 25 2 1 11 
743 25 3 1 11 
744 25 0 2 11 
745 25 1 2 11 












747 25 3 2 11 
748 25 0 3 11 
749 25 1 3 11 
750 25 2 3 11 
751 25 3 3 11 
752 25 0 4 11 
753 25 1 4 11 
754 25 2 4 11 
755 25 3 4 11 
756 25 2 1 11 
757 25 3 1 11 
758 25 0 2 11 
759 25 1 2 11 
760 25 2 2 11 
761 25 3 2 11 
762 25 0 3 11 
763 25 1 3 11 
764 25 2 3 11 
765 25 3 3 11 
766 25 0 4 11 
767 25 1 4 11 
768 25 0 1 11 
769 25 1 1 11 
770 25 2 1 11 
771 25 3 1 11 
772 25 0 2 11 
773 25 1 2 11 
774 25 2 2 11 
775 25 3 2 11 












777 25 1 3 11 
778 25 2 3 11 
779 25 3 3 11 
780 25 0 4 11 
781 25 1 4 11 
782 25 0 1 11 
783 25 1 1 11 
784 25 2 1 11 
785 25 3 1 11 
786 25 0 2 11 
787 25 1 2 11 
788 25 2 2 11 
789 25 3 2 11 
790 25 0 3 11 
791 25 1 3 11 
792 25 2 3 11 
793 25 3 3 11 
794 25 0 4 11 
795 25 1 4 11 
796 25 0 1 18 
797 25 1 1 18 
798 26 0 1 7 
799 26 1 1 7 
800 26 2 1 7 
801 26 3 1 7 
802 26 0 2 7 
803 26 1 2 7 
804 26 2 2 7 
805 26 3 2 7 












807 26 1 3 12 
808 26 2 3 12 
809 26 0 1 12 
810 26 1 1 7 
811 26 2 1 7 
812 26 3 1 7 
813 26 0 2 7 
814 26 1 2 7 
815 26 2 2 7 
816 26 3 2 7 
817 26 0 3 7 
818 26 1 3 12 
819 26 2 3 12 
820 26 0 1 12 
821 26 1 1 12 
822 26 2 1 7 
823 26 3 1 7 
824 26 0 2 7 
825 26 1 2 7 
826 26 2 2 7 
827 26 3 2 7 
828 26 0 3 7 
829 26 1 3 7 
830 26 2 3 12 
831 26 0 1 12 
832 26 1 1 12 
833 26 2 1 12 
834 26 3 1 7 
835 26 0 2 7 












837 26 2 2 7 
838 26 3 2 7 
839 26 0 3 7 
840 26 1 3 7 
841 26 2 3 7 
842 26 2 1 12 
843 26 3 1 12 
844 26 0 2 12 
845 26 1 2 12 
846 26 0 1 7 
847 26 1 1 7 
848 26 2 1 7 
849 26 3 1 7 
850 26 0 2 7 
851 26 1 2 7 
852 26 0 1 7 
853 26 1 1 7 
854 26 2 1 12 
855 26 3 1 12 
856 26 0 2 12 
857 26 1 2 12 
858 26 0 1 7 
859 26 1 1 7 
860 26 2 1 7 
861 26 3 1 7 
862 26 0 2 7 
863 26 1 2 7 
864 26 0 1 7 
865 26 1 1 7 












867 27 1 1 12 
868 27 2 1 12 
869 27 3 1 12 
870 27 0 2 20 
871 27 1 2 21 
872 27 2 2 21 
873 27 3 2 21 
874 27 0 3 8 
875 27 1 3 8 
876 27 2 1 8 
877 27 3 1 8 
878 27 0 1 8 
879 27 1 1 8 
880 27 2 1 8 
881 27 3 1 8 
882 27 0 1 8 
883 27 1 1 8 
884 27 2 1 8 
885 27 3 1 8 
886 27 0 1 8 
887 27 1 1 8 
888 27 2 1 8 
889 27 3 1 8 
890 27 0 1 9 
891 27 1 1 9 
892 27 2 1 9 
893 27 0 1 9 
894 27 1 1 9 
895 27 2 1 9 












897 27 1 1 9 
898 27 2 1 9 
899 27 1 1 9 
900 27 0 1 9 
901 27 1 1 9 
902 28 0 1 11 
903 28 0 1 11 
904 28 0 1 11 
905 28 1 1 11 
906 28 2 1 9 
907 28 3 1 9 
908 28 0 2 9 
909 28 1 2 9 
910 28 2 2 9 
911 28 3 2 9 
912 28 0 1 9 
913 28 1 1 9 
914 28 2 1 9 
915 28 3 1 9 
916 28 0 2 9 
917 28 1 2 9 
918 28 2 2 11 
919 28 3 2 11 
920 28 0 1 11 
921 28 1 1 11 
922 28 2 1 9 
923 28 3 1 9 
924 28 0 2 9 
925 28 1 2 9 












927 28 3 2 9 
928 28 0 1 9 
929 28 1 1 9 
930 28 2 1 9 
931 28 3 1 9 
932 28 0 2 9 
933 28 1 2 9 
934 28 2 2 11 
935 28 3 2 11 
936 28 0 1 11 
937 28 1 1 11 
938 28 2 1 9 
939 28 3 1 9 
940 28 0 1 9 
941 28 1 1 9 
942 28 2 1 9 
943 28 3 1 9 
944 28 0 1 9 
945 28 1 1 9 
946 28 2 1 9 
947 28 3 1 9 
948 28 0 1 9 
949 28 1 1 9 
950 28 2 1 11 
951 28 3 1 11 
952 28 0 1 11 
953 28 1 1 11 
954 28 2 1 9 
955 28 3 1 9 












957 28 1 1 9 
958 28 2 1 9 
959 28 3 1 9 
960 28 0 1 9 
961 28 1 1 9 
962 28 2 1 9 
963 28 3 1 9 
964 28 0 1 9 
965 28 1 1 9 
966 29 2 1 11 
967 29 3 1 11 
968 29 0 1 11 
969 29 1 1 11 
970 29 2 1 9 
971 29 3 1 9 
972 29 0 2 9 
973 29 1 2 9 
974 29 2 2 9 
975 29 3 2 9 
976 29 0 3 9 
977 29 1 3 9 
978 29 0 1 9 
979 29 0 2 9 
980 29 1 2 9 
981 29 2 2 9 
982 29 0 1 11 
983 29 1 1 11 
984 29 2 1 11 
985 29 3 1 11 












987 29 1 2 9 
988 29 2 2 9 
989 29 0 1 9 
990 29 1 1 9 
991 29 2 1 9 
992 29 3 1 9 
993 29 0 2 9 
994 29 1 2 9 
995 29 2 2 9 
996 29 3 1 9 
997 29 0 2 9 
998 29 0 1 11 
999 29 1 1 11 
1000 29 2 1 11 
1001 29 3 1 11 
1002 29 0 2 9 
1003 29 2 1 9 
1004 29 0 1 9 
1005 29 1 1 9 
1006 29 2 1 9 
1007 29 0 1 9 
1008 29 1 1 9 
1009 29 2 1 9 
1010 29 0 1 9 
1011 29 1 1 9 
1012 29 2 1 9 
1013 29 0 1 9 
1014 29 1 1 11 
1015 29 2 1 11 












1017 29 1 1 11 
1018 29 2 1 13 
1019 29 1 1 13 
1020 29 0 1 14 
1021 30 0 1 14 
1022 30 0 1 14 
1023 30 0 1 14 
1024 30 1 1 14 
1025 30 2 1 14 
1026 30 3 1 14 
1027 30 0 2 14 
1028 30 1 2 14 
1029 30 2 2 14 
1030 30 3 2 14 
1031 30 0 3 14 
1032 30 1 3 14 
1033 30 2 3 14 
1034 30 3 3 14 
1035 30 0 4 14 
1036 30 1 4 14 
1037 31 2 4 17 
1038 31 3 4 2 
1039 31 0 1 2 
1040 31 1 1 2 
1041 31 2 1 2 
1042 31 3 1 2 
1043 31 0 2 2 
1044 31 1 2 2 
1045 31 2 2 2 












1047 31 0 3 2 
1048 31 1 3 2 
1049 31 2 3 2 
1050 31 3 3 2 
1051 31 0 4 2 
1052 31 1 4 2 
1053 31 2 4 2 
1054 31 3 4 2 
1055 32 0 5 2 
1056 32 1 5 2 
1057 32 0 1 2 
1058 32 1 1 2 
1059 32 2 1 2 
1060 32 3 1 2 
1061 32 0 2 2 
1062 32 1 2 2 
1063 32 2 2 2 
1064 32 3 2 10 
1065 32 0 3 10 
1066 32 1 3 10 
1067 32 2 3 10 
1068 32 3 3 10 
1069 32 0 4 10 
1070 32 1 4 10 
1071 32 2 4 10 
1072 32 3 4 10 
1073 32 0 5 10 
1074 32 1 5 10 
1075 32 2 5 10 












1077 32 0 6 10 
1078 32 1 6 10 
1079 32 2 3 10 
1080 32 3 3 10 
1081 32 1 3 10 
1082 32 0 4 10 
1083 32 0 3 10 
1084 32 3 1 10 
1085 32 0 2 10 
1086 32 1 2 10 
1087 32 2 2 10 
1088 32 3 2 10 
1089 32 2 1 10 
1090 33 1 1 10 
1091 33 0 1 10 
1092 33 0 1 10 
1093 33 1 1 10 
1094 33 2 1 8 
1095 33 3 1 8 
1096 33 0 2 8 
1097 33 1 2 8 
1098 33 2 2 8 
1099 33 3 2 8 
1100 33 0 3 8 
1101 33 1 3 8 
1102 33 0 1 8 
1103 33 1 1 8 
1104 33 2 1 8 
1105 33 3 1 8 












1107 33 1 2 8 
1108 33 2 2 8 
1109 33 3 2 8 
1110 33 0 3 8 
1111 33 1 3 8 
1112 33 2 2 8 
1113 33 3 2 8 
1114 33 0 2 8 
1115 33 1 2 8 
1116 33 0 1 8 
1117 33 1 1 8 
1118 33 2 1 8 
1119 33 3 1 8 
1120 33 0 2 8 
1121 33 1 2 8 
1122 33 2 2 8 
1123 33 3 2 8 
1124 33 0 1 8 
1125 33 1 1 8 
1126 33 2 1 8 
1127 33 3 1 8 
1128 33 0 2 8 
1129 33 1 2 8 
1130 33 2 2 8 
1131 33 3 2 8 
1132 33 0 1 8 
1133 33 1 1 8 
1134 33 2 1 8 
1135 33 3 1 8 












1137 33 1 2 8 
1138 33 2 2 8 
1139 33 3 2 8 
1140 33 0 1 8 
1141 33 1 1 8 
1142 33 2 1 8 
1143 33 3 1 8 
1144 33 0 2 8 
1145 33 1 2 8 
1146 33 2 2 8 
1147 33 3 2 8 
1148 33 0 1 8 
1149 33 1 1 8 
1150 33 2 1 8 
1151 33 3 1 8 
1152 33 0 2 8 
1153 33 1 2 8 
1154 33 2 2 8 
1155 33 3 2 8 
1156 33 0 1 8 
1157 33 1 1 8 
1158 34 2 1 8 
1159 34 3 1 8 
1160 34 0 1 8 
1161 34 1 1 8 
1162 34 2 1 8 
1163 34 3 1 8 
1164 34 0 2 8 
1165 34 1 2 8 












1167 34 3 2 8 
1168 34 0 3 8 
1169 34 0 1 8 
1170 34 1 1 8 
1171 34 2 1 8 
1172 34 3 1 8 
1173 34 0 2 8 
1174 34 1 2 8 
1175 34 2 2 8 
1176 34 3 2 8 
1177 34 0 3 8 
1178 34 0 1 8 
1179 34 1 1 8 
1180 34 2 1 8 
1181 34 3 1 8 
1182 34 0 2 8 
1183 34 1 2 8 
1184 34 2 2 8 
1185 34 3 2 8 
1186 34 0 3 8 
1187 34 0 1 8 
1188 34 1 1 8 
1189 34 2 1 8 
1190 34 3 1 8 
1191 34 0 2 8 
1192 34 1 2 8 
1193 34 2 2 8 
1194 34 3 2 8 
1195 34 0 3 8 












1197 34 1 1 8 
1198 34 2 1 8 
1199 34 3 1 8 
1200 34 0 2 8 
1201 34 1 2 8 
1202 34 2 2 8 
1203 34 3 2 8 
1204 34 0 3 8 
1205 34 0 1 8 
1206 34 1 1 8 
1207 34 2 1 8 
1208 34 3 1 8 
1209 34 0 2 8 
1210 34 1 2 8 
1211 34 2 2 8 
1212 34 3 2 8 
1213 34 0 3 8 
1214 34 0 1 8 
1215 34 1 1 8 
1216 34 2 1 8 
1217 34 3 1 8 
1218 34 0 2 8 
1219 34 1 2 8 
1220 34 2 2 8 
1221 34 3 2 8 
1222 34 0 3 8 
1223 34 0 1 8 
1224 34 1 1 8 
1225 34 2 1 8 












1227 34 0 2 8 
1228 34 1 2 8 
1229 34 2 2 8 
1230 35 3 2 8 
1231 35 0 3 8 
1232 35 0 1 8 
1233 35 1 1 8 
1234 35 2 1 8 
1235 35 3 1 8 
1236 35 0 2 8 
1237 35 1 2 8 
1238 35 2 2 8 
1239 35 3 2 8 
1240 35 0 3 8 
1241 35 1 3 8 
1242 35 2 3 8 
1243 35 3 3 8 
1244 35 0 4 8 
1245 35 1 4 8 
1246 35 2 4 11 
1247 35 3 4 11 
1248 35 0 5 11 
1249 35 1 5 11 
1250 35 0 1 11 
1251 35 1 1 11 
1252 35 2 1 11 
1253 35 3 1 11 
1254 35 0 2 11 
1255 35 1 2 11 












1257 35 3 2 11 
1258 35 0 3 11 
1259 35 1 3 11 
1260 35 2 3 11 
1261 35 3 3 11 
1262 35 0 4 11 
1263 35 1 4 11 
1264 35 2 4 11 
1265 35 3 4 11 
1266 35 0 5 11 
1267 35 1 5 11 
1268 35 0 1 11 
1269 35 1 1 11 
1270 35 2 1 11 
1271 35 3 1 11 
1272 35 0 2 11 
1273 35 1 2 11 
1274 35 2 2 11 
1275 35 3 2 11 
1276 35 0 3 11 
1277 35 1 3 11 
1278 35 2 3 11 
1279 35 3 3 11 
1280 35 0 4 11 
1281 35 1 4 11 
1282 35 2 4 11 
1283 35 3 4 11 
1284 35 0 5 11 
1285 35 1 5 11 












1287 35 1 1 11 
1288 35 2 1 11 
1289 35 3 1 11 
1290 35 0 2 11 
1291 35 1 2 11 
1292 35 2 2 11 
1293 35 3 2 11 
1294 35 0 3 11 
1295 35 1 3 11 
1296 35 2 3 11 
1297 35 3 3 11 
1298 35 0 4 11 
1299 35 1 4 11 
1300 35 2 4 11 
1301 35 3 4 11 
1302 35 0 5 11 
1303 35 1 5 11 
1304 35 0 1 11 
1305 35 1 1 11 
1306 35 0 1 11 
1307 35 1 1 11 
1308 35 0 1 11 
1309 35 1 1 11 
1310 36 0 1 11 
1311 36 1 1 11 
1312 36 0 1 11 
1313 36 1 1 11 
1314 36 2 1 11 
1315 36 3 1 11 












1317 36 1 2 11 
1318 36 2 2 11 
1319 36 3 2 11 
1320 36 0 3 11 
1321 36 1 3 11 
1322 36 2 3 11 
1323 36 3 1 11 
1324 36 0 1 11 
1325 36 1 1 11 
1326 36 2 1 8 
1327 36 3 1 8 
1328 36 0 1 8 
1329 36 1 1 8 
1330 36 2 1 8 
1331 36 3 1 8 
1332 36 2 1 22 
1333 37 1 1 9 
1334 37 0 1 9 
1335 37 0 1 9 
1336 37 1 1 9 
1337 37 2 1 9 
1338 37 3 1 9 
1339 37 0 2 9 
1340 37 1 2 9 
1341 37 2 2 9 
1342 37 0 1 9 
1343 37 1 1 9 
1344 37 2 1 9 
1345 37 3 1 9 












1347 37 1 2 9 
1348 37 2 2 9 
1349 37 0 1 9 
1350 37 1 1 9 
1351 37 2 1 9 
1352 37 3 1 9 
1353 37 0 2 9 
1354 37 1 2 9 
1355 37 2 2 9 
1356 37 0 1 9 
1357 37 1 1 9 
1358 37 2 1 9 
1359 37 3 1 9 
1360 37 0 2 9 
1361 37 1 2 9 
1362 37 2 2 9 
1363 37 0 1 9 
1364 37 1 1 9 
1365 37 2 1 9 
1366 37 3 1 9 
1367 37 0 2 9 
1368 37 1 2 9 
1369 37 2 2 9 
1370 37 0 1 9 
1371 37 1 1 9 
1372 37 2 1 9 
1373 37 3 1 9 
1374 37 0 2 9 
1375 37 1 2 9 












1377 37 0 1 9 
1378 37 1 1 9 
1379 37 2 1 9 
1380 37 3 1 9 
1381 37 0 2 9 
1382 37 1 2 9 
1383 37 2 2 9 
1384 37 0 1 9 
1385 37 1 1 9 
1386 37 2 1 9 
1387 37 3 1 9 
1388 37 0 2 9 
1389 37 1 2 9 
1390 37 2 2 9 
1391 37 0 1 9 
1392 37 1 1 9 
1393 37 2 1 9 
1394 37 3 1 9 
1395 37 0 2 9 
1396 37 1 2 9 
1397 37 2 2 9 
1398 37 0 1 9 
1399 37 1 1 9 
1400 37 2 1 9 
1401 37 3 1 9 
1402 37 0 2 9 
1403 37 1 2 9 
1404 37 2 2 9 
1405 37 0 1 9 












1407 37 2 1 9 
1408 37 3 1 9 
1409 37 0 2 9 
1410 37 1 2 9 
1411 37 2 2 9 
1412 37 0 1 9 
1413 37 1 1 9 
1414 37 2 1 9 
1415 37 3 1 9 
1416 37 0 2 9 
1417 38 1 2 18 
1418 38 2 2 18 
1419 38 0 1 18 
1420 38 1 1 18 
1421 38 2 1 23 
1422 38 3 1 23 
1423 38 0 2 23 
1424 38 1 2 23 
1425 39 2 2 23 
1426 39 3 2 23 
1427 39 0 1 20 
1428 39 1 1 20 
1429 40 2 1 20 
1430 40 3 1 20 
1431 40 0 2 20 
1432 40 1 2 25 
1433 40 2 2 25 
1434 40 3 2 26 
1435 40 0 1 6 












1437 40 2 1 27 
1438 41 3 1 7 
1439 41 0 2 7 
1440 41 1 2 7 
1441 41 2 2 7 
1442 41 3 2 7 
1443 41 0 3 7 
1444 41 0 1 7 
1445 41 1 1 7 
1446 41 2 1 7 
1447 41 3 1 7 
1448 41 0 2 7 
1449 41 1 2 7 
1450 41 2 2 7 
1451 41 3 2 7 
1452 41 0 3 7 
1453 41 1 3 7 
1454 41 2 3 7 
1455 41 2 1 7 
1456 41 0 1 7 
1457 41 1 1 7 
1458 41 2 1 7 
1459 41 0 1 7 
1460 41 1 1 7 
1461 41 2 1 7 
1462 41 0 1 14 
1463 41 1 1 14 
1464 41 2 1 14 
1465 41 0 1 14 












1467 42 2 1 14 
1468 42 0 1 14 
1469 42 1 1 14 
1470 42 2 1 14 
1471 42 0 1 14 
1472 42 1 1 14 
1473 42 2 1 14 
1474 42 0 1 14 
1475 42 1 1 14 
1476 42 0 1 2 
1477 42 1 1 2 
1478 42 2 1 2 
1479 42 3 1 2 
1480 42 0 2 2 
1481 42 1 2 2 
1482 42 2 2 2 
1483 43 3 2 2 
1484 43 0 3 2 
1485 43 1 3 2 
1486 43 2 3 2 
1487 43 3 3 2 
1488 43 0 4 2 
1489 43 1 4 2 
1490 43 2 4 2 
1491 43 3 4 2 
1492 43 0 5 2 
1493 43 0 1 2 
1494 43 1 1 2 
1495 43 2 1 2 












1497 43 0 2 2 
1498 43 1 2 2 
1499 43 2 2 2 
1500 43 3 2 2 
1501 44 0 3 2 
1502 44 1 3 10 
1503 44 2 3 10 
1504 44 3 3 10 
1505 44 0 4 10 
1506 44 1 4 10 
1507 44 2 4 10 
1508 44 3 4 10 
1509 44 0 5 10 
1510 44 1 5 10 
1511 44 0 1 10 
1512 44 1 1 10 
1513 44 2 1 10 
1514 44 3 1 10 
1515 44 0 2 10 
1516 44 1 2 10 
1517 44 2 2 10 
1518 44 3 2 10 
1519 44 0 3 10 
1520 44 1 3 10 
1521 44 2 3 10 
1522 44 3 3 10 
1523 44 0 4 10 
1524 44 1 4 10 
1525 44 2 4 10 












1527 44 0 5 10 
1528 44 1 5 10 
1529 44 2 5 10 
1530 44 3 5 10 
1531 44 0 6 10 
1532 44 1 6 10 
1533 44 2 6 10 
1534 44 2 1 10 
1535 44 3 1 10 
1536 44 0 2 10 
1537 44 1 2 10 
1538 44 2 2 10 
1539 44 3 2 10 
1540 44 0 3 10 
1541 44 1 3 10 
1542 44 2 3 10 
1543 44 3 3 10 
1544 45 0 4 8 
1545 45 1 4 8 
1546 45 2 4 8 
1547 45 3 4 8 
1548 45 0 5 8 
1549 45 1 5 8 
1550 45 2 5 8 
1551 45 3 5 8 
1552 45 0 6 8 
1553 45 0 1 8 
1554 45 1 1 8 
1555 45 0 1 8 












1557 45 2 1 8 
1558 45 3 1 8 
1559 45 0 2 8 
1560 45 1 2 8 
1561 45 2 2 8 
1562 45 3 2 8 
1563 45 0 3 8 
1564 45 0 1 8 
1565 45 1 1 8 
1566 45 2 1 8 
1567 45 3 1 8 
1568 45 0 2 8 
1569 45 1 2 8 
1570 45 2 2 8 
1571 45 3 2 8 
1572 45 0 3 8 
1573 45 0 1 8 
1574 45 1 1 8 
1575 45 2 1 8 
1576 45 3 1 8 
1577 45 0 2 8 
1578 45 1 2 8 
1579 45 2 2 8 
1580 45 3 2 8 
1581 45 0 3 8 
1582 45 0 1 8 
1583 45 1 1 8 
1584 45 2 1 8 
1585 45 3 1 8 












1587 45 1 2 8 
1588 45 2 2 8 
1589 45 3 2 8 
1590 45 0 3 8 
1591 45 0 1 8 
1592 45 1 1 8 
1593 45 2 1 8 
1594 45 3 1 8 
1595 45 0 2 8 
1596 45 1 2 8 
1597 45 2 2 8 
1598 45 3 2 8 
1599 45 0 3 8 
1600 45 0 1 8 
1601 45 1 1 8 
1602 45 2 1 8 
1603 45 3 1 8 
1604 45 0 2 8 
1605 45 1 2 8 
1606 45 2 2 8 
1607 45 3 2 8 
1608 45 0 3 8 
1609 45 0 1 8 
1610 45 1 1 8 
1611 45 2 1 8 
1612 45 3 1 8 
1613 45 0 2 8 
1614 45 1 2 8 
1615 45 2 2 8 












1617 46 0 3 8 
1618 46 0 1 8 
1619 46 1 1 8 
1620 46 2 1 8 
1621 46 3 1 8 
1622 46 0 2 8 
1623 46 1 2 8 
1624 46 2 2 8 
1625 46 3 2 8 
1626 46 0 3 8 
1627 46 0 1 8 
1628 46 1 1 8 
1629 46 2 1 8 
1630 46 3 1 8 
1631 46 0 2 8 
1632 46 1 2 8 
1633 46 2 2 8 
1634 46 3 2 8 
1635 46 0 3 8 
1636 46 0 1 8 
1637 46 1 1 8 
1638 46 2 1 8 
1639 46 3 1 8 
1640 46 0 2 8 
1641 46 1 2 8 
1642 46 2 2 8 
1643 46 3 2 8 
1644 46 0 3 8 
1645 46 0 1 8 












1647 46 2 1 8 
1648 46 3 1 8 
1649 46 0 2 8 
1650 46 1 2 8 
1651 46 2 2 8 
1652 46 3 2 8 
1653 46 0 3 8 
1654 46 0 1 8 
1655 46 1 1 8 
1656 46 2 1 8 
1657 46 3 1 8 
1658 46 0 2 8 
1659 46 1 2 8 
1660 46 2 2 8 
1661 46 3 2 8 
1662 46 0 3 8 
1663 46 0 1 8 
1664 46 1 1 8 
1665 46 2 1 8 
1666 46 3 1 8 
1667 46 0 2 8 
1668 46 1 2 8 
1669 46 2 2 8 
1670 46 3 2 8 
1671 46 0 3 8 
1672 46 0 1 8 
1673 46 1 1 8 
1674 46 2 1 8 
1675 46 3 1 8 












1677 46 1 2 8 
1678 46 2 2 8 
1679 46 3 2 8 
1680 46 0 3 8 
1681 46 0 1 8 
1682 46 1 1 8 
1683 46 2 1 8 
1684 46 3 1 8 
1685 46 0 2 8 
1686 46 1 2 8 
1687 46 2 2 8 
1688 47 3 2 8 
1689 47 0 3 8 
1690 47 0 1 8 
1691 47 1 1 8 
1692 47 2 1 8 
1693 47 3 1 8 
1694 47 0 2 8 
1695 47 1 2 8 
1696 47 2 2 8 
1697 47 3 2 8 
1698 47 0 3 8 
1699 47 0 1 8 
1700 47 1 1 8 
1701 47 2 1 8 
1702 47 3 1 8 
1703 47 0 2 8 
1704 47 1 2 8 
1705 47 2 2 8 












1707 47 0 3 8 
1708 47 0 1 8 
1709 47 1 1 8 
1710 47 2 1 8 
1711 47 3 1 8 
1712 47 0 2 8 
1713 47 1 2 8 
1714 47 2 2 8 
1715 47 3 2 8 
1716 47 0 3 8 
1717 47 0 1 8 
1718 47 1 1 8 
1719 47 2 1 8 
1720 47 3 1 8 
1721 47 0 2 8 
1722 47 1 2 8 
1723 47 2 2 8 
1724 47 3 2 8 
1725 47 0 3 8 
1726 47 0 1 8 
1727 47 1 1 8 
1728 47 2 1 8 
1729 47 3 1 8 
1730 47 0 2 8 
1731 47 1 2 8 
1732 47 2 2 8 
1733 47 3 2 8 
1734 47 0 3 8 
1735 47 0 1 8 












1737 47 2 1 8 
1738 47 3 1 8 
1739 47 0 2 8 
1740 47 1 2 8 
1741 47 2 2 8 
1742 47 3 2 8 
1743 47 0 3 8 
1744 47 0 1 8 
1745 47 1 1 8 
1746 47 2 1 8 
1747 47 3 1 8 
1748 47 0 2 8 
1749 47 1 2 8 
1750 47 2 2 8 
1751 47 3 2 8 
1752 47 0 3 8 
1753 47 0 1 8 
1754 47 1 1 8 
1755 47 2 1 8 
1756 47 3 1 8 
1757 47 0 2 8 
1758 47 1 2 8 
1759 47 2 2 8 
1760 48 3 2 8 
1761 48 0 3 8 
1762 48 0 1 8 
1763 48 1 1 8 
1764 48 2 1 8 
1765 48 3 1 8 












1767 48 1 2 8 
1768 48 2 2 8 
1769 48 3 2 8 
1770 48 0 3 8 
1771 48 0 1 8 
1772 48 1 1 8 
1773 48 2 1 8 
1774 48 3 1 8 
1775 48 0 2 8 
1776 48 1 2 8 
1777 48 2 2 8 
1778 48 3 2 8 
1779 48 0 3 8 
1780 48 0 1 8 
1781 48 1 1 8 
1782 48 2 1 8 
1783 48 3 1 8 
1784 48 0 2 8 
1785 48 1 2 8 
1786 48 2 2 8 
1787 48 3 2 8 
1788 48 0 3 8 
1789 48 0 1 8 
1790 48 1 1 8 
1791 48 2 1 8 
1792 48 3 1 8 
1793 48 0 2 8 
1794 48 1 2 8 
1795 48 2 2 8 












1797 48 0 3 8 
1798 48 0 1 8 
1799 48 1 1 8 
1800 48 2 1 8 
1801 48 3 1 8 
1802 48 0 2 8 
1803 48 1 2 8 
1804 48 2 2 8 
1805 48 3 2 8 
1806 48 0 3 8 
1807 48 0 1 8 
1808 48 1 1 8 
1809 48 2 1 8 
1810 48 3 1 8 
1811 48 0 2 8 
1812 48 1 2 8 
1813 48 2 2 8 
1814 48 3 2 8 
1815 48 0 3 8 
1816 48 0 1 8 
1817 48 1 1 8 
1818 48 2 1 8 
1819 48 3 1 8 
1820 48 0 2 8 
1821 48 1 2 8 
1822 48 2 2 8 
1823 48 3 2 8 
1824 48 0 3 8 
1825 48 0 1 8 












1827 48 2 1 8 
1828 48 3 1 8 
1829 48 0 2 8 
1830 48 1 2 8 
1831 48 2 2 8 
1832 49 3 2 8 
1833 49 0 3 8 
1834 49 0 1 8 
1835 49 1 1 8 
1836 49 2 1 8 
1837 49 3 1 8 
1838 49 0 2 8 
1839 49 1 2 8 
1840 49 2 2 8 
1841 49 3 2 8 
1842 49 0 3 8 
1843 49 0 1 8 
1844 49 1 1 8 
1845 49 2 1 8 
1846 49 3 1 8 
1847 49 0 2 8 
1848 49 1 2 8 
1849 49 2 2 8 
1850 49 3 2 8 
1851 49 0 3 8 
1852 49 1 3 8 
1853 49 2 3 8 
1854 49 3 3 8 
1855 49 0 4 8 












1857 49 0 1 8 
1858 49 1 1 8 
1859 49 2 1 8 
1860 49 3 1 8 
1861 49 0 2 8 
1862 49 1 2 8 
1863 49 2 2 8 
1864 49 3 2 8 
1865 49 0 3 8 
1866 49 1 3 8 
1867 49 2 3 8 
1868 49 3 3 8 
1869 49 0 4 8 
1870 49 1 4 8 
1871 49 0 1 8 
1872 49 1 1 11 
1873 49 2 1 11 
1874 49 3 1 11 
1875 49 0 2 11 
1876 49 1 2 11 
1877 49 2 2 11 
1878 49 3 2 11 
1879 49 0 3 11 
1880 49 1 3 11 
1881 49 2 3 11 
1882 49 3 3 11 
1883 49 0 4 11 
1884 49 1 4 11 
1885 49 0 1 11 












1887 49 2 1 11 
1888 49 3 1 11 
1889 49 0 2 11 
1890 49 1 2 11 
1891 49 2 2 11 
1892 49 3 2 11 
1893 49 0 3 11 
1894 49 1 3 11 
1895 49 2 3 11 
1896 49 3 3 11 
1897 49 0 4 11 
1898 49 1 4 11 
1899 49 1 1 11 
1900 49 2 1 11 
1901 49 3 1 11 
1902 49 0 2 11 
1903 49 0 1 11 
1904 49 1 1 11 
1905 49 2 1 11 
1906 49 3 1 11 
1907 49 0 2 11 
1908 50 0 1 11 
1909 50 1 1 11 
1910 50 2 1 11 
1911 50 3 1 11 
1912 50 0 2 11 
1913 50 0 1 11 
1914 50 1 1 11 
1915 50 2 1 11 












1917 50 0 2 11 
1918 50 0 1 11 
1919 50 0 1 11 
1920 50 1 1 11 
1921 50 2 1 11 
1922 50 3 1 11 
1923 50 0 2 11 
1924 50 1 2 11 
1925 50 2 2 11 
1926 50 3 2 11 
1927 50 0 3 11 
1928 50 1 3 11 
1929 50 2 3 11 
1930 50 3 3 11 
1931 50 0 4 11 
1932 50 1 4 11 
1933 50 2 4 11 
1934 50 3 4 11 
1935 50 0 5 11 
1936 50 1 5 7 
1937 50 3 2 7 
1938 50 0 3 7 
1939 50 1 3 7 
1940 50 2 3 7 
1941 50 0 1 7 
1942 50 1 1 7 
1943 50 2 1 7 
1944 50 3 1 7 
1945 50 0 2 7 












1947 50 2 2 7 
1948 50 3 2 7 
1949 50 0 3 7 
1950 50 1 3 7 
1951 50 2 3 7 
1952 50 0 1 7 
1953 50 1 1 7 
1954 50 2 1 7 
1955 50 3 1 7 
1956 50 0 2 7 
1957 50 1 2 7 
1958 50 2 2 7 
1959 50 3 2 7 
1960 50 0 3 7 
1961 50 1 3 7 
1962 50 2 3 7 
1963 50 0 1 7 
1964 50 1 1 7 
1965 50 2 1 7 
1966 50 3 1 7 
1967 50 0 2 7 
1968 51 1 2 7 
1969 51 2 2 7 
1970 51 3 2 7 
1971 51 0 3 7 
1972 51 1 3 7 
1973 51 2 3 7 
1974 51 3 1 7 
1975 51 0 1 7 





Index Vehicle Type 
Forward Speed  
(ft/hr) 
Maneuvering Speed  
(ft/hr) 
Number of JMICs 
Required 
Fork Truck Required 
During Vehicle Loading? 
(T/F) 
1 TANK 12240 4680 8 1 
2 HMMWV CARGO 18720 16200 1 0 
3 LAV 16560 13320 2 0 
4 EFV 10800 3600 2 0 
5 AAV 10080 3600 2 0 
6 ACE 12240 4680 1 0 
7 LVS 16200 3240 8 1 
8 MTVR 14040 2880 8 1 
9 MTVRXLWB 14040 2880 12 1 
10 HMMWV TRAILER 18720 16200 2 0 
11 MTVR TRAILER 14040 2880 4 1 
12 LVS TRAILER 16200 3240 4 1 
13 HMMWV OTHER 18720 16200 1 0 
14 HMMWV 19800 7200 1 0 
15 HMMWV 19800 7200 1 0 
16 HMMWV 19800 7200 1 0 
17 HMMWV 44550 16200 1 0 
18 HOWITZER 19800 7200 1 0 
19 RT FORKLIFT 19800 7200 1 0 
20 RT TRACTOR 19800 7200 1 0 
21 LAV 19800 7200 2 0 
22 XLW B MTVR 19800 7200 1 0 
23 BOAT BRIDGE 19800 7200 1 0 
24 FORKLIFT 19800 7200 1 0 
25 TRACTOR 19800 7200 1 0 
26 ASSAULT BREACHER 19800 7200 1 0 
27 TRACTOR 19800 7200 1 0 
 235 
Vehicle  
Index Vehicle Type 
Forward Speed  
(ft/hr) 
Maneuvering Speed  
(ft/hr) 
Number of JMICs 
Required 
Fork Truck Required 
During Vehicle Loading? 
(T/F) 
28 BRIDGE 19800 7200 1 0 
29 LVS TRAILER 19800 7200 1 0 
30 HMMWV 19800 7200 2 0 
31 MOTOR CYCLE 29700 10800 1 0 
32 DITCHER 19800 7200 1 0 
 
 









of JMICs Required 
For Assembly Wave 
1 8 36 
2 12 17 
3 5 10 
4 5 10 
5 5 10 
6 7 14 
7 13 18 
8 11 15 
9 14 32 
10 15 30 
11 15 39 
12 11 69 
13 14 47 
14 12 60 
15 14 31 
16 18 18 









of JMICs Required 
For Assembly Wave 
18 16 16 
19 23 40 
20 6 36 
21 5 34 
22 5 10 
23 8 58 
24 9 72 
25 16 58 
26 11 68 
27 10 36 
28 8 64 
29 10 55 
30 16 16 
31 18 18 
32 22 35 
33 10 68 
34 9 72 
35 18 80 
36 11 23 
37 7 84 
38 8 8 
39 8 4 
40 9 9 
41 11 28 
42 17 17 
43 18 18 
44 23 43 
45 9 72 









of JMICs Required 
For Assembly Wave 
47 9 72 
48 9 72 
49 14 76 
50 18 60 












TAMCN Equipment Nomenclature Wave Assignment
1 1 E1888 TANK, COMBAT, FT, 120MM GUN 1 
2 1 E1888 TANK, COMBAT, FT, 120MM GUN 1 
3 1 E1888 TANK, COMBAT, FT, 120MM GUN 1 
4 1 E1888 TANK, COMBAT, FT, 120MM GUN 1 
5 13 D1125 TRUCK,UTILITY, TOW CARRIER, 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP HMMWV 1 
6 13 D1125 TRUCK,UTILITY, TOW CARRIER, 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP HMMWV 1 
7 13 D1125 TRUCK,UTILITY, TOW CARRIER, 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP HMMWV 1 
8 13 D1125 TRUCK,UTILITY, TOW CARRIER, 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP HMMWV 1 
9 13 D1159 TRK, UTILITY, ARMT CARR W/SA 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP HMM 2 
10 13 D1159 TRK, UTILITY, ARMT CARR W/SA 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP HMM 2 
11 13 D1159 TRK, UTILITY, ARMT CARR W/SA 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP HMM 2 
12 13 D1159 TRK, UTILITY, ARMT CARR W/SA 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP HMM 2 
13 13 D1159 TRK, UTILITY, ARMT CARR W/SA 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP HMM 2 
14 3 E0947 LIGHT ARMORED VEHICLE 2 
15 3 E0947 LIGHT ARMORED VEHICLE 2 
16 3 E0947 LIGHT ARMORED VEHICLE 2 
17 3 E0947 LIGHT ARMORED VEHICLE 2 
18 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 2 
19 13 D1159 TRK, UTILITY, ARMT CARR W/SA 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP HMM 2 
20 4 E0857 EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE (PERS) 2 
21 4 E0857 EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE (PERS) 3 
22 4 E0857 EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE (PERS) 3 
23 4 E0857 EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE (PERS) 3 
24 4 E0857 EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE (PERS) 3 
25 4 E0857 EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE (PERS) 3 







TAMCN Equipment Nomenclature Wave Assignment
27 4 E0857 EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE (PERS) 4 
28 4 E0857 EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE (PERS) 4 
29 4 E0857 EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE (PERS) 4 
30 4 E0857 EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE (PERS) 4 
31 4 E0857 EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE (PERS) 5 
32 4 E0857 EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE (PERS) 5 
33 4 E0857 EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE (PERS) 5 
34 4 E0857 EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE (PERS) 5 
35 4 E0857 EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE (PERS) 5 
36 4 E0857 EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE (PERS) 6 
37 4 E0857 EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE (PERS) 6 
38 4 E0857 EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE (PERS) 6 
39 4 E0858 EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTINGVEHICLE (CMND) 6 
40 3 E0948 LAV, LOGISTICS 6 
41 3 E0942 LAV ANTI-TANK 6 
42 3 E0942 LAV ANTI-TANK 6 
43 3 E0949 LIGHT ARMORED VEHICLE MORTAR CARRIER 7 
44 13 D1125 TRUCK, TOW CARRIER 7 
45 13 D1125 TRUCK, TOW CARRIER 7 
46 3 E0947 LIGHT ARMORED VEHICLE 7 
47 3 E0947 LIGHT ARMORED VEHICLE 7 
48 3 E0947 LIGHT ARMORED VEHICLE 7 
49 3 E0947 LIGHT ARMORED VEHICLE 7 
50 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 7 
51 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 7 
52 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 7 
53 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 7 
54 6 B0589 EXCAVATOR, COMBAT (ACE) 7 
55 6 B0589 EXCAVATOR, COMBAT (ACE) 7 
56 11 B1298 LINE CHARGE LAUNCH KIT, TRLR MTD 8 







TAMCN Equipment Nomenclature Wave Assignment
58 3 E0948 LAV, LOGISTICS 8 
59 3 E0948 LAV, LOGISTICS 8 
60 3 E0950 LAV MAINTENANCE/RECOVERY 8 
61 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 8 
62 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 8 
63 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 8 
64 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 8 
65 11 B1298 LINE CHARGE LAUNCH KIT, TRLR MTD 8 
66 8 D1073 TRUCK, DUMP, 7T (MTVR)W/WINCH 8 
67 1 E1888 TANK, COMBAT, FT, 120MM GUN 9 
68 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 9 
69 13 D1001 TRK AMB, 2 LITTER ARMD, 1 1/4 TON HMMWV 9 
70 13 D1001 TRK AMB, 2 LITTER ARMD, 1 1/4 TON HMMWV 9 
71 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 9 
72 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 9 
73 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 9 
74 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 9 
75 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 9 
76 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 9 
77 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 9 
78 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 9 
79 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 9 
80 3 E0946 LAV COMMAND AND CONTROL (BN) 9 
81 3 E0947 LIGHT ARMORED VEHICLE 10 
82 3 E0948 LAV, LOGISTICS 10 
83 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 10 
84 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 10 
85 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 10 
86 5 E0856 ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE, RECOVERY 10 
87 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 10 







TAMCN Equipment Nomenclature Wave Assignment
89 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 10 
90 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 10 
91 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 10 
92 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 10 
93 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 10 
94 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 10 
95 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 10 
96 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 11 
97 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 11 
98 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 11 
99 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 11 
100 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 11 
101 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 11 
102 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 11 
103 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 11 
104 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 11 
105 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 11 
106 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 11 
107 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 11 
108 8 D0198 HIMARS LAUNCHER 11 
109 9 D1062 HIMARS RSV TRK,CARGO,7T XLWB (MTVR) 11 
110 11 E06X5 HIMARS RST (MTVR TRAILER VARIANT) 11 
111 9 D1062 HIMARS RSV TRK,CARGO,7T XLWB (MTVR) 12 
112 11 E06X5 HIMARS RST (MTVR TRAILER VARIANT) 12 
113 7 D0209 POWER UNIT, FRONT, 12 1/2 TON, 4X4 12 
114 12 D08XX Trl,r Mk xx Flat Rack (repl Mk14, Mk17, Mk18) 12 
115 7 D0209 POWER UNIT, FRONT, 12 1/2 TON, 4X4 12 
116 12 D08XX Trl,r Mk xx Flat Rack (repl Mk14, Mk17, Mk18) 12 
117 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 12 
118 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 12 







TAMCN Equipment Nomenclature Wave Assignment
120 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 12 
121 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 12 
122 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 13 
123 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 13 
124 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 13 
125 8 D1073 TRUCK, DUMP, 7T (MTVR)W/WINCH 13 
126 10 D0080 CHASSIS, TRLR, GENERAL PURPOSE, 3 1/2 TON, 2-WHL 13 
127 8 D1073 TRUCK, DUMP, 7T (MTVR)W/WINCH 13 
128 11 D0880 TRLR, TANK, WATER, 400 GAL, 1 1/2T, 2-WHL 13 
129 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 13 
130 10 D0085 CHASSIS, TRAILER, 3/4 T 2 WHEEL 13 
131 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 13 
132 10 D0085 CHASSIS, TRAILER, 3/4 T 2 WHEEL 13 
133 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 13 
134 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 13 
135 6 B0589 EXCAVATOR, COMBAT (ACE) 13 
136 6 B0589 EXCAVATOR, COMBAT (ACE) 14 
137 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 14 
138 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 14 
139 2 D1159 TRK, UTILITY, ARMT CARR W/SA 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP HMM 14 
140 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 14 
141 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 14 
142 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 14 
143 7 D0209 POWER UNIT, FRONT, 12 1/2 TON, 4X4 14 
144 12 D08XX Trl,r Mk xx Flat Rack (repl Mk14, Mk17, Mk18) 14 
145 7 D0209 POWER UNIT, FRONT, 12 1/2 TON, 4X4 14 
146 12 D08XX Trl,r Mk xx Flat Rack (repl Mk14, Mk17, Mk18) 14 
147 9 E06X4 HIMARS RSV TRK,CARGO,7T XLWB (MTVR) 14 
148 11 E06X5 HIMARS RST (MTVR TRAILER VARIANT) 15 
149 9 E06X4 HIMARS RSV TRK,CARGO,7T XLWB (MTVR) 15 







TAMCN Equipment Nomenclature Wave Assignment
151 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 15 
152 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 15 
153 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 15 
154 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 15 
155 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 15 
156 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 15 
157 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 15 
158 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 15 
159 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 15 
160 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 15 
161 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 15 
162 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 16 
163 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 16 
164 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 16 
165 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 16 
166 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 16 
167 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 16 
168 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 16 
169 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 16 
170 13 D1159 TRK, UTILITY, ARMT CARR W/SA 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP HMM 16 
171 13 D1159 TRK, UTILITY, ARMT CARR W/SA 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP HMM 16 
172 13 D1159 TRK, UTILITY, ARMT CARR W/SA 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP HMM 16 
173 13 D1159 TRK, UTILITY, ARMT CARR W/SA 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP HMM 16 
174 13 D1159 TRK, UTILITY, ARMT CARR W/SA 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP HMM 16 
175 13 D1159 TRK, UTILITY, ARMT CARR W/SA 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP HMM 16 
176 13 D1159 TRK, UTILITY, ARMT CARR W/SA 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP HMM 16 
177 13 D1159 TRK, UTILITY, ARMT CARR W/SA 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP HMM 16 
178 13 D1159 TRK, UTILITY, ARMT CARR W/SA 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP HMM 16 
179 13 D1159 TRK, UTILITY, ARMT CARR W/SA 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP HMM 16 
180 13 D1159 TRK, UTILITY, ARMT CARR W/SA 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP HMM 17 
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182 13 D1125 TRUCK,UTILITY, TOW CARRIER, 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP HMMWV 17 
183 13 D1125 TRUCK,UTILITY, TOW CARRIER, 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP HMMWV 17 
184 13 D1125 TRUCK,UTILITY, TOW CARRIER, 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP HMMWV 17 
185 13 D1125 TRUCK, TOW CARRIER 17 
186 13 D1125 TRUCK, TOW CARRIER 17 
187 13 D1125 TRUCK, TOW CARRIER 17 
188 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 17 
189 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 17 
190 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 17 
191 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 17 
192 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 17 
193 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 17 
194 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 17 
195 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 17 
196 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 17 
197 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 18 
198 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 18 
199 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 18 
200 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 18 
201 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 18 
202 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 18 
203 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 18 
204 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 18 
205 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 18 
206 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 18 
207 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 18 
208 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 18 
209 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 18 
210 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 18 
211 15 DX101 HMMWV (MANPADS) 18 
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213 15 DX101 HMMWV (MANPADS) 19 
214 15 DX101 HMMWV (MANPADS) 19 
215 15 DX101 HMMWV (MANPADS) 19 
216 16 D0308 SHOP SET, CONTACT MAINTENANCE 19 
217 16 D0308 SHOP SET, CONTACT MAINTENANCE 19 
218 17 D1002 TRK AMB, 2 LITTER, SOFT TOP, 1 1/4 TON HMMWV 19 
219 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 19 
220 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 19 
221 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 19 
222 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 19 
223 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 19 
224 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 19 
225 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 19 
226 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 19 
227 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 19 
228 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 19 
229 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 19 
230 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 19 
231 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 19 
232 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 19 
233 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 19 
234 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 19 
235 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 19 
236 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 20 
237 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 20 
238 1 E1888 TANK, COMBAT, FT, 120MM GUN 20 
239 1 E1888 TANK, COMBAT, FT, 120MM GUN 20 
240 1 E1888 TANK, COMBAT, FT, 120MM GUN 20 
241 1 E1888 TANK, COMBAT, FT, 120MM GUN 20 
242 1 E1888 TANK, COMBAT, FT, 120MM GUN 21 
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244 1 E1888 TANK, COMBAT, FT, 120MM GUN 21 
245 1 E1888 TANK, COMBAT, FT, 120MM GUN 21 
246 4 E0857 EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE (PERS) 21 
247 4 E0857 EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE (PERS) 22 
248 4 E0857 EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE (PERS) 22 
249 4 E0857 EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE (PERS) 22 
250 4 E0857 EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE (PERS) 22 
251 4 E0857 EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE (PERS) 22 
252 4 E0857 EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE (PERS) 23 
253 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 23 
254 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 23 
255 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 23 
256 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 23 
257 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 23 
258 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 23 
259 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 23 
260 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 24 
261 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 24 
262 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 24 
263 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 24 
264 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 24 
265 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 24 
266 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 24 
267 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 24 
268 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 24 
269 11 D0880 TRLR, TANK, WATER, 400 GAL, 1 1/2T, 2-WHL 25 
270 11 D0880 TRLR, TANK, WATER, 400 GAL, 1 1/2T, 2-WHL 25 
271 11 D0880 TRLR, TANK, WATER, 400 GAL, 1 1/2T, 2-WHL 25 
272 11 D0880 TRLR, TANK, WATER, 400 GAL, 1 1/2T, 2-WHL 25 
273 11 D0880 TRLR, TANK, WATER, 400 GAL, 1 1/2T, 2-WHL 25 
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275 11 D0880 TRLR, TANK, WATER, 400 GAL, 1 1/2T, 2-WHL 25 
276 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 25 
277 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 25 
278 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 25 
279 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 25 
280 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 25 
281 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 25 
282 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 25 
283 18 E0671 XM 777 LW155 25 
284 18 E0671 XM 777 LW155 25 
285 7 D0209 POWER UNIT, FRONT, 12 1/2 TON, 4X4 26 
286 12 D08XX Trl,r Mk xx Flat Rack (repl Mk14, Mk17, Mk18) 26 
287 7 D0209 POWER UNIT, FRONT, 12 1/2 TON, 4X4 26 
288 12 D08XX Trl,r Mk xx Flat Rack (repl Mk14, Mk17, Mk18) 26 
289 7 D0209 POWER UNIT, FRONT, 12 1/2 TON, 4X5 26 
290 12 D08XX Trl,r Mk xx Flat Rack (repl Mk14, Mk17, Mk18) 26 
291 7 D0209 POWER UNIT, FRONT, 12 1/2 TON, 4X5 26 
292 12 D08XX Trl,r Mk xx Flat Rack (repl Mk14, Mk17, Mk18) 26 
293 7 D0209 POWER UNIT, FRONT, 12 1/2 TON, 4X6 26 
294 12 D08XX Trl,r Mk xx Flat Rack (repl Mk14, Mk17, Mk18) 26 
295 7 D0209 POWER UNIT, FRONT, 12 1/2 TON, 4X6 26 
296 12 D08XX Trl,r Mk xx Flat Rack (repl Mk14, Mk17, Mk18) 27 
297 19 B2566 TRUCK,FORKLIFT ROUGH TERRAIN 4000 LB 27 
298 19 B2566 TRUCK,FORKLIFT ROUGH TERRAIN 4000 LB 27 
299 20 B2567 TRACTOR, RT, ARTICULATED STEER 27 
300 21 A0966 MEWSS 27 
301 21 A0966 MEWSS 27 
302 21 A0966 MEWSS 27 
303 8 D0198 HIMARS LAUNCHER 27 
304 8 D0198 HIMARS LAUNCHER 27 
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306 11 E06X5 HIMARS RST (MTVR TRAILER VARIANT) 28 
307 9 E06X4 HIMARS RSV TRK,CARGO,7T XLWB (MTVR) 28 
308 11 E06X5 HIMARS RST (MTVR TRAILER VARIANT) 28 
309 9 E06X4 HIMARS RSV TRK,CARGO,7T XLWB (MTVR) 28 
310 11 E06X5 HIMARS RST (MTVR TRAILER VARIANT) 28 
311 9 E06X4 HIMARS RSV TRK,CARGO,7T XLWB (MTVR) 28 
312 11 E06X5 HIMARS RST (MTVR TRAILER VARIANT) 28 
313 9 E06X4 HIMARS RSV TRK,CARGO,7T XLWB (MTVR) 28 
314 11 E06X5 HIMARS RST (MTVR TRAILER VARIANT) 29 
315 9 E06X4 HIMARS RSV TRK,CARGO,7T XLWB (MTVR) 29 
316 11 E06X5 HIMARS RST (MTVR TRAILER VARIANT) 29 
317 9 E06X4 HIMARS RSV TRK,CARGO,7T XLWB (MTVR) 29 
318 11 E06X5 HIMARS RST (MTVR TRAILER VARIANT) 29 
319 9 E06X4 HIMARS RSV TRK,CARGO,7T XLWB (MTVR) 29 
320 11 E06X5 HIMARS RST (MTVR TRAILER VARIANT) 29 
321 13 D1159 TRK, UTILITY, ARMT CARR W/SA 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP HMM 29 
322 13 D1159 TRK, UTILITY, ARMT CARR W/SA 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP HMM 29 
323 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 29 
324 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 30 
325 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 30 
326 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 30 
327 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 30 
328 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 30 
329 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 30 
330 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 30 
331 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 30 
332 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 30 
333 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 30 
334 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 30 
335 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 30 
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337 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 30 
338 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 30 
339 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 30 
340 17 D1002 TRK AMB, 2 LITTER, SOFT TOP, 1 1/4 TON HMMWV 31 
341 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 31 
342 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 31 
343 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 31 
344 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 31 
345 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 31 
346 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 31 
347 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 31 
348 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 31 
349 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 31 
350 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 31 
351 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 31 
352 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 31 
353 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 31 
354 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 31 
355 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 31 
356 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 31 
357 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 31 
358 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 32 
359 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 32 
360 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 32 
361 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 32 
362 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 32 
363 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 32 
364 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 32 
365 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 32 
366 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 32 
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368 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 32 
369 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 32 
370 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 32 
371 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 32 
372 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 32 
373 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 32 
374 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 32 
375 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 32 
376 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 32 
377 10 D0085 CHASSIS, TRAILER, 3/4 T 2 WHEEL 32 
378 10 D0085 CHASSIS, TRAILER, 3/4 T 2 WHEEL 32 
379 10 D0085 CHASSIS, TRAILER, 3/4 T 2 WHEEL 32 
380 10 D0085 CHASSIS, TRAILER, 3/4 T 2 WHEEL 33 
381 10 D0085 CHASSIS, TRAILER, 3/4 T 2 WHEEL 33 
382 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 33 
383 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 33 
384 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 33 
385 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 33 
386 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 33 
387 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 33 
388 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 33 
389 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 33 
390 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 34 
391 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 34 
392 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 34 
393 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 34 
394 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 34 
395 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 34 
396 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 34 
397 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 34 
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399 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 35 
400 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 35 
401 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 35 
402 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 35 
403 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 35 
404 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 35 
405 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 35 
406 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 35 
407 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 35 
408 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 35 
409 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 35 
410 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 35 
411 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 35 
412 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 35 
413 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 35 
414 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 35 
415 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 35 
416 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 35 
417 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 36 
418 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 36 
419 11 D0880 TRLR, TANK, WATER, 400 GAL, 1 1/2T, 2-WHL 36 
420 11 D0880 TRLR, TANK, WATER, 400 GAL, 1 1/2T, 2-WHL 36 
421 8 D1073 TRUCK, DUMP, 7T (MTVR)W/WINCH 36 
422 8 D1073 TRUCK, DUMP, 7T (MTVR)W/WINCH 36 
423 8 D1073 TRUCK, DUMP, 7T (MTVR)W/WINCH 36 
424 8 D1073 TRUCK, DUMP, 7T (MTVR)W/WINCH 36 
425 8 D1073 TRUCK, DUMP, 7T (MTVR)W/WINCH 36 
426 8 D1073 TRUCK, DUMP, 7T (MTVR)W/WINCH 36 
427 22 D1213 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT, WRECKER 36 
428 9 D1062 TRK,CARGO,7T XLWB (MTVR) 37 
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430 9 D1062 TRK,CARGO,7T XLWB (MTVR) 37 
431 9 D1062 TRK,CARGO,7T XLWB (MTVR) 37 
432 9 D1062 TRK,CARGO,7T XLWB (MTVR) 37 
433 9 D1062 TRK,CARGO,7T XLWB (MTVR) 37 
434 9 D1062 TRK,CARGO,7T XLWB (MTVR) 37 
435 18 E0671 XM 777 LW155 38 
436 18 E0671 XM 777 LW155 38 
437 18 E0671 XM 777 LW155 38 
438 18 E0671 XM 777 LW155 38 
439 23 B0114 BOAT, BRIDGE ERECTION 38 
440 23 B0114 BOAT, BRIDGE ERECTION 38 
441 23 B0114 BOAT, BRIDGE ERECTION 38 
442 23 B0114 BOAT, BRIDGE ERECTION 38 
443 23 B0114 BOAT, BRIDGE ERECTION 39 
444 23 B0114 BOAT, BRIDGE ERECTION 39 
445 24 B2561 TRK, FORKLIFT 39 
446 24 B2561 TRK, FORKLIFT 39 
447 24 B2561 TRK, FORKLIFT 39 
448 24 B2561 TRK, FORKLIFT 39 
449 20 B2567 TRACTOR, RT, ARTICULATED STEER 39 
450 20 B2567 TRACTOR, RT, ARTICULATED STEER 39 
451 20 B2567 TRACTOR, RT, ARTICULATED STEER 40 
452 20 B2567 TRACTOR, RT, ARTICULATED STEER 40 
453 20 B2567 TRACTOR, RT, ARTICULATED STEER 40 
454 25 B2460 TRACTOR, FT, W/ANGLE BLADE 40 
455 25 B2460 TRACTOR, FT, W/ANGLE BLADE 40 
456 26 B0ABV ASSAULT BREACHER VEHICLE (ABV) W/MINE PLOW ATTACHED 40 
457 6 B0589 EXCAVATOR, COMBAT (ACE) 40 
458 27 B2482 TRACTOR, ALL WHEEL DRIVE W/ATTACHMENTS 40 
459 27 B2482 TRACTOR, ALL WHEEL DRIVE W/ATTACHMENTS 40 
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461 7 D0209 POWER UNIT, FRONT, 12 1/2 TON, 4X4 41 
462 29 D0881 TRLR, RIBBON BRIDGE 41 
463 7 D0209 POWER UNIT, FRONT, 12 1/2 TON, 4X4 41 
464 29 D0881 TRLR, RIBBON BRIDGE 41 
465 7 D0209 POWER UNIT, FRONT, 12 1/2 TON, 4X4 41 
466 29 D0881 TRLR, RIBBON BRIDGE 41 
467 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 41 
468 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 41 
469 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 41 
470 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 41 
471 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 42 
472 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 42 
473 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 42 
474 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 42 
475 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 42 
476 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 42 
477 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 42 
478 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 42 
479 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 42 
480 14 AX001 MRC JTRS 42 
481 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 42 
482 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 42 
483 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 42 
484 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 42 
485 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 42 
486 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 42 
487 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 42 
488 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 43 
489 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 43 
490 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 43 







TAMCN Equipment Nomenclature Wave Assignment
492 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 43 
493 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 43 
494 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 43 
495 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 43 
496 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 43 
497 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 43 
498 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 43 
499 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 43 
500 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 43 
501 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 43 
502 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 43 
503 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 43 
504 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 43 
505 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 43 
506 2 D1158 TRK, UTILITY, CARGO TRP CARR 1 1/4 TON W/EQUIP, HM 44 
507 30 A3232 TRANSPORTABLE TACSATCOM (SMART-T) AN/TSC154 44 
508 10 D0085 CHASSIS, TRAILER, 3/4 T 2 WHEEL 44 
509 10 D0085 CHASSIS, TRAILER, 3/4 T 2 WHEEL 44 
510 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 44 
511 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 44 
512 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 44 
513 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 44 
514 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 44 
515 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 44 
516 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 44 
517 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 44 
518 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 44 
519 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 44 
520 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 44 
521 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 44 
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523 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 44 
524 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 44 
525 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 44 
526 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 44 
527 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 44 
528 10 D0850 TRLR, CARGO, 3/4T, 2-WHL 44 
529 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 45 
530 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 45 
531 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 45 
532 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 45 
533 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 45 
534 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 45 
535 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 45 
536 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 45 
537 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 45 
538 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 46 
539 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 46 
540 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 46 
541 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 46 
542 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 46 
543 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 46 
544 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 46 
545 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 46 
546 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 46 
547 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 47 
548 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 47 
549 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 47 
550 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 47 
551 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 47 
552 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 47 
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554 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 47 
555 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 47 
556 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 48 
557 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 48 
558 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 48 
559 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 48 
560 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 48 
561 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 48 
562 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 48 
563 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 48 
564 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 48 
565 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 49 
566 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 49 
567 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 49 
568 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 49 
569 8 D0198 MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 49 
570 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 49 
571 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 49 
572 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 49 
573 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 49 
574 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 49 
575 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 49 
576 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 49 
577 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 49 
578 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 49 
579 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 50 
580 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 50 
581 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 50 
582 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 50 
583 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 50 
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585 11 D0860 TRAILER, CARGO, 1-1/2T, 2-WHL, 50 
586 31 D0201 MOTORCYCLE, MILITARY, 2-WHL 50 
587 31 D0201 MOTORCYCLE, MILITARY, 2-WHL 50 
588 31 D0201 MOTORCYCLE, MILITARY, 2-WHL 50 
589 31 D0201 MOTORCYCLE, MILITARY, 2-WHL 50 
590 7 D0209 POWER UNIT, FRONT, 12 1/2 TON, 4X4 50 
591 29 D0881 TRLR, RIBBON BRIDGE 50 
592 7 D0209 POWER UNIT, FRONT, 12 1/2 TON, 4X4 50 
593 29 D0881 TRLR, RIBBON BRIDGE 50 
594 7 D0209 POWER UNIT, FRONT, 12 1/2 TON, 4X5 50 
595 29 D0881 TRLR, RIBBON BRIDGE 50 
596 7 D0209 POWER UNIT, FRONT, 12 1/2 TON, 4X5 50 
597 29 D0881 TRLR, RIBBON BRIDGE 51 
598 7 D0209 POWER UNIT, FRONT, 12 1/2 TON, 4X6 51 
599 29 D0881 TRLR, RIBBON BRIDGE 51 
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APPENDIX C – STAKEHOLDER QUESTIONAIRE 
 
1)  What value do you see the sea base to you? 
2)   Is there a capability gap with current military cargo platforms that would limit 
transportability from a sea base to the insertion point? Please describe in detail 
3)   For each operational scenario below what is the OPTEMPO for the ASE (please 
complete questions below with regard to each scenario) 
  a.     CONUS to sea base 
  b.     sea base to debarkation point (combat) 
  c.     sea base to debarkation point (humanitarian) 
  d.     Cargo on-load & off-load  
   i.      How fast does it need to be moved? 
   ii.     How far will it have to be moved? 
   iii.    What are the environmental conditions? 
iv.   Will the ASE require refueling while undergoing this mission? 
v.     What are the obstacles (man made or natural) that the vessel may encounter 
vi.    Will the ASE require defensive measures? (countermeasures, machine gun, 
signature reduction) 
 
4)   Under what sea states will cargo transfer take place? 
  a. What are the primary mission items that need to be moved? 
 b. What are the typical weather conditions one may have to operate in with 
regards to transit and cargo operations? 
 260 
c.   What is the daily required thru-put rate in terms of cargo type, tonnage, 
area, volume and deck point loads? 
  d.   How will the cargo be loaded and secured in the vessel  
e.   Will bulk, liquid, containerized cargo, personnel or a combination 
thereof be transported 
  f.    Will rolling stock be loaded  
  g.    How many trips per day are envisioned for one ASE  
 
5)   What other vehicles will the ASE be required to interface with (consider ships, 
aircraft, and other various operational military ground vehicles – be specific) 
  a.     Military  
  b.     Commercial 
  c.     Coalition / NATO 
 
6)  Based on previous military operations what is the one operational characteristic could 
make the ASE indispensable  
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Top Level Functions 
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